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## Near East/South Asia Report

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13 September 1985

## NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ALGERIAN, MOROCCAN MANEUVERING ON SAHARA ISSUE DESCRIBED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 31 Jul 85 pp 4-6

[Text]

Morocco has suffered further diplomatic reverses in a series of Western Sahara initiatives that include an attempt to persuade the UN secretary-general, **Perez de Cuellar**, to organise the long promised and often postponed referendum in the Western Sahara.

The election of **Mohammed Abdelaziz**, President of the **Saharan Democratic Republic (SADR)** as one of the OAU vice-presidents at the recent heads of state meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa, was seen in **Algeria** as representing a significant step forward in its diplomatic offensive. The forthcoming meeting of non-aligned countries will be the next arena for both countries to vie for support over the chronic Western Sahara problem. At the same time, a diplomatic storm is brewing between the two North African neighbours over Moroccan accusations of Algerian support for its dissidents abroad.

This current wave of diplomatic manoeuvring stems from Algeria's intense irritation with Morocco and **Libya** over the treaty of union they signed last August at the Moroccan border town of Oudja. Algiers interpreted it, correctly, as a deliberate Moroccan attempt to disrupt moves towards North African political unity which Algeria had initiated a year earlier through its treaty of concord and fraternity with **Tunisia**. That treaty, which provided for a 20-year period of close collaboration between Algeria and Tunisia, was signed on 19 March, 1983, and **Mauritania** joined it the following December. Since an essential element in the Algerian-inspired treaty was that those states that adhered to it would first of all resolve all outstanding border disputes between them - which, in practice, meant that they would accept the Algerian viewpoint whenever it was voiced - **Libya** found that it could not join in, even though it placed a formal request to do so in December 1983. Morocco clearly would not qualify while it continued the Saharan war.

Algeria's irritation was intensified when its leaders realised the proposed structure for the Morocco-Libya union was virtually identical to a Moroccan proposal made to Algeria the previous May. The new treaty was also open to any other state to join without the tacit restriction over border rectifications that existed in the Algerian alternative. This served to exacerbate Algeria's hurt pride. President **Chadli Benjedid** and his team decided that Morocco had no intention of making any compromise over North Africa's divisive problems, particularly Western Sahara. This conclusion was buttressed by the knowledge that, not only had Morocco avoided any move towards negotiations over a referendum for self-determination, as required by the OAU declarations in Nairobi in June 1981, but that the Moroccan policy of slowly extending its system of defensive walls would eventually make any such concessions meaningless.

In the pacified areas behind the earth wall system, Morocco has been translocating a local population, so that incoming Moroccans will outnumber indigenous Saharans and would thus guarantee a favourable result in any referendum. (AC Vol 26 No 8).

Last October Algerian leaders decided that a unified diplomatic and military campaign was the only realistic response to what it saw as Moroccan and Libyan duplicity. On the one hand, Polisario was given access to Algerian supplies of modern weapons, to make up for the severance of supplies from Libya, which had been scaled down a year earlier and which, by 1984, had virtually stopped. These included SAM missiles and BMP-1 Soviet-made armoured vehicles that carry sophisticated anti-tank equipment, so that Polisario's *Saharan People's Liberation Army* (SPLA) could launch its "Greater Maghreb Offensive". This has consisted of a campaign of rolling attacks on the defensive wall system, as it approached to within 20 kms of the Algerian frontier and, more recently, as the fifth wall in the system was extended south-westwards from Amgala towards the coastal town of Dakhla.

Algeria also engaged in a new diplomatic offensive. The first stage of this was to ensure that the OAU should allow SADR to take up its seat accorded to it as an African member state in February 1982. Until November 1984, SADR had never participated in major OAU deliberations because of the danger of a Moroccan walkout and the consequent break-up of the organisation. This time Algerian diplomats decided to force a showdown. In part this was prompted by **Nigeria** which had made it clear that it was no longer prepared to tolerate Moroccan pressure in the OAU.

The Algerian government has continued to push other states into recognising the SADR. The US authorities have resisted Algerian pressure to force Morocco into making concessions though Congress was more willing to consider the proposals. Not only was there considerable sympathy, orchestrated by Congressman **Howard Wolpe**, of the Foreign Affairs Committee, but US annoyance with Morocco over the treaty with Libya, America's arch enemy, has meant that there are now fears that future US military aid to Morocco may be cut. White House signals to Hassan, an inveterate Washington visitor, indicated that he is not welcome because of the Sahara issue and the treaty with Libya.

Morocco has not been idle. In March, five personal emissaries were sent by King Hassan to explain the Moroccan position to 20 countries in the Middle East and Africa. He has begun also to repair diplomatic bridges with those states from which he had severed diplomatic relations over recognition of the SADR. First came **Mexico** in June and then, earlier this month, relations were restored with **Angola**, nine years after they were broken. Behind this move is the intention to exert pressure on states which seemed to be open to persuasion to resist condemning Morocco over its Western Sahara policies.

Morocco persuaded Libya not to invite SADR as a member of the Arab-African Conference which should have been held in Tripoli in April. Part of the justification for this move was that the Saharan issue was no longer a proper issue for African states to consider. Morocco clearly wishes to move the issue into the Middle East where it knows it still enjoys support from moderate states.

In recent weeks, the issue has become acute again. The OAU, following its declared policy of concentrating on Africa's economic problems rather than the political issues, such as Libya's occupation of northern **Chad**, or the Western Sahara, ignored the Saharan issue during its heads of state meeting in Addis Ababa last month.

However, its election of the SADR president could be interpreted as an insult to the absent Morocco.

Nonetheless, Morocco managed to persuade de Cuellar to visit Rabat to discuss a UN-monitored referendum in the Sahara. The UN secretary-general apparently considered this move as a breakthrough and was heard to voice a series of sanguine views over an imminent settlement in North Africa. His involvement did not last long - no doubt because his staff made it evident that any UN participation which did not also include the OAU would meet stiff resistance from other African states. As a result, de Cuellar extricated himself gracefully from the Moroccan embrace.

During the OAU conference, the Moroccan press announced that a group of Moroccan exiles had been discovered trying to cross the Moroccan-Algerian frontier to convey arms to unnamed accomplices inside Morocco. The Moroccan security services had, according to minister of the interior **Driss Basri**, been watching the group for two months and were fully aware of its plans. The minister also hinted that the Algeria intelligence services had been involved in organising the attempt – a claim that was promptly denied in Algiers.

The timing of the incident in relation to the OAU conference suggests Morocco needed to demonstrate Algerian duplicity in claiming a purely moral role over the Saharan issue while supporting groups designed to undermine the legitimate government of a neighbouring state. Some observers recalled that on a previous occasion Algeria had accused Morocco of similarly supporting a dissident group in Kabylia with weapons and explosives. The truth behind this recent incident is not known, although the Moroccan authorities claim to have many more facts to reveal.

Although Morocco appears to have achieved a degree of military success in the Sahara, it has not excelled internationally. Its support in the West may still be solid, but Algerian determination in the face of what Algerian leaders see as Moroccan dishonesty may lead to an embarrassing defeat at the non-aligned meeting. Despite Morocco's belated awareness of the danger and its attempts to mitigate it – either by a diplomatic campaign of its own or by attempts to discredit Algeria's behaviour towards its neighbours – the attempt might come too late. The significance of this manoeuvring is still not clear. Provided support in the Arab world and in the West remains solid, Morocco can pursue its chosen course in the Sahara, preferably with UN support.

The critical question is whether Algeria is prepared to support Polisario to the extent of risking war with Morocco by trying to attack Morocco's solid backing in the West or the Middle East. If it is, then diplomatic manoeuvring is likely to move to the forum of the Arab League ●



REGIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

FORD, OTHERS OFF BOYCOTT LIST--Beirut - The Arab League had ended the boycott of the Ford Motor Company and movies featuring actor Omar Sharif stating they have no links with the Zionist entity, Lebanon's AL SHARQ newspaper said yesterday. The Arab office for the Boycott of Israel, a Damascus-based organization controlled by the Arab League, decided to lift the boycotts on Wednesday. Lebanese singer Jamet Fagal, known as Sabah, was also cleared. The office based its decision about the US corporation on documents proving Ford no longer has links with the Zionist entity. The Ford boycott was imposed in 1967 after it set up an assembly plant for jeeps in the Zionist-occupied Palestine. The plant was closed subsequently because it was losing money. Eight other companies were also taken off the blacklist - Colgate Palmolive Co. (United States), Imetal S.A. (France), Bayer A.G. (West Germany), Cheverton Laidler Ltd, RGB Stainless, Royal Food Products (Britain), All India Medical Corporation and Pacific Manufacturing Co (New Zealand). Another 13 companies were told they would automatically be allowed to operate in Arab countries after a six-month wait. They include Durametalllic Corporation of the US, Allied Foods of Britain and two Indian firms. [Text] [Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 19 Jul 85 p 11 GF]

CSO: 4400/223

ALGERIA

POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR STRAINED RELATIONS WITH FRANCE NOTED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 31 Jul 85 p 5

[Text]

President Chadli Benjedid's government is upset by France's apparent tilt towards Morocco in the Western Sahara war. In early June the commander of the French army, Gen. Jeannou Lacaze, visited Morocco partly to discuss the sale of French military hardware, which would probably be paid for by Saudi Arabia. The news was greeted most frostily in Algiers, where French prime minister Laurent Fabius and foreign minister Roland Dumas were received with obvious reservations.

Algiers believes the reason for France's friendliness with King Hassan is the latter's position as an intermediary between France and Col. Gadaffi over Chad. Chadian president Hisssein Habré's recent visit to Rabat was presumably a result of dialogue between Tripoli and Rabat. But the Algerians also reckon that Gadaffi himself believes negotiation, in almost any circumstances, is a sign of weakness, and that therefore a very forceful policy is needed to check his regional ambitions.

There are two other issues between Algiers and Paris: former president Ahmed Ben Bella's political activities in Paris, and the growing anti-migrant worker attitude in France. The Algerians want Ben Bella's activities curtailed so he cannot diffuse his propaganda to the 800,000 Algerians working in France. (His supporters were rounded up in several towns at the start of the summer). Despite earlier assurances to the French ambassador in Algiers, François Scheer, that the anti-French press campaign (AC Vol 26 No 12) would stop, recent editions of the official French-language weekly, *Révolution Africaine*, have continued in the same vein.

As previously noted, the anti-French campaign is part of the power-struggle at the top of the Algerian elite. The pro-American

faction behind prime minister Abdelhamid Brahimi and foreign minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi has subtly joined forces with the pro-Soviets in the semi-clandestine *Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste* (PAGS), partly to counter Chadli's own preference for France. PAGS is strongly represented in the media, hence the energy of France-bashing. A far-reaching consequence of the new understanding between PAGS and the pro-Americans could be a move to prevent Chadli from standing for a third term of office. They are seeking to change the *Charte Nationale* (the constitution) accordingly.

A new source of tension will probably be the planned renegotiation of the price France pays for Algerian liquefied natural gas (LNG). After adjusting downwards the price it pays for Dutch and Soviet gas, the French company, *Gaz de France*, has launched an offensive to reduce its purchase price, now about 15% above the market, of Algerian gas. The Algerian hydrocarbon monopoly, SONATRACH, has resisted, sticking to the 1982 arrangement signed by presidents Chadli and Mitterrand, whereby France agreed to pay a "political" price for Algerian gas. The deepening economic crisis no longer permits such extravagance. New talks are scheduled for next year.

The Algerians have been cutting back their purchase of French goods. Instead, they have encouraged commercial contracts with Spain, Italy and Belgium. France's monthly trade deficit with Algeria has now reached FF500m. If the gas talks take a bad turn, the Algerians will certainly resort to other European countries for three large contracts - a car assembly plant, modernisation of the telephone system and the Algiers metro ●

CSO: 4500/186

EGYPT

EFFECTS OF U.S. AID DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 9 Jul 85 pp 3, 9

[Article by 'Abd-al-Qadir Shahib: "U.S. Pressures on Egypt Intensify Because of New Crisis in Foreign Currency; an American Report Admits that U.S. AID Is Responsible for Price Increases and Subsidy Reductions in Egypt"]

[Text] Egypt's interest payments on its U.S. military loans were late several times this year. In 1985 these payments amounted to about 500 million dollars; next year they will rise to 650 million dollars.

Because of these delays Egypt came very close to losing all its new military and economic aid from the United States. U.S. law bars any country that is late in making its interest payments or its payments on debts to the United States from receiving any new financial or military assistance.

That is why several months ago the Egyptian government submitted a request to the American administration asking for approximately a billion dollar increase in U.S. aid to Egypt next year. Half the amount requested would be urgent aid that Egypt would receive immediately to help her pay back her delinquent debts to the Americans. Egypt's prime minister, Mr Kamal Hasan 'Ali justified his government's request for additional U.S. aid in statements he gave THE WASHINGTON POST. The prime minister said that Egypt's foreign currency resources had declined.

The United States of America was thus given an opportunity to intensify its pressures on us. Because it is privy to the secrets of our economic as well as our non-economic affairs, the United States siezed that opportunity and did not waste it.

The United States is applying this new pressure on us because it wants to achieve a combination of three objectives. First, the United States wants to continue the process of changing the Egyptian economy and turning it into a clearly defined capitalist economy, putting an end once and for all to any role the state may have in the life of the economy. The United States wants to link Egypt's economy with the economies of western capitalist countries, chiefly the American economy. The United States' second objective is to sieze Egypt's Ra's Banas Base. Finally, the United States wants to improve Egyptian-Israeli relations and push the course of normalization between Egypt and Israel forward in different areas.

These three objectives can be summed up into only one objective: to control Egypt's foreign and domestic policies. During the past 3 years, the years that followed the assassination of al-Sadat, the United States noticed a decline in Egypt's official obedience to U.S. policy. That was revealed by a U.S. State Department survey of how countries voted during the past 3 years in the United Nations. During that time Egypt voted 78 times against the United States, especially on Israeli practices in the occupied land, on Arab and Palestinian rights and on the rights of Third World countries.

That is why the American administration saw the new crisis that is about to hit the Egyptian economy as its opportunity to restore the official obedience that Egypt had manifested during al-Sadat's administration.

#### American Admissions

There are numerous signs of this intensifying U.S. pressure on Egypt that reveal its objectives.

Foremost among those signs are the American admissions themselves. The most candid of these American admissions that pressure was being applied to Egypt were those that were included in a report by the Agency for International Development [AID] to the U.S. Congress for fiscal year 1985.

The report clearly states that "The United States' principal objectives in its program of financial aid to Egypt are manifested in the achievement of peace, stability and security in the area. The United States wants to broaden the scope of the current peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and it wants to induce all the principal countries in the Arab-Israeli dispute to achieve a peaceful and a comprehensive settlement. Egypt is considered the principal center from which these objectives can be achieved."

The report also states, "The program," that is, the financial aid program, "served U.S. interests by allowing Egypt to maintain its commitment to peace with Israel and to the process of establishing peace in the Middle East. Egypt has also continued to support the interests of the free world in the Middle East and in the Horn of Africa."

The report also states, "The aid program has shown the United States' support for Egypt's involvement in the process of establishing peace in the area. It has also shown the United States' support for Egypt's growing movement towards a marketplace economy, that is, a capitalist economy."

American admissions go even further when the report states that "The government's recent price hike measures were due in part to a dialogue on policies between the government and AID." The agency also made a significant contribution in the area of subsidies for consumer goods. It supervised studies on food policy, and it consulted with senior officials of the Egyptian government. The political choices [the government had to make] became evident after these studies and consultations were completed. Competition was to be encouraged. That is why the Egyptian government's 1983-1984 budget sought to cut 400 million dollars in food subsidies.

Thus, the United States admits quite innocently that it was behind the price increases and the reduction in subsidies for the poor and for people on fixed incomes. Before that, the United States admitted that it had used financial aid to force Egypt to continue its commitment to the Camp David accords and policies. AID's report promises that U.S. efforts in this regard would continue.

Besides this American admission there were numerous other pieces of evidence that revealed the magnitude of the pressure that was being applied to Egypt. The aim of that pressure is to control Egyptian policies.

This evidence can be found in the retractions Egypt made in its official economic policies and in its official relations with Israel as well.

The most notable retraction in the area of the economy was that which affected some of the steps that had previously been taken to set the right course for importing goods from abroad. It was announced that the government intended to allow anything to be imported into the country, but that high tariffs would be imposed on commodities whose imports the government wanted to reduce. Such a method cannot succeed as long as there are groups of people whose consumption is excessive.

The fact that the government changed its mind about setting the right course for imports was accompanied by a retraction of price regulations. Fixed prices for new kinds of goods were also abolished to confirm the orientation toward a marketplace economy. This is what the United States of America wants for our economy, so that it could be easily controlled.

As far as official relations between Egypt and Israel are concerned, the chill that had come over those relations in the aftermath of Israel's invasion of Lebanon underwent a thaw, and those relations were back to what they were during al-Sadat's administration. In some cases they were even more cordial.

Official political communications between Egypt and Israel were resumed with the meeting that took place last September in New York between Dr 'Isamat 'Abd-al-Majid, Egypt's minister of foreign affairs and Yitzhaq Shamir. That meeting, which was held during the UN General Assembly meetings, was the first meeting between Egypt's and Israel's ministers of foreign affairs in over 2 years.

That meeting opened the door to intense high-level political communications between the Egyptian and Israeli governments. Cairo received more than one Israeli envoy, chief among whom were Israel's minister of energy and Ezer Weizmann, Israel's minister of state. More than one Egyptian envoy were also received in occupied Jerusalem. The last Egyptian envoy to go there was 'Abd-al-Hadi Qandil, minister of petroleum; he was the first Egyptian minister to visit Israel in almost 3 years. But the most prominent of these Egyptian visitors was Dr Usamah al-Baz, President Mubarak's personal envoy. Dr al-Baz went to occupied Jerusalem even though he has been harshly criticized by Israeli newspapers as the person who is impeding the progress of normalization efforts between Egyptians and Israelis.

## Pressures Cause Retractions

These intense political communications between the Egyptian and Israeli governments were responsible for a few Egyptian official retractions on the Taba situation, on the return of the Egyptian ambassador to Israel or on the resumption of normalization efforts with Israel. But the most prominent of these retractions may be:

--Egypt retracted its position of refusing to conduct talks on Taba with the Israelis in a European country, and it has agreed to having these talks held in Beersheba, Israel where these talks were held last March.

--Egypt retracted its position of refusing to link the special talks on Taba with normalization efforts and with bilateral relations between the two countries, and it accepted the principle of conducting comprehensive talks on all these topics at Mena House in Cairo last June. This gives Israel more leeway to bargain politically.

--Egypt modified or reduced its conditions for returning the Egyptian ambassador to Israel. The first condition that Egypt had made was that of returning Taba to Egypt. That is what the president had said in an interview with THE WALL STREET JOURNAL last December. Since then the president did state that condition repeatedly. Now, however, after retractions have been made, that condition is restricted to a statement about "announcing arbitration on Taba and identifying a committee and setting a schedule for completing the operation." President Mubarak made that announcement in his Labor Day address last May 1.

--Normalization efforts between Egypt and Israel, which were frozen during the past 3 years, have been resumed. The efforts that are being made now are faster and more energetic. Import and export permits to four Israeli firms have been approved by the Egyptian government, which is actually importing Israeli oil. Egypt has also agreed to pay new compensation to Israel for the water pipes that Israeli troops left behind in Sinai. Special talks between Egypt and Israel regarding such compensation had been suspended after Israeli troops invaded Lebanon.

The Egyptian government also entered into new agreements with Israel to import diesel fuel from Israel, and it sent a delegation from the Ministry of Agriculture to Israel to conduct talks on the development of barren land.

In return, Israel's minister of oil sent Mr Mahir Abazah, Egypt's minister of electricity, a large file containing information on power stations. This is in preparation for the creation of some kind of cooperation in the field of energy, which is what the Egyptian government had requested from Israel.

And Israeli tourists are once again coming to Egypt. More than 34,000 Israeli tourists have visited Egypt, and the Egyptian government has promised that the number of Egyptian tourists traveling to Israel would be increased. The Egyptian government also promised it would put an end to anti-Israeli campaigns in Egyptian newspapers.

To put it briefly, the course of normalization has been revived. Of course, U.S. pressures are responsible for that. This is what the American newspaper, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR admitted when it said last January that the United States was urging Egypt and Israel to resume their efforts to normalize their relations. Israel, of course, does not need to be urged in that regard.

There is nothing new about these new and growing pressures. Foreigners usually apply pressure during years of hardship.

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EGYPT

GRADUAL APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC LAW ADVOCATED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 16 Jul 85 p 6

[Article by 'Umar al-Talmasani: "The Gradual Application of Islamic Law"]

[Text] This religion has been perfected, and with it God's blessings to Muslims have been bestowed. "This day I have perfected your religion for you and completed My favour to you. I have chosen Islam to be your faith" [al-Ma'idah: 3]. Interpreting, explaining or expounding such an unequivocal text would be pointless since what is permissible is evident, and what is forbidden is also evident. No Muslim who has an ounce of faith can claim that he would pursue a gradual approach to sanction what is permissible or ban what is forbidden. There is absolutely no room for opinions or wavering in this regard. People who talk their way around this issue, clouding its clear meaning are only wasting their efforts in more ways than one. I will not respond to those who said that I have softened my demand for the application of Islamic law. I do not understand how anyone can make such a statement! The people who have suffered bitterly since 1918 because of their demand for the application of Islamic law--they've been tortured, driven out of their homes, their property was confiscated, and some were even killed--are not the ones who are reconsidering their demand for the application of Islamic law. And when were they supposed to have started reconsidering this issue? When all political parties called for the application of Islamic law and made that demand the first item in their elections brochures! Would it be acceptable or even reasonable to reconsider the matter after such success has been achieved? What then do I mean by calling for an orderly and gradual application of Islamic law? Let me explain.

First, the former speaker of the People's Assembly, Dr Sufi Abu Talib sent me a complete copy of the work that was done on the application of Islamic law by the People's Assembly Religious Affairs Committee. Others had taken part in that effort. I thanked Dr Sufi for this favor that he had shown me, but, [I wonder], what will become of that effort?

Second, [this proposed plan for the application of Islamic law] will be presented to the People's Assembly where a deliberate and careful discussion of each article will take place.

Third, all these statutes will not be presented at once; they will be presented one at a time. After all the statutes have been presented, the law will be



issued and published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette], and it will become effective on the date of publication.

Fourth, is there anything else that those who have been calling for the application of Islamic law--and I am one of them--can do? Is not this a gradual approach to the application of Islamic law?

Fifth, when this subject comes up for discussion in the People's Assembly, it will be the right or the duty of those who have this code in their possession to take part in that discussion. Is not this a gradual approach?

Sixth, the present speaker of the assembly, Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub decided that he would purge all the laws from everything that is incompatible with the precepts of Islamic law. Is not the end result the same in both cases?

Seventh, when the present speaker of the assembly sets forth this idea, doesn't the assembly have the right and the obligation as well to discuss these violations in each statute one at a time? Is not this a gradual approach?

Eighth, Egypt's international circumstances are unlike those of other Islamic countries. Would it not be acceptable to take such circumstances into account without having to get excited and take risks whose consequences are known only to God? Taking such risks may cost us some of that freedom that we are exercising today. I cannot say any more on this point in particular. Everyone who is involved in politics inside the country and abroad knows this and more. A display of arrogance in this regard would be embarrassing and awkward; only those who are unaware of what is going on would resort to that.

Ninth, since the present speaker of the People's Assembly promised that he would purge all statutes of everything that is incompatible with the laws of God, would it not be more useful and beneficial to ask him to live up to his promise? After all, a free man has an obligation to keep his promise, and a free man will. To a free man anything else would be unacceptable. Wouldn't this be more useful and beneficial than an involvement in conflicts and challenges that would have a lasting effect on people's feelings and impede progress without any legitimate reason? Those who wish to rush matters have used God as an excuse and have thus absolved themselves by their religion. What is left for such people is to become messengers of peace. They are to bring people together and reconcile them with each other instead of letting us confront each other in front of the public in a manner that is acceptable to no one. Whose interests are being served by that?

Tenth, judges and lawyers have been dealing with certain statutes for scores of years. They are familiar with and accustomed to them. Would it be possible to shift at once from the far left to the far right? Anyone who says that is possible gives no consideration to the nature of things, and fair-minded people would not stand for that.

Eleventh, is it not incumbent upon colleges of law to begin teaching students the civil, criminal, commercial, defense, investigative and other aspects of the canonical law of Islam so when they are asked to prosecute a case and make judgements, they would know what they are doing?

Twelfth, if the government begins applying any law that is derived from the canonical law of Islam, then the process of applying the law of Islam would have begun, and retreating from that course becomes impossible. If the government were to retreat from that course, public opinion, from which the government derives support, would be angry. Is not this the gradual application of Islamic law? And here I would urge the assembly and the government to take the first steps toward the application of Islamic law. After all, the journey of a thousand miles begins with one step.

Thirteenth, if the canonical law of Islam is not applied, can any official in Egypt make any counter claims about what is permissible or what is not? Haven't these matters been settled already, regardless of whether or not that official has approved them or not? God's judgment is carried out, and His laws remain in effect no matter how much time passes. God did promise that His law would be upheld. And who is it amongst us who has discharged his promises to God? No one!

Fourteenth, there are numerous matters that I know of, but there are others who are more knowledgeable about these matters than I am. I am therefore obligated to intervene in the matter, but I will do so calmly and diplomatically to spare myself many shocks that could come my way if the steps I take were unwise or unbalanced. The canonical law deals leniently with those who act under duress, giving them more leeway than what is permitted under ordinary circumstances.

Beyond that, let me tell everyone who is interested that I pledged to God that no matter what I had to face, I would continue to demand the application of His laws until I die. Unlike those who look for what is shameful in others' conduct to exonerate themselves, I will be careful about what I say and write so I would not slip into such practices and accuse people about their intentions and objectives. None of this concerns me as long as God is not displeased with me. "Lord, You have knowledge of all that we hide and all that we reveal: nothing in heaven or earth is hidden from You" [Ibrahim: 38]. I make no claims to being right, and I ask God's forgiveness for me and for those who wrong me. To them, I will say nothing more than "May the peace of God be with you!"

This is not an apology for an opinion that I subscribe to; it is rather a clarification intended for those who did not understand what I've been seeking. But I will leave those who know what I've been seeking and still oppose me to God Who can see through people's deceptions; He knows what they do not reveal. I have never defended what I wrote or said because I am confident about what I write, whether people like it or not. I am confident that my purpose in what I say or write is the cause of God Almighty. If I were to try and avoid people's wrath and court their pleasure in what I write, I would forfeit the protection of God which I now have because it's only His pleasure that I seek. A group of people may be dissatisfied with this statement, and another may be satisfied with it. Since neither group can bring about any benefit or harm to itself, I need not fear its wrath or court its pleasure. Let me declare here and now that I will be happy to respond to every objective reaction to my article, but I will cite this passage from the Koran in response to vilification and ridicule: "...Walk humbly on the earth... [al-Furqan: 72]. One man told another, "So and so is saying damaging things about you." The other man said, "I will not be vexed by what he says; he is tempted by the devil. May God forgive him and me." I will abide by the morals of the Koran: "... he that forgives and seeks reconciliation shall be

rewarded by Allah" [al-Shura: 40]. I will conclude these illustrations of the noble Koranic conduct by citing God Almighty: "To endure with fortitude and to forgive is a duty incumbent on all" [al-Shura: 43]. I invite all people to follow this high road of conduct, and I ask God to hear and accept our pleas. God Almighty has authority over what we say.

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EGYPT

DISCUSSION, REFUTATION OF SOVIET BOOK ON ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 9 Jul 85 p 6

[Article by Justice al-Dimirdash al-'Aqali: "A Discussion of the Latest Book by Brimakov, Director of the Institute of Orientalism at the Academy for Soviet Science; Revolution and Islam: Islam Preceded Other Religions in Condemning Clergymen's Deviant Practices; Ideas on Religion Should Be Reexamined, and Marxist Point of View on Religion Should Be Reevaluated"]

[Text] Ever since it attracted the interest of researchers in the various branches of human knowledge Islam has continued to be of equal interest to the proponents of acquired knowledge and the masters of cognition: those whose thoughts wander in the metaphysical realm or those whose thoughts do not stray beyond the laws of nature.

There is nothing unusual about the fact that all these people have been interested in Islam and that the reasons for their interest in it are different. This is because Islam was revealed to confirm the truth of the Koran. It proved that the words of the Koran and their applications were honest and that the Koran had faithfully reported on everything.

Since Islam addresses the mind and appeals to its judgment, and since it calls for the careful consideration and proper verification of matters, it would hardly be appropriate if it were to become intolerant of the results of any sound rational process, even if those results appeared to the learned and the erudite to be different from what they know and had become accustomed to.

Islam's receptivity to properly acquired knowledge and sound perceptions is the product of the fact that its universe combines the invisible world and the visible world, or the world of the supernatural and the natural. But Islam retains the characteristics of each world and deals with each world on its own terms. According to Islam, this is not a matter of combining two separate worlds into one universe; it is rather a matter of blending together into one world two different stages of life: the stage of this life and that of the hereafter.

It is this blending together of two stages of life that gives Islam its unique course which is based on invariables, and those guarantee its stability and steadfastness, and on variables, and those allow it to change and move forward.

The invariables of Islam manifest themselves in faith in God and His angels, His books, messengers and the Day of Judgment. The variables of Islam, however, have to do with understanding the characteristics of human activity on earth. This activity depends on the facts, laws and transformations of matter. These transformations interact negatively or positively with man's activities. This means that such interactions are always dynamic and, at the same time, they seem to move in one direction that may not be set back or reversed. It is essentially a movement that is generally geared toward progress.

That is why it is only through his faith and actions that a Muslim's convictions become consistent with the proper course of the Koran. Through faith a Muslim can deal with the invariables of the invisible world, and through his actions he can deal with the variables of the visible world that we live in. In fact, the proper introduction to faith in the invisible world in Islam's point of view requires one to have a proper understanding of the material objects of the visible world. Whenever the Koran called upon people to believe in the invisible world, it also urged them to contemplate the material world as well.

For example, God Almighty said, "Let them reflect on the camels, and how they were created; the heaven, how it was raised on high; the mountains, how they were set down; the earth, how it was levelled flat" [al-Ghashiyah: 17-20]. God Almighty said, "Let man reflect from what he is created" [al-Tariq: 5]. God Almighty also said, "Say: 'Roam the earth and see how Allah conceived Creation'" [al-'Ankabut: 20]. This means that acquiring a proper understanding of the secrets and laws of matter is the ideal way to have a stable and a well-grounded faith.

Muslims must also observe and contemplate the fact that if they deal satisfactorily with the invariables of religion but their actions fall short of dealing satisfactorily with the variables, their faith will be like a tree that bears no fruit. This is because such faith is a passive kind of faith that cannot effect any change in life. God Almighty says, "Allah does not change a people's lot unless they change what is in their hearts" (al-Ra'd: 11). It is most hateful to Almighty God when Muslims merely pay lip service to their faith, and their feelings are inconsistent with what they say and do. God Almighty said, "Believers, why do you profess what you never do? It is most odious in Allah's sight that you should say one thing and do another" [al-Saff: 2-3].

At the same time the Koran shows that if a person deals adequately with the substance of life in accordance with its laws and dynamics and makes a serious effort to plan and carry out his actions, he will be able to reap the fruits of his labor regardless of his faith or the lack of it. God Almighty says, "Those that desire the life of this world with all its frippery shall be rewarded for their deeds in their own lifetime: nothing shall be denied them" [Hud: 15].

This is Islam, the culmination of God's actions to honor mankind. Its great miracle is the Koran, which frees the minds of those who read it from the slavery of imitation and gives them freedom to think. The Koran has set guidelines for this freedom of the mind to help people think along more appropriate lines. These guidelines provide Muslims with guidance and give them a sense of focus and a sense of direction. They do not restrict and paralyze thought, creating thereby a state of inertia.

The earliest Muslims discovered the dignity of exercising their minds; to them thinking was a religious duty they carried out. They learned the lessons that knowledgeable experts taught them, and they put those lessons to good use. The earliest Muslims believed that action was the first step to faith as well as its ultimate reward. They took action and they acted with skill, and their actions changed their world and indeed the lives of the societies of their age. They were able to determine with accuracy the effects that the course of history's subsequent events will have on these societies so that progress for mankind could be achieved.

These Muslims were then succeeded by those who were divided by their whims and appetites for extravagance and waste. Some of them thought that acquired knowledge could be preserved by making it impossible for the human mind to grasp this knowledge and master it.

They were thus denying themselves the blessing of exercising the mind and thinking, an activity mentioned and urged repeatedly by the Koran. They also forbade the process of reviving and rejuvenating the Koranic text, a process that evolves when these texts interact with the material world. Hence, the gap grew between what was said and done and between theory and practice, and the roots of inertia took hold.

If this, the last of the revealed religions did not foster its own secret for survival, Muslims would have forced it into the caves of history with their backward movements and the lethargy of their religious scholars. It is Islam's dynamic and self-renewal attributes that soon restore to it its early purity. This is the interpretation of what God Almighty says, "It was We that revealed the Koran, and shall Ourselves preserve it" [al-Hijr: 9]. The messenger, may God bless him and grant him salvation said, "Allah sends upon my nation in each century someone who will rejuvenate its religion." Or he said something to that effect.

This is the historical and contemporary reality of Islam. It attests to the fact that Islam's endurance, which manifests itself in faith, and its dynamic quality, which is manifested in the actions of Muslims, have enabled Islam to continue exercising its influence on all events even at this stage in contemporary history when Muslims are politically weak. This appeared to perplex and contradict what many researchers had considered indisputable and self-evident regarding the connection between the influence of a religious doctrine and the power and integration of a society that professes that doctrine.

This perplexity was expressed by Professor Dr Yevgeniy Brimakov, director of the Institute of Orientalists, which is affiliated with the Academy of Soviet Science. Dr Brimakov wrote: "The Islamic surge that came late in the seventies and in the early eighties took bourgeois political scientists and especially American political scientists by surprise despite the fact that the United States of America since World War II had been devoting more attention to contemporary Islamic issues than any other country in the West.

"After traditional Islamic countries won their national independence, a few American scholars started talking about the need to find a new and effective

middle ground solution between Muslims and non-Muslims that would be consistent with the circumstances and requirements of the current stage. If traditional Islam and contemporary bourgeois institutions were to converge, liberal Islamic countries could be kept within the sphere of imperialist influence.

"But the revival of Islam as a political force prevented traditional Islamic countries and bourgeois institutions from coming together, and American historians and sociologists continued to believe that religion's involvement in the process of politicizing the masses was temporary and would not last long. They also took the anti-imperialist tendency in the growing Islamic solidarity movement too lightly.

"And time proved that these predictions and appraisals were inaccurate.

"It seems that the discussion must revolve around Islam as an energetic and stable factor of political life in the Islamic countries of the East. Islam's powerful influence on political life and the relative stability of that influence is explained by the fact that about 800 million persons--not including Muslims in the socialist world--make up the majority of the population in 35 countries and an influential minority in 18. Besides, Islam is proclaimed as the official state religion in many countries.

"Throughout its 1,300-year history Islam continued to exercise effective influence on the life of society. During the early days of Islam the Muslim population was historically extremely devout. Like any other religion, Islam has a direct effect on relations in the family and in society. Islam preserves the traditions of society. Besides, one attribute of Islam may be summarized by saying that the Koran and the canonical law of Islam comprise the principles that define for man the moral guidelines and rules of conduct that he should follow not only in the family and in society, but also in his personal life and in his economic and social activities. To believers Islam is not merely a religion; it is also a way of life."

After demonstrating that western circles, the United States of America in particular, had failed to understand the scope of Islam's influence on events in the Middle East and had been caught off guard by what he called the Islamic surge that ushered the revolutionary process in Iran, the scholar Brimakov concluded his study by presenting a general overview of Lenin's idea of the social essence of a religious movement and the high regard the Soviet leader had for anti-imperialist Islamic movements. In this regard Mr Brimakov said, "Lenin has always taught revolutionaries to take into account the social essence of a religious movement and its position in the international confrontation between imperialist and socialist forces.

"Like the international communism that he founded, Lenin proclaimed his high regard for those anti-imperialist Islamic organizations and movements which included the broad masses in their ranks. In 1919, for example, while responding to a question from an American journalist on the tactics the Russian Soviet Republic was employing with Islamic countries, Lenin stated that the Soviet state's actions toward Muslims abroad stem from a desire to support the free and independent development of every nation. Lenin stated that the Soviet state

rejected absolutely everything that would consolidate the persecution of toilers in civilized capitalist countries by the capitalist minority in those countries. Lenin also stated that the Soviet state rejected the persecution of hundreds of millions of toilers in the colonies of Asia, Africa and elsewhere.

"In 1923 the address of the Executive Committee for International Communism to the leader of the anti-imperialist Islamic Indonesian Organization, (Sirikat Islam), stated that despite the differences between the issue of international communism and that of (Sirikat Islam), those differences did not constitute an obstacle to their common struggle and to the unification of their efforts against imperialism.

"On the other hand, Lenin's attitude toward Islamic political movements characterized those movements as ideological conflicts against representatives of the exploiting classes who use Islam as an intellectual cover to protect their own interests. Those exploiting classes use Islam to mobilize the masses so they can achieve their reactionary political objectives. Lenin was always calling for the need to merge a relentless struggle against using religion to bring about anti-revolutionary objectives and the utmost degree of goodwill toward the Islamic masses."

Brimakov made this statement in the conclusion of his study: "Lenin, the great leader of the world's proletariat, had always devoted much attention to consolidating the efforts of atheist and non-atheist toilers in the struggle against imperialism. Lenin wrote, 'The unity of this revolutionary struggle by the oppressed class to create a heaven on earth is truly more important to us than the unity of the proletariat's views on heaven in the afterlife'."

The scholar, Brimakov wrote some of what we cited above in his book entitled, "The East after the Collapse of Colonialism." Brimakov devoted part of the third chapter in the book to a study entitled, "The Influence of Traditional Factors: Revolution and Islam." That section may be found on pages 77 to 85 of the book. The book was published by Progress House in Moscow in 1985. The author had given Mr Hamid Zaydan, editor-in-chief of AL-SHA'B, a copy of the book as a gift, and Mr Zaydan was kind enough to let me examine it. He also asked me to study the book and comment on it.

Below, I will analyze and comment on Mr Brimakov's views, proving what I believe to be the truth as I see it as a Muslim.

God speaks the truth, and He guides us to the right way.

Early in his discussion on revolution and Islam Dr Brimakov said, "There are traditional historical factors that affect revolution in the east and define its characteristics. Besides, the various components of revolution mature at different rates. Naturally, revolution is not the product of traditions, as some Islamic ideologues affirm; it is rather the product of a class struggle. And yet, the worship of traditions damages the class struggle, distorts its meaning and imposes modes of conduct on it that are alien and unknown to it. In some cases these modes of conduct can be abnormal."



Dr Brimakov also said, "The influence of religion is not restricted to Islam. And yet, the influence of religion on revolution in liberal countries, especially after the decline of colonialism, became more evident in Islam in particular."

Dr Brimakov then backs up his statement by citing a report by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to the party's 26th Congress on what he called, "The Influence of Traditions in General and Islam in Particular on the Revolutionary Process in the East."

What attracts attention in Dr Brimakov's statements in these and similar paragraphs throughout this study is his recurring characterization of Islam in particular and religion in general as the worship of traditions. Brimakov then denies that revolution can be the product of such traditions, and he affirms that it can only be the product of a class struggle.

But to characterize Islam as the worship of traditions or certain kinds of traditions is to make a statement that is not supported by facts. Brimakov provided neither proof nor evidence to back up that statement. The only support for such a statement may be found in Marxist tradition which usually describes religion in these terms because its judgement on religion is based on the outside appearances of some of those who profess that religion. But a proper scientific examination would not judge a religious course or denomination unless that judgement is based on an argument that is derived from the religion itself or specifically from one of the indisputable sources of its ideas. A serious scholar has no excuse if he prejudges any religious doctrine without referring to its confirmed sources, unless he is denied access to them either because they do not exist or because they are not available to him. A scholar may then be excused for describing a religious doctrine whose sources he cannot check by repeating misconceptions about that doctrine. His descriptive accounts would continue to stand as mere conjectures that cannot be confirmed with certainty. Such conjectures must always be qualified, and caution must always be observed in accepting or amending them.

But in the case of Islam Brimakov was unfair when he attributed to Islam characteristics that have nothing to do with Islam, even though what he said is a common error publicized by Islam's enemies and by those who know nothing about it. There can be no acceptable excuse for a scholar who takes part in promoting such an error.

This is because Islam is unique among the religions of mankind: it has two important characteristics that no fair-minded scholar would overlook. These two characteristics are:

1. The existence of a confirmed and incontrovertible source, which is the Holy Koran.
2. The clarity of the historical movement of Islamic society. When we check the Koran, we find that its wise texts tell us clearly that imitation is objectionable. The Koran condemns those who are captives to tradition. It attributes the reasons for loss of faith and loss of guidance to the fact that children

imitate their parents' actions and beliefs without investigating them or scrutinizing them. Read what God Almighty says, "When it is said to them: 'Follow what Allah has revealed,' they reply: 'We will follow that which our fathers practised,' even though their fathers were senseless men lacking in guidance" (al-Baqarah: 170).

God Almighty said, "Thus, whenever, before you, We sent an apostle to warn a nation, those who lived in comfort said: 'This was the faith our fathers practised; we are merely walking in their footsteps.' Each apostle said: 'What if I bring you a religion more enlightened than your fathers'?' " [al-Zukhruf: 23-24].

Thus, anyone who says that Islam is the worship of tradition, or that it places any value on any custom that may be considered traditional cannot advance his argument in the face of unequivocal passages in the Koran that denounce imitation and imitators. These passages in the Koran rule out any merit for traditions that have no objective merit on their own to justify their survival.

Early Islamic society, a society in which the facts about Islam manifested themselves more than they did in any subsequent society, stood out because of its dynamic events and the lives led by its men. Early Islamic society was never a society that yielded to traditions, no matter what they were. Islamic society was founded and established to represent a revolutionary society--a most profound revolution against pre-Islamic traditions. When one considers the fact that Islam describes a society that follows tradition as a society of ignorance, one realizes how profound was the revolution that Islam brought about in the face of traditions. This clears Islam of the charge that it is in any way imitative or traditional, not to mention Mr Brimakov's characterization of Islam as the worship of traditions!

In fact, the battle which non-believers in Quraysh and in the Arabian Peninsula fought against Islam from day one has been chronicled, and its events and incidents are well-known. Pre-Islamic non-believers had declared that war to defend their worn-out and unjust traditions from Islam's rebellion against those traditions that the non-believers had become accustomed to. Their idolatrous practices were nothing but a cover for the worship of power and racial and class discrimination. They considered worshipping more than one god and practising racial discrimination the means by which masters could annihilate the enslaved and the weak and continue to exploit them.

How then did Professor Brimakov come up with his statement about Islam being a form of worshipping traditions when passages in the Koran show unequivocally the course of history in the lives of Muslim men?

A relevant explanation for this unjust accusation may be found in two points that we mention by way of giving Mr Brimakov the benefit of the doubt regarding his integrity and scientific accuracy.

The first point is that Mr Brimakov did not have adequate information about the course of Islam and about Islamic history in action.

The second point is that he compares Islam to other religions, particularly the religious practices and functions of members of the church's clergy before the

socialist revolution. The Rasputin-like practices of these clergymen had a tragic effect which left no doubt that religion, as far as these practices were concerned, had become some kind of tradition used to benumb people's senses. As the Marxists said specifically, "Religion is the opiate of the people."

And yet it is fairness based on an accurate knowledge of Islam which soon exonerates that valuable religion from the religious practices of the church's clergymen, especially the clergymen who were employed in the kaiser's court. Those clergymen used religion as a vehicle for their appetites: they issued pardons to wrongdoers and sinners who gave them lavish gifts, and they denounced and condemned those who tried to free people from the shackles of superstition.

The fact is that Islam was the first religion to condemn the deviant practices of clergymen who used religious rites and rituals to deceive people and take their property away from them. The Koran condemned and exposed such practices 13 centuries before the socialist revolution condemned and exposed them, and it did so more vehemently and more effectively. Although the revolution declared war on religion on the basis of rejecting the practices of clergymen serving in the Petersburg court, and although it expressed that rejection by coining the incisive phrase that religion is the opiate of the people, the Koran had condemned such practices before that, and it had threatened woeful punishment and agony to those who engage in such practices.

God Almighty said, "Believers, many are the rabbis and monks who defraud men of their possessions and debar them from the path of Allah. Proclaim a woeful punishment to those that hoard up gold and silver and do not spend it in Allah's cause" (al-Tawbah: 34).

Accordingly, whereas communism, as the late Sayyid Qutb said in his book, "Ma'rakat al-Islam wa al-Ra'simaliyah" [The Battle of Islam and Capitalism], was a doctrine that suffered a great deal from clergymen as it struggled to destroy the kaisers' rule and give the masses the necessities of life which they had been deprived of," we believe that after the socialist revolution achieved its uncommon victory, it no longer had the need to use religion as a cover for its ideas. This was a formula that was dictated to it by the conditions of the revolution's birth and by the kaiser's violent methods, which were supported by the clergy's terrorism. And yet the socialist revolution will not be able to further the ideas of social justice that it has been promising unless it reexamines its ideas on religion and does not yield to those statements that were dictated by the circumstances of the revolution's birth. If the revolution yields to those statements, it will be victimized and imprisoned by those same traditions against which it claims to be rebelling.

It was fortunate that what Dr Brimakov dubbed the Islamic surge that took the world by surprise early in the eighties disproved all the predictions and appraisals that American imperialists had tried to use to bring traditional Islam and contemporary bourgeois institutions together for the purpose of keeping liberal Islamic countries within the sphere of imperialist influence.

It was also fortunate that Soviet ideas, represented by Dr Brimakov, realized the significance of that idea which he expressed in the following statement: "The discussion should center around Islam as an energetic, constant factor in the political life of Islamic countries in the East."

Soviet leader Lenin had realized that earlier when he recognized the close relationship between the efforts of all toilers, non-believers as well as believers, in their struggle against imperialism. Lenin wrote: "The unity of the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed class to create a paradise on earth is more important to us than the unity of the proletariat's opinions on paradise in heaven." The time has come for Marxist thought to take a step further toward uniting the efforts of all toilers to create a paradise on earth. This would be a preliminary step to becoming worthy of a place in paradise in heaven. According to the standards of Islam, there is no contradiction between what toilers do to create a paradise on earth and becoming worthy because of those actions of a place in paradise in heaven.

As far as I am concerned, I think that in general what Dr Brimakov mentioned in his valuable study constitutes a positive movement in the direction of taking the step that Marxist thought has to take to reexamine religion and re-evaluate the Marxist point of view on religion. I think that pursuing that course constitutes the most important aspect of the real challenge scholars face in their quest for social justice on earth. I would think that one of the most difficult tasks they would have to face and that would frustrate many of their efforts would be that contrived dispute between those who are motivated by religion in their search for justice and those who are seeking the same justice but who for non-objective historical reasons cannot imagine that such justice can be achieved without the destruction of religion.

It is this contrived dispute that American imperialism and client regimes which are associated with it are relying on. Putting an end to that dispute, or at least defusing it, would not only serve the truth--and by that we mean the historical and doctrinal aspects of the truth--but it would also provide a decisive response to all imperialist attempts to exploit religion and to use it as a mask to cover up imperialism's ambitions and inhumane practices. Any attempt to put an end to that dispute is an attempt in favor of realizing the humanity of man wherever he is. Accordingly, every effort should be made to put an end to that dispute regardless of the obstacles.

The first ingredient in that contrived dispute that attracts a scholar's attention to the need to put an end to it is that difficulty which Dr Brimakov described in the first part of the study (page 67).

Dr Brimakov said, "Naturally, the revolution is not the product of traditions, as a few Islamic ideologues affirm; it is rather the product of a class struggle." If we noticed that Dr Brimakov was talking about Islam when he used the term, "traditions," and referred to religion, [we may conclude that] what he meant or what he thinks is the key to the dispute is as follows:

Revolution is not the product of Islam as a few Muslim ideologues affirm; it is rather the product of a class struggle. Does Dr Brimakov think that Islam ignores that class struggle or that it minimizes its effect in revolutionizing the human spirit? Didn't Islam furnish that struggle with the knowledge and direction that any scholar in the humanities should become aware of? We will resume our discussion, God willing, on Islam's attitude toward the class struggle.

EGYPT

PRESS ORGANIZATION, OWNERSHIP, CENSORSHIP DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 17 Jul 85 p 3

/Article by Hasan Badawi: "Twenty-five Years After Organization of the Press, Journalists Say Organization Was Necessary and Its Re-examination Is More Urgent"/

/Text/ Those who work in the press and look after its affairs reply in the negative.

Everyone agrees that the national press is in reality an official press because it represents the government and its party. Its heads and editors'-in-chief owe their loyalty to those who appoint them and have taken the place of the government's censor.

Everyone agrees on the need to change the rules and regulations governing press institutions in order to conform to a multi-party society and about the need for journalists and their unions to draw up such rules and regulations themselves without waiting for official legislation from above. Here are the details.

Nationalization of the Press

This year marks the 25th anniversary of the decree, enacted 20 May 1960, organizing the press.

According to this presidential decree, the ownership of the AKHBAR AL-YAWN, Dar al-Hilal, AL-AHRAM and ROSE AL-YUSUF Organization was turned over to the National Union. This legacy was then passed on to the Socialist Union and thereafter to the Shura Council, which is still a front for the ownership of the press organizations. According to Dr Ahmad al-Sawi, dean of the journalism department at the American University of Cairo, the true owner is the government.

Dr al-Sawi added:

During 1979 to 1980, the state formed a committee, called the Press Organization Committee, to review the status of the press following the abolition of the Socialist Union. This committee proposed several forms

of ownership (cooperative, press employee ownership, joint stock companies). However, the majority rejected these proposals, wanting instead to establish government ownership of these organizations through another front. Hence the Shura Council, which was created to represent the new front to take on the role of owner.

#### Ownership in Form

On 11 March 1975 a presidential decree was issued to form a supreme council of the press. The decree included a provision that employees of press organizations would have 49 percent ownership of their organizations.

Mahmud Sami, former secretary of the Journalists Union, believes that ownership of each organization by the Shura Council and the press employees is in name only. An employee, for example, cannot sell any of his shares and the Shura Council does not exercise its rights of ownership. The organizations do no more than submit a budget to the Supreme Press Council, which has never debated a budget or issued guidelines. He emphasizes that the problem of ownership is the quintessential problem of the national press.

On the other hand, 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdullah--member of the Supreme Press Council, member of the Journalists Union board between 1957 and 1964 and union representative between 1971 and 1983--believes that Shura Council ownership is true ownership. The council appoints the president and the editor-in-chief of the press organization and half of the board members. It also entrusts administrative and fiscal supervision of these organizations to the Supreme Press Council.

Anyhow, this is not how the story started.

#### Enthusiastic Welcome

When the presidential decree for the organization of the press was issued in May 1960, it was welcomed by all the newspapers. For example, the main headlines in the 25 May 1960 edition of AL-AKHBAR read as follows:

- "Newspapers Are for the People"

- "AKHBAR AL-YAWM, AL-AHRAM, AL-HILAL and ROSE AL-YUSUF Turned over to National Union"

- "Half of Press Organizations' Net Profits for Employees and Workers"

- "Press Is Part of Popular Organization Not Under Administrative Apparatus."

Headlines in the same newspaper on 26 May 1960 read as follows:

- "For These Reasons President Turns over Press Ownership to the People"

- "Millions of Citizens Had Opinions About Colors of Newspapers"

- "Some Topics Diverted Youth from Right Path"

- "Age of Exploiting Press for Individual or Group Interests is Gone"

The main headlines in AL-AKHBAR on 30 May 1960 were as follows:

- "'Abd-al-Nasir Talks About the Press"

- "Press Must Be a Mission Rather Than a Commodity and a Business"

- "The Society We Want to Build Is Not One of Nightclubs and Entertainment"

- "The Press Has a Right and Indeed a Duty to Open Criticism"

- "Cannot Imagine Any Logic for Slander Campaigns Against People's Private Lives"

- "If We Want to Have a Press, It Must Serve Our Noble Society"

- "We Must See Our Problems to Find Right Solution"

'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah said:

Mustfa Amin wrote more than once that he and his brother, 'Ali Amin, the founders of AKHBAR AL-YAWM, had intended to turn over ownership of the organization to their employees prior to the organization decree. This is what Ihsan 'Abd-al-Quddus, who was abroad and welcomed the decree upon its issuance, did as well.

AL-AHRAM correspondent Mustafa Bahjat Badawi explained the general phenomenon of welcome as a state of revolutionary exuberance after the revolution reached its climax with the union with Syria in 1958 and after we established our entity by living through the 1956 tripartite aggression with great success, turning defeat into victory, and after the Egyptianization decisions and the nationalization of Misr Bank in February 1960. That is why everyone welcomed the decree. Moreover, the decree included benefits for press employees whereby employees were granted half of the profits and the other half were earmarked for renovations in the press organization. In other words, the government was not after material gains from the press.

Why Nationalization?

Everyone agrees that it was natural for the press organization decree to be issued at that time and was in keeping with the existence of one political organization and with the then economic, social and political guidelines.

Even if some opinions differ on its issuance a quarter of a century later, much of its water flew into the river of Egyptian society during it.

Journalist Union secretary Jalal 'Arif said:

After the revolution the national and regional movement led by 'Abd-al-Nasir embraced all political currents. Economic, social and political developments imposed a new reality which some of the press leaders failed to grasp at the time. It was unreasonable that when Egypt was preoccupied with the Egyptianization, construction and Arab unity battles, some newspapers made the defection of a fashion model their primary issue, which occupied their leadlines for days and days. During the change-over to socialism, we had the formula of a single political organization which included the labor force. It was logical that the press be a model for this reality and this is what the press organization law achieved.

#### Death of the Murderer

There were some strange headlines prior to the organization decree. For example, AL-AKHBAR's main headlines on 10 April 1960 were:

- "Death of the Murderer"

- "'Abd-al-Nasir in Pakistan"

The top headlines were about the death of the then well-known murderer Mahmud Sulayman and the bottom one, about the visit of 'Abd-al-Nasir to Pakistan.

Were these headlines some of the reasons for the issuance of the decree?

Jalal 'Arif replied:

I do not think so. I was with AL-AKHBAR at the time and this headline in particular was the result of a technical error due to the omission of a third headline separating the other two.

About the reasons for issuing this decree, 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah added:

There were a large number of newspapers whose financial sources were not subject to control. Some were financed by foreign parties and advertisements had a great influence on the orientation of the press.

#### Decree in Its Framework

Mustafa Bahjat Badawi added:



'Abd-al-Nasir explained the reasons for the decree in a conference he held at the time. He said the press was an important tool, but unfortunately its attention had moved away from the interests of the masses to follow sensationalism, personal events and show-business personalities; that it was controlled by capital and advertisements; and that it was a dangerous weapon that had an influence on public opinion.

The decision must be put in the framework of the change in 'Abd-al-Nasir's thinking at the time and in the framework of the revolution's experiences in the fifties, including internal and external conspiracies against it, and the emergence of antirevolutionary trends and tendencies in that period's press. This is different from our current evaluation of the decree 25 years after its issuance. When we look at it from an abstract point of view, we find that it contains additions the purpose of which could have been served without total nationalization.

#### Nationalization and Freedom

Nationalization of the press is still in effect to this day, with the exception of the partisan press. The Sadatist governments of the seventies began their era by dismissing over 100 journalists from Socialist Union membership and removing some of them from office while transferring others to non-journalist jobs. When the partisan newspapers came out, AL-AHALI was systematically pursued and confiscated right after the Camp David accords until it closed down. The press tragedy reached its peak with the September 1981 massacre, when six opposition newspapers and magazines were confiscated. The events of that period clearly demonstrated how the government tightened its grip on non-partisan newspapers.

Did the sixties witness such suppression of the press? Was that period free of serious press battles and freedom of expression?

Jalal 'Arif replied:

The negative aspects of the sixties cannot be compared to the positive ones. The press at that time was one of the weapons of the entire Arab nation in its battles. Contrary to some opinions, the press in that period witnessed intellectual battles and differences of opinion and all the forces had their chance to express their opinion. A review of the "opinion" page in AL-AHRAM at that time, for example, reveals a diversity of opinions, as did the "cultural" page which was a reflection of a rich cultural life in which all writers from Rashad Rushdi to Na'man 'Ashur sparkled.

Mustafa Bahjat Badawi said:

The statement that censorship was imposed from 1939 until cancelled in February 1974 is incorrect. I was editor-in-chief of AL-JUMHURIYAH from 1964 to 1965 and there was no censorship. There were editorials criticizing

the regime, including the famous one by Sa'id Khayyal in AL-JUMHURIYAH in 1967 in which he criticized the military organization. There were numerous articles criticizing the public sector and the Socialist Union for its bureaucracy and isolation from the people. ROSE AL-YUSUF took many critical positions and cartoons played a prominent role even in AL-JUMHURIYAH, which was the newspaper of the revolution. Freedom is relative and there was a measure of freedom, but at the same time some restrictions were placed on journalists' independence. Whims played a certain role in the sixties and there was a type of obscuring of the severe excesses before 1967, which I believe were some of the causes of the 1967 defeat.

#### Limited Freedom and Breathing Space

Mahmud Sami believes that the press of the sixties was the press of one opinion and one party and was directly subject to government guidelines and sanctioned tendencies.

However, this period witnessed certain criticisms against the government and numerous press battles in which different opinions were put forth.

All these matters were within certain boundaries acceptable to the government. Following the 1967 war, it was in the regime's interests to open a window or a breathing space for the people to vent their suppressed emotions over the 1967 war. Furthermore, disagreement between the political organization and the military organization necessitated raising these subjects, particularly since post-1967 war political logic had the decisive word or tried to wrest the initiative from the military organization as a means of disclosing the reasons and secrets behind the 1967 defeat. There was also disagreement between some Socialist Union leaders and press leaders, which raised subjects critical of Socialist Union actions.

#### Censorship Always

'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah said that the press of the sixties was following the socialist line and it was natural when society is shifting from capitalism to socialism to impose censorship. That period was not all black as some allege. There was criticism--albeit within bounds--which, while it gave socialists the opportunity to advocate socialism, placed restrictions on those who opposed it. Censorship was not something new and did not stop with the end of the sixties. Censorship was instituted at the beginning of World War II in 1939 and has continued until now, although it was lifted in February 1974 when it was replaced by the editor-in-chief, the actual and tougher censor. Moreover, there is a press office at the Ministry of Information, but the real and most dangerous censor is the editor-in-chief because he implements the policy of the one who appoints him.

### 'Abd-al-Nasir Intervenes

Journalists also relate what happened during the first half of the sixties when ROSE AL-YUSUF waged a long campaign against public-sector deviations. Mahmud al-Maraghi wrote consistently for over 2 years and the directors of public-sector companies lodged repeated complaints at board meetings. Prime Minister Zakariya Muhyi-al-Din then intervened, calling for production and board meetings during which the directors met with 'Abd-al-Nasir to convey their grievance to him. The reply of 'Abd-al-Nasir was:

I cannot stop the press from revealing mistakes, but I will look into what is being published. And if the director is at fault, I will bring him to account and, if the journalist is at fault, I will him to account.

Thus, 'Abd-al-Nasir did not side with the public sector despite the fact that it was one of the features of revolutionary transition and was considered the regime's main protege.

The question is, what happened next?

### Information Newspapers

During the seventies, according to Jalal 'Arif, the economic, political and social reality changed, thus helping to bring out the press' negative experiences and obliterate its positive ones. National press organizations were no longer able to embrace the different political currents. Today, there are parties which own newspapers that express their views and political forces which are deprived of both parties and newspapers. We have national organizations which are national in name only while they are in fact party of the government. Undoubtedly, the freedom to form parties and publish newspapers, with control over their sources of finance, will take care of many of the shortcomings of the current situation, but the problem of official newspapers, which has, through erroneous practices in light of changing political conditions, turned into private estates owned and run by their presidents, will persist. Under this new situation, the Egyptian press has been falling technically and professional and no longer has any notable positive influence, neither in Egypt nor in the Arab world, after losing its credibility and turning into something of a news bulletin. This situation will not be corrected by imported technology and modern machinery, notwithstanding the need for such things, but rather by developing these newspapers and turning them into a political expression of what is going on in the country. It is true that the last 3 years have witnessed a limited relaxation, that some previously banned writers have found their way to the reader and that the press has experienced some diversity of opinion. This, however, has been a very limited way under a regime that puts the appointment of organization presidents in the hands of the government and their future in that of the ruler.

## We Confiscated AL-AHALI!

Mustafa Bahjat Badawi had this to say about the press of the seventies:

The idea to lift press censorship was, unfortunately, only the result of al-Sadat's detente with America and not out of a true belief in democracy. Hence, the process was closer to being a "decor" than a judicious judgment. I have much evidence in this regard in al-Sadat's speeches as well as positions, including: "Democracy has teeth and claws," "blowing away the journalists," press office controls press institutions" and "the well-known battle between al-Sadat and the free press represented by AL-AHALI under the name of the left platform, which was confiscated more times than it was published in the name of the law, which was devised to serve al-Sadat's whims." Al-Sadat always used to say in his meetings: "We have confiscated AL-AHALI" and "AL-AHALI publishes banalities." I used to reiterate at the time that I was ready to discuss word by word and from the legal and political point of view what AL-AHALI used to publish. That was intended to protect al-Sadat's sheltered person as well as his family and servants from the opponents of the open-door policy. Things got so that he was fed up with the freedom of the press which, deep down, he did not believe in. So he dealt his famous blow in September 1981, which ended with the advent of 6 October 1981. Today, there are broad freedoms in objective criticism and there is coverage. The real beneficiary is the masses. The press shows no deference to the desires of the rulers because this is true democracy.

## Censorship of Colors

Censorship, according to Mahmud Sami, has been around for a long time. The censor, who used to come to the newspaper with instructions from the press office of the Ministry of Information, has been replaced and the term "instructions" has been toned down to "guidelines."

Mahmud Sami holds the editors-in-chief responsible, saying:

Censorship is now voluntary because the press office no longer issues binding instructions to the newspapers. It only gives guidelines or pointers which the editor-in-chief is free to honor or disregard if he deems such an action in the interest of the newspaper's policy and not incompatible with the government's general policy.

Ahmad Sawi had the following to say about dualism in the press today:

I do not at all understand the existence of the Shura Council. It is supposed to be a legislative council that owns the mass media. The Shura Council does not represent true ownership since it cannot control the sources of finances of the press organizations which are in reality self-directed. The ownership is, in reality, a political ownership and we now have dualism: government-owned newspapers which always side with

the government--this is the real reason for the limited distribution of the National Party newspapers because the newspapers in general reflect the government's viewpoint and, therefore, there is no need for a ruling party newspaper--and the other team of newspapers, the opposition press which are owned by the parties and are in financial trouble and suffer from a newsprint shortage and therefore may have to shut down.

I believe that the government must immediately take its hands off the press organizations, which were nationalized in 1960. There is a great discrepancy between the salaries of editors in the general press and the opposition press and a greater discrepancy in the amount of newsprint available to these two kinds of newspapers. There is a gross inconsistency between the totalitarianism governing the national press organizations and the freedom exercised by party newspapers.

#### "End the Debate" Law

The Journalists Union held several seminars in 1979-1980 to look into the ownership of the so-called national newspapers. According to 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah, some demanded that ownership be held by the organizations's employees while others called for cooperative ownership. The members demanded the election of the editor-in-chief for a limited term subject to renewal so that the newspaper may reflect independent opinion and so that loyalty would not be to a power that has the right to hire and fire. Suddenly the power-of-the-press law was promulgated in 1980 after which seminars stopped and discussion ceased.

Mahmud Sami believes that the idea form of ownership is to make press organization employees the major shareholders, thus giving them the majority of seats in the general assembly and the board of directors. In view of the fact that they emerge from the base and do not belong to the government, we would have served the interest of such employees. The board of directors and the editor-in-chief must be elected from the general assembly or the board of directors while specific precepts for both positions must be set so as to guarantee the selection of the best elements for this national task.

#### Reform is Possible with a Condition

Jalal 'Arif believes that reform in the national organizations can be done in several ways through a system that renders these organizations truly national and avoids the negative features of private capital ownership and the dominance of a single opinion. An effort has to be made to study the required reforms.

Dr al-Sawi and Jalal 'Arif said the following alternatives have been put forward:

-To keep the ownership of the organizations public, provided that they are placed under the leadership of the Supreme Press Council representing all political currents.

-Cooperative membership for press organization employees and the selection of editors-in-chief through a democratic process.

-Conversion of these organizations into joint-stock companies with a ceiling on ownership.

The important thing with regard to these and other proposals is to have a clear goal, which is that these newspapers reflect the political currents, that they be run in a democratic way and that the absolute powers of the organization presidents be eliminated.

While Mustafa Bahjat Badawi demands that the union call the journalists to a meeting to prepare a working paper in this regard to be put forward at the highest levels, Jalal 'Arif, the union's secretary general, emphasized that this is the basic issue before the union now and the union has to find a solution to it without waiting for legislation to fall on it from above, imposing an unhealthy reality, as happened in the past.

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EGYPT

NEW NPUG CENTRAL COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP PROFILED

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 17 Jul 85 p 7

/Article by Hasan Badawi: "Over Half of Central Committee Members Are Newcomers"/

/Text/ For the first time, new NPUG labor, farm, youth, women, university professor and education leaders have joined the central committee, making up over half of its membership.

This was a reflection of the formation of the party's second general conference, made up of nearly 700 members from the various governorates, and an expression of the expansion and spread of the party structure to new governorates and the enrollment in the party of new forces from the various political currents.

Who are these new leaders? What have they offered? And what priorities do they put forth for the upcoming phase?

AL-AHALI tried, with difficulty, to obtain answers from some of these new leaders during the few breaks between the central committee meetings held 2 days after arduous and continuous efforts during the general conference sessions.

In March 1984, prior to the People's Assembly elections, the NPUG Party succeeded in creating an organizational structure in the North Sinai Governorate. This structure started with 100 members and grew to 250 within a year, a ratio of 2.5 for every 1,000 inhabitants, which is the highest membership rate in the governorates. The party succeeded as well in rebuilding its organizational structure in Matruh Governorate.

Party activity in the rest of the country's governorates was uninterrupted. It grew and was mirrored in the consolidation of the organizational structure and in its increasing mass influence. All this was reflected in the membership of the party's general conference and the formation of its new Central Committee.

For example, five members from the North Sinai Governorate were elected to the new central committee. They are: Muhammad 'Ubayd 'Ayish, Saqr Hasan Saqr, 'Azmi al-'Abd Husayn, Mamduh 'Ubayd 'Ayish and Ashraf Ibrahim Salih. All are new young leaders entering the party's central committee for the first time and range in age between 25 and 35.

Furthermore, Matruh Governorate offered the central committee three members, all from among the new leaders. They are: Mamduh Raghieb al-Darbali, Dr 'Adil 'Abd-al-Karim Mahmud and Musa Muhammad Musa.

Port Sa'id Governorate sent to the central committee 5 new members out of a total of 6; Qina, 6 new members out of a total of 7; al-Minufiyah, 9 new members out of a total of 12; and Aswan, 6 members out of a total of 12.

### History of Struggle

Muhammad 'Ubayd 'Ayish, central committee member and NPUG secretary for North Sinai Governorate, said:

"The political history of the NPUG members in the governorate is one of struggle. There were different forms of armed resistance against the enemy undertaken by the governorate's masses of which we were a part. The main form of struggle under the occupation, however, was adherence to the land and steadfast resistance to the enemy's attempts to drive the people from the land in order to convert it into settlements, particularly in the areas of Yamit, Abu Shannar, Rafah and Shaykh Zuwayd."

Muhammad 'Ubayd pointed to an important phenomenon in the party structure in North Sinai, represented in its rapid growth. In only 1 year, membership jumped from 100 to 250 members to reach a party population ratio of 1:440, for a population of 110,000 individuals, a rate unsurpassed in several old governorates.

The party last year also succeeded in creating in the governorate a women's organization and progressive youth federations. The governorate's Progressive Youth Federation is almost equal to its counterpart in the governorates of Cairo and Giza from the viewpoint of strength and efficacy. It puts out its own publications regularly. The party last year published in the governorate 12 non-periodical publications, distributed through press distribution outlets for a nominal fee.

### Priorities

Muhammad 'Ubayd went on to say:

"Our priorities which we shall put forth through our presence in the party's central leadership will be represented in better services in remote and nomadic areas; better conditions for fishermen, laborers and craftsmen; resistance to corruption and deviation in local and executive agencies; and the propagation of party ideology among the broadest sector of the population.



"We base our vision of the national issue on our governorate's reality. We want to enrich the party's struggle experience with our own struggle experience, which is suffering an informational black-out because the surrenderist solution is trying to obliterate the people's history of struggle, to establish a spirit of frustration and no appreciation of national heroisms and to select traitorous models as leaders and examples. Our role in North Sinai is to bring out the national leaders. We ran with them for the recent People's Assembly elections and highlighted them in our publications in an effort to raise the value of struggle and enrich the spirit of struggle. There has to be an awakening of the national consciousness because we are, as they say, in the lion's mouth, and our demand, therefore, as adopted by the party at the central level, is to arm the people of Sinai to defend themselves in the confrontation with the Zionist enemy.

"We also would like the building of Sinai to be considered a national issue, from the viewpoint of development which serves national security, by firmly establishing the inhabitants on the land and tying them to it from the production point of view. The means of production heretofore have been backward and primitive. Growth, if not universal and service-oriented, cannot achieve the desired change of comprehensive economic and social development. We have to transfer people to the eastern borders because they are the ones who can defend the land."

#### Terrorism in the West

Mamduh Raghieb al-Darbali, NPUG secretary and central committee member, took us from the eastern to the western borders by saying:

"The party is required to have a true reading of this governorate's heartbeat, particularly in view of its location on the Libyan borders. All the Egyptian troops who were pulled out of Sinai following the demilitarization of that area have been transferred to it, thus turning it into a large and diverse intelligence camp under which the local population is suffering. We have the general and military intelligence, the border intelligence, criminal investigation and state security. Citizens are being harassed. Fishing is prohibited along the governorate's 500 km-long shores and the governorate's share of services and investments is negligible. There are no farms or factories, and education, health and other services are totally ignored."

Musa Muhammad Musa, organization secretary in the governorate and central committee member, confirmed the above, adding:

"Matruh Governorate can be the breadbasket of the entire country, as it used to be during Roman Empire. The present attitude of the governorate's political and executive authorities is investment-oriented in the fashion of the open-door policy and is only concerned with tourist cities and hotels to the exclusion of production and services."

'Adil 'Abd-al-Karim, central committee member and NPUG assistant secretary in the governorate, added:

"Our priorities include combating administrative corruption in the health services sector and rampant negligence in governorate hospitals and medical treatment, particularly in Matruh and other remote governorates. We will also lead a fight against widespread unemployment in the governorate at a time when workers are brought in from the outside to work at oil sites in the very areas, and for the right of every citizen to honest, productive work."

#### New Intellectuals

Among the new leaders in the central committee, we met with Dr 'Abd-al-Basit 'Abd-al-Mu'ti, professor of sociology at Heliopolis University and head of the Sociology Association headquartered in Tunis. It is an association, according to Dr 'Abd-al-Basit, which advocates fundamental goals and uses sociology to achieve them. These goals are unity in reply to diviveness, liberation in reply to subjection and independent self-reliant growth and popular participation in facing the concentration of power in the hands of limited bands at the Arab-world level.

/Question/ What literary work have you offered the people?

/Answer/ I have offered many works, some of which are academic, related to sociological guidelines and the training of students and researchers. They concentrate on theoretical and methodological issues. The bulk of my work, however, addresses the masses in as simple a language as possible, such as "The Distribution of Poverty in the Egyptian Village, Mass Media and the Falsification of Awareness." These works are aimed at equipping the ordinary man with basic keys to understanding and interpreting his reality and his problems. The "World of Knowledge" series in Kuwait has published a number of these works. The bulk of my literary production is in the form of articles dealing with Arab and Egyptian issues and problems, in the forefront of which are development issues, the development of the Arab and Egyptian village in particular, and labor, housing and women issues. The UN West Asia Economic Committee has published a book I wrote about the principles of designing and monitoring projects for changing the status of the rural woman, which has come out in several languages, in addition to women's issues and emigration to the Arab Gulf countries.

/Question/ What can we add to the party's priorities in the upcoming stage?

/Answer/ We must concentrate mainly on more interaction with the masses. This requires a better understanding of these masses. We must address them in an appropriate language and must be ready to learn from them and to work with and through them in the sense that people basically study their reality, arrange their problems and contribute to their solution. Moreover,

our criticism must be productive in that we must offer positive alternatives to any issue we decide to discuss and solve. We have at our disposal great capabilities whereby we can reach the people in a quicker and more profound way. We must intensify the party's social orientation through direct dealing with the toiling and poor masses, the laborers, the farmers and the employees in particular.

### Three Parallel Lines

One university professor who ties science to social issues, the issues of farmers in particular, is Dr Muhammad Abu Mandur, member of the party's central committee. He is a new central leader and head of the Agricultural Economics Department at the Cairo University School of Agriculture.

Dr Abu-Mandur is a founding NPUG member who served on the mass labor committee after the party was established and was secretary of the party's farmers office. He then went to Democratic Yemen and returned in 1983 to join the party's various activities, especially through the farmers office and the Egyptian Farmers Federation (under establishment). During this period he wrote on a number of topics published in AL-AHALI, all focusing on the agricultural issue in Egypt.

Dr Abu Mandur said:

"The party needs to work on three parallel lines which, I believe, take priority in the upcoming stage:

"The first line is participation in a series of in-depth studies on Egypt's political, economic, social and cultural reality with concentration on field effort. Such studies will help effectively in the visualization of the social map in Egypt and the social presence and awareness of Egyptian social classes which in turn will help us visualize a mass labor plan compatible with the reality of such a map.

"The second is to make certain that the NPUG is first and foremost a mass party. This requires the more effective development of mass labor methods and techniques.

"The third one is to emphasize intensive work among the various forces and sectors of the national liberation movement within and outside Egypt in a way that aids the formulation of an operational work program around which the broadest masses can rally."

### And New Nasirist Leaders

Jamal Fahmi, a student leader in the seventies, assistant secretary of the Nasirist Thought Club at Cairo University at the time and a NPUG member since 1984, said:

"It is clear from the definition that I am a Nasirist and that my membership in the NPUG is new. However, I have participated in the basic mass activities and battles launched by the national and progressive movement in Egypt. Moreover, I believe in the struggle unity of the various Egyptian leftist groups and that the sum of struggles launched by the left in general in resisting the power of apostasy, led by al-Sadat, has expanded the ground on which the leftist groups are standing. I believe there is a complete program for all these groups which will enable them to continue their struggle for a long time. Before I joined the NPUG, I used to exercise this conviction of mine, both at the university and after graduation, at the popular work places as well as the national battles the left used to launch. However, my presence in the NPUG was necessary in order to embark upon an endeavor, which I think reflects the goal of many young men of different affiliations within the framework of the left, to render the NPUG, the only open party of the Egyptian left, a more efficient frontal expression of the left groups' unity of purpose and program. If the party can succeed in this, and I believe it can, it will be a prologue for its success in building a mass party, something the second general conference adopted as its slogan, because the unity of rank and purpose in the framework of democracy and healthy frontal relations are decidedly the proper approach for consolidating the left's struggle in the Egyptian street."

Amid the NPUG ranks the new leaders in the central committee begin their activities by taking part in the NPUG battles for the sake of national liberation, social progress and the building of the largest front in the history of the Egyptian left.

12502

CSO: 4504/446

EGYPT

SIGNIFICANCE OF CRISES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 17 Jul 85 p 3

/Article by Muhammad Sid Ahmad: "Our Foreign Policy: Time Bombs Surrounding Egypt"/

/Text/ There are several indications that Egyptian policy is in more than one predicament, that these predicaments are like timed mines that will have the most dire consequences and that the time has come to take a stand and conduct a comprehensive re-evaluation of this policy in all its dimensions before it is too late and before the situation gets out of control.

We shall be satisfied with citing examples related to Egypt's foreign policy and its relations with its immediate neighbors. We begin with Israel and the Taba question.

The Taba question has not been suspended and is not dead. There is tireless, step-by-step unilateral movement on the Israeli side toward imposing a fait accompli. In the face of these successive steps, including the aggressive strategy they entail, Cairo's position is marked by a step-by-step retreat.

Historical documents confirm Egypt's right to Taba and Israel is well aware of that. That is why it wanted to avoid arbitration, suggesting "conciliation" as an alternative, so as to have unlawful privileges in Taba on the premise that Egypt's acceptance is a confirmation of its good will and not because Israel has claims in Taba to justify its staying there. When this attempt ran into difficulties, Perez alluded to the possibility of accepting the principle of "arbitration" provided that his good will is rewarded by the return of the Egyptian ambassador to Tel-Aviv!

When this other attempt ran into difficulties as well, Israel came out with another innovation. It transformed Eilat into a free-trade zone on the basis that what applied to Eilat had to apply to the adjoining Taba area because tourists in Eilat hotels would be exempt from the value-added tax and it was not fair to give this privilege to Eilat hotel guests and not to guests of Sonesta Hotel which Israel built in Taba!

Cairo protested, saying that applying the special law transforming Eilat into a free-trade zone to Taba was in violation of the agreement the two countries signed in April 1982 not to introduce any new activities to the Taba area. It seems, however, that the Egyptian protest did not carry much weight in Israel because indications are that Cairo is eager to improve relations and proceed with normalization. The Israeli press pointed out that President Mubarak recently ratified the agreement to open an Egyptian cultural center in Israel, along the lines of the Israeli one in Cairo, to demonstrate Egypt's good will in total disregard for Israel's steps toward imposing a fait accompli.

We move on to Sudan, whose relations with Egypt at present may be the most sensitive and inflammable.

Official Egyptian press editorials this week described the march a few days ago on the Egyptian embassy by 40,000 demonstrators demanding Numayri's extradition as a Libyan-engineered operation backed by Sudanese "leftist detachments."

The authorities are grossly wrong to attribute the Sudanese people's uprising and their revolt against Numayri to a scheme engineered abroad. Indeed, their adoption of such a "conspiratorial interpretation of history" may be a main reason for their support of Numayri to the end in a fashion that caused them to lose their credibility with the Sudanese masses, especially after these masses ousted him and came into a position to know all the facts.

They would have done well to realize that the Sudanese people, after 16 years of Numayri's rule, are suffering from a famine unprecedented in their modern history, a crushing economic crisis, a civil war which is dissipating capabilities in the south and deteriorating conditions in all fields which will definitely produce a volatile revolutionary situation.

All of the various factions and groups of the Sudanese people, without distinction between right and left, believe that Numayri is responsible for such bad conditions and Cairo, in the opinion of the various factions, is protecting him on the pretext that the Egyptian constitution prohibits the extradition of political refugees.

This is not a call for violating the constitution in this regard. Neither do we in any way support the actions of another Arab regime, close to Cairo, against 'Umar al-Muhaysi or al-Qadhdhafi's actions--in cooperation with al-Sadat at the time--of landing an airplane carrying Bubakr al-Nur and 'Uthman Hamadallah to turn them over to Numayri following Hashim al-'Ata's abortive coup. Numayri executed them on the spot and not a single official voice was raised in Egypt at the time to condemn al-Qadhdhafi's action on grounds that he violated the principles of the Egyptian constitution.

We wonder, however, if the pretext of political asylum could be used if Numayri were to be put on trial as an ordinary criminal and actually convicted. There are many reasons to believe that the charges, the most recent of which is the bribe he received in smuggling the "Falasha" from Ethiopia to Israel through Sudan, can be proven. And is it not a stark defiance of the Sudanese people and of their new leadership for Cairo to protect a criminal who has lost his political capacity and was alone responsible throughout many long years for the boundless tragedies the Sudanese people are now experiencing? Moreover, a Sudanese-Egyptian agreement signed in 1903 obligates the two sides to exchange criminals so that they may be brought to trial in their own country.

We do not mean to be more royal than the king or more rigid than the unyielding Sudanese prime minister. Dr Jazuli Daf'allah announced that the demand for Numayri's extradition is a slogan raised at the street level. "I have called for it from several rostrums, but I have to say there are certain considerations between us and Egypt. We do not wish to create a crisis with our brothers in Egypt because our relations with Egypt are very important. We respect and are proud of these relations and our plan is to deal with the situation and arrive at satisfactory results without a crisis.

"These relations do in fact encompass--besides historical fraternity between the two peoples--economic, strategic, security and food considerations, on top of which are those related to the Nile waters, Egypt's main artery. The level of the Nile waters has been dropping in recent years and Khartum more than Cairo holds the key to dealing with this disaster."

We are not saying that they violated the law and the constitution. What we are saying in dealing with the volatile crisis in Sudan is that political considerations must be placed above legal and constitutional ones. Cairo must admit that it has been unfair to the Sudanese people, and it ought to conduct a self-criticism of its fraternization with the despot at the expense of the historic relations between the two people. Cairo could, without any breach of protocol, have asserted its dissatisfaction with the despot's criminal action, but it was not eager to do so. It has unfortunately exhibited frightful blindness to what was happening in Sudan and is now paying the price.

Finally, we come to Libya and the unprecedented deterioration of Egyptian-Libyan relations brought about by al-Qadhdhafi's decision to expel Egyptians working in Libya and President Mubarak's decision not to receive al-Qadhdhafi's envoy and the talk about evacuating the border areas and amassing military troops there.

There is no doubt that the consolidation of Sudanese-Libyan relations, following the visit to Tripoli by the Sudanese defense minister, 'Uthman 'Abdallah Muhammad, and the signing of a military protocol between the countries, has had a direct influence on the deterioration of Egyptian-Libyan relations.

Egypt's destiny must not be increased submission to the Israeli fait accompli at a time when its relations with two adjacent Arab neighbors are running into difficulties.

The consolidation of Egyptian-Jordanian or Egyptian-Iraqi relations does not represent a way out of this predicament.

We are not talking about Cairo's complete absence in Lebanon or its growing reliance on its "special relations" with America in a way incompatible with its declared commitment to the policy of non-alignment. We are talking, however, about the direct challenges which are erupting at the present in particular.

Thus we say it is time for a comprehensive re-examination of government policies that will get the government out of this predicament and save it from these timed mines which will have the most evil consequences.

There is evidence that the government's domestic policies are in a predicament.

But those emanating from its foreign policies are no less dangerous.

This is an issue Cairo will have to address at its meeting with African leaders in Addis Ababa tomorrow.

12502

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EGYPT

MEETING ON SINAI HELD IN AL-'ARISH

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 30 Jul 85 p 8

[Article by Hatim Sidqi and Ahmad al-Tabarani]

[Text] Mr Munir Shash, governor of North Sinai, announced during the first scientific symposium held in al-'Arish yesterday that Egyptian scientists were currently working on a plan to establish a society based on sound economic and scientific principles, and to create new opportunities for work for the people of Sinai and to attract Nile valley inhabitants to be a large productive force. He said that the al-Magharah coal and Subaykah saltworks would be the nucleus of a chemical complex that would include glass factories, and that 1000 feddans had been set aside for the building of tourism projects; in addition, the growing of trees with saline water would be expanded.

During the symposium, which was attended by Mr Majdi Sulayman, governor of South Sinai, Dr Abu-al-Futuh 'Abd-al-Latif, vice president of the Scientific Research Academy, and Dr 'Ali Abyzayd, president of the office of Sinai construction and development, the governor said that the heads of scientific research groups had set up a program for implementing vital projects in Sinai costing 2.5 million pounds, and that the governorate had done studies on exploiting raw cement in al-Hasanah and marble in Jabal Yalaq. It had eventually built a cement factory in al-Hasanah, and another for dairy products in Rafah.

The vice president of the Scientific Research Academy said that the academy had established a system to populate Sinai, exploit the natural resources, provide the means for settling large numbers of people, and to formulate an integrated, scientific plan for social development in the governorate.

The researchers presented their accomplishments and the results they had gotten at the present stage. One of the most remarkable was the possibility of trying to cultivate some Sinai regions. Dr Muhammad Mahmud Munir, a professor at the Desert Research Institute, presented a plan for subterranean waters, making a collection of native plants and animals, digging new water wells, making a chart of the salinity of the wells in the region, and defining the grazing season and the areas that can be used in the experiments.

Dr 'Umar Darraz, the project's director, said that it would be possible to introduce livestock production into the agricultural system by introducing the cultivation of certain short-lived legumes, and expanding the cultivation of trees, along with using saline water to grow forage crops that can tolerate high salinity and drought, and developing and growing varieties of field crops and vegetables that are salt and drought tolerant.

Dr Nabih Ibrahim 'Ashur, a professor at the National Research Institute, announced that experiments had shown that it would be possible to grow certain types of crops such as lentils, beans, zucchini, watermelon, cantaloupe, honeydew melons, and cucumbers, since they had done well under conditions of irrigation with highly saline water. There is also a plan to introduce new and improved strains of date and olive trees.

The governor of South Sinai called for the need to follow up on the applied results of the projects on nature, to ascertain how serious the steps to implement them had been to benefit from them. He concentrated on the importance of estimating how much water there was in the Sahal al-Qa' and Wadi Sidr regions, considering that they are among the most important regions where agriculture might be practiced.

12547

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EGYPT

EXPERIMENT ON STOCKING FISH IN RICE FIELDS REPORTED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 5 Aug 85 p 3

[Article: "Rice Fields are Turned into Fish Farms"]

[Text] Can the dream be turned into a reality, and a new crop of fish of up to 100 million kilograms according to all expectations be extracted from the country's rice fields, which cover up to a million feddans? The fish would be introduced into markets thirsting for this important protein, and it would add 150 million pounds to the national income.

What do the experiments say: experiments that have in fact begun, aimed at bringing success to the national campaign to stock rice fields with fish? And what are the chances that they will spread throughout these farms that are covered with water throughout the growing season?

Dr Yahya Husni, head of the fisheries resource agency, says that the basic aim of the project is to provide a protein source and to increase the family income of every rice farmer in the six governorates famous for rice cultivation in the Nile Delta. The head of the fisheries resource agency adds that the process of stocking fish in with the rice takes place by transferring the fry from the fish hatchery to the fields in the early morning before sunrise to prevent mortality. The farmer who wants the fry will have prepared an extra water channel in the field where the fry will go when the water is being drained from the rice. Then special traps which consist of wooden frames surrounded by ordinary wire are placed in the irrigation and drainage ditch. Another condition imposed on the lands where fry is to be placed is that the fry cannot be delivered until at least 7 days after the rice seedlings have been sprayed with herbicides; also, the plastic bag containing the fry must be opened gradually within the irrigation basin so that the fry will not move suddenly into a new water environment and be affected by it and die. The role of the farmer here is limited just to introducing the fry at the beginning of July, and to carrying out fishing operations in November after water has been withheld from the rice before it is harvested.

Lands on which fish have been placed have achieved higher and better yields than those where fry had not been introduced. That goes back to the fact that the constant motion of the fish in the water stirs it up, and it is known that rice breathes through roots submerged in the water, and so vital growth processes are improved when fish are present. They also feed on water plants, which are small leafy plants that grow among the rice roots and affect the ease of irrigation. In addition, the organic wastes excreted by the fish are regarded as good fertilizer for the land. Observations and agricultural research have shown that the yield from fields that have been stocked with fry is more productive than from others. There is an encouraging phenomenon that the head of the fisheries resource agency points to: In the village that was selected last year for distribution of fry, and during the period when water was being withheld from the rice and the fish crop was being harvested, the consumption of meat and chicken stopped completely, because the farmers were consuming the fish, either receiving them as gifts, or selling them at low prices that enabled everybody to buy them. The type of fry from the al-mabruk fish has shown a rapid rate of growth of up to 5.6 grams per day. That is the highest rate in the world, since the world average does not exceed 3 grams per day, and that of course can be attributed to the importance, excellence and success of raising it under Egypt's moderate climate conditions.

In spite of a season for distributing the fry that lasts until the end of July, the hatcheries will remain open to receive every farmer who wants to get fry free. Nothing is required of him other than providing a deed, something that proves that he farms the rice area that he wants to stock with fry. The agency will provide technical follow-ups and veterinary supervision free throughout the season up until water is withheld from the rice and the fish are gathered.

#### New Impetus to Fisheries

Mr Labib Zamzam, governor of al-Buhayrah, says about the al-Buhayrah hatchery that supplies the governorates of al-Gharbiyah, al-Daqahliyah, al-Sharqiyah and al-Fayyum with fry: "The plan to raise fish in with the rice has activated the fishery resource and given it new impetus. We used to import the parents from Hungary at a cost of about \$50 each. In addition there were problems with transport, delays, and other things. But this year import operations ceased completely, and we were able to select males and females from among the fish present at Barsiq farm, and they were distributed to the three hatcheries at Fuwah in Kafr al-Shaykh, Saft Khalid in al-Buhayrah, and al-'Abbasah in al-Sharqiyah."

Through cooperation between the Fuwah hatchery and Barsiq farm, nurturing operations were carried out at the farm which raised its production from 15 million fry to about 45 million. The average production of Saft Khalid also rose from 15 million fry to 30 million. It is known that artificial reproductive operations which brings about the first hatching occur in May, and the second is in the fall. It is carried out by slaughtering a number of male and

female parents and getting the pituitary gland, which is responsible for reproduction, from the fish's head. Then it is placed in a preservative substance, and sexually mature females are injected with pituitary gland of the male in an amount proportional to the weight of the fish. In about 6 hours at the most, the female fish begins to eject eggs that are received in special basins. The same thing is done to the males, which at the same time begin to eject. Then the basins, which measure about 1 meter by 2 meters, are stirred constantly until fertilization is complete, and the fertilized eggs are moved through a funnel covered by a screen to be pushed by a constant stream of fresh, renewed water for a period of 3 consecutive days, until the eggs begin to hatch and the fry begin to emerge. On the following day, artificial feeding operations are begun with a powder with a high fiber content of no less than 50 percent. On the seventh day, they are transferred out for farming. But al-mabruk fish fry, with which the rice fields are stocked, must be moved to nurturing basins of about 2 feddans in area and which hold about half a million fry, which are tended with great care until they are the size of a finger. That is the size appropriate to the length of the rice season, since it makes the size to which the fish has grown at harvest time conform to the shortness of the rice season, which varies between 2 1/2 and 3 months. But what do the farmers in the farms of Qarun Abu Talib in al-Fayyum say about their new experience? Farmer Riyadh Husni said, "The idea is an old one, and we used to find fish naturally in the sack after planting rice, but after the High Dam, the fish decreased. If only the good would return once again, and I could collect a sack or two of fish as they say!" Another farmer, Ahmad Ibrahim said, "We have seen our neighbors who have stocked fish in with the rice getting good yields, so we asked Guidance for fry and we put them in, and our Lord provides." Mahmud Husayn "al-Minya," a farmer from al-Buhayrah, said, "I stocked fish last year and we got high yields. From a feddan, I gathered about 100 kilos of fish, but I was ashamed to sell them to the townspeople, so I divided them among them. I wish the organization would take the crop and sell it to the people."

Hasanayn Abu Zayd of al-Buhayrah says, "I would have liked to have stocked fish in with my rice, but they said that Guidance had restricted the areas. If only they would give it out to everyone, so that everyone could have this good thing."

12547

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EGYPT

## WATER SUPPLY, WASTE DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 3 Aug 85 p 7

[Commentary by Salah Muntasir]

[Text] It seems that there is nothing strange about the fact that water consumption in Cairo rises during the hours of 3 and 4 in the morning, for all the letters which I have received commenting on this alarming fact that has been discovered by the Cairo water agency confirm that this time, between 3 and 4 in the morning, is the only time during which thousands, or say hundreds of thousands, of people who live in Cairo can get water. Those who wrote some of the letters mentioned to me that family members take turns among themselves to get up at that time to fill buckets, containers and bottles with water in preparation for the day's dry spell! Some of them mentioned that water does not get up to the third and fourth floors--as in the Shaykulani area in Shubra--except at dawn.

On the subject of water consumption and those who do not get it, Rif'at Muharib of the Suez Canal agency suggests making available to the public the installation of faucets having a "jazarah". This is an expression that he has often repeated, and I have understood it to be a technical term for a washerless type of faucet.

He also proposed connecting a line for "impure water" within cities, to be used for watering gardens and crops, [cleaning] in front of shops and streets, putting out fires, and in building and construction jobs, thus saving the pure water that is used for these purposes that he mentioned.

However, Sa'd 'Ali Wahbah, a bachelor of science at Adco, proposes that more than half a million 12-year-old students in the sixth elementary be trained to install faucet washers, siphon stoppers, and Butagas cylinder washers. He suggests that that be done in school by science teachers and teachers in technical and agricultural education in ten consecutive and specialized periods.

The man making this suggestion--which I do not find preposterous, and in fact I might encourage--says that this would require a "locally made, hand operated key" with three openings: one for Butagas cylinders, one for 1/2 inch faucets, and a third for 3/4 inch faucets. This key can be manufactured in military factories at a cost of about half a pound.

Besides that, he proposed spending 30 piasters per student to buy the washers and string for training. This would bring the cost per student to 80 piasters. In other words, the total cost of training half a million students would be 400,000 pounds.

But with that we would save the equivalent of millions of pounds in water lost every year.

12547

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EGYPT

BRICK SHORTAGE IN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 16 Jul 85 p 6

[Article by Ahmad al-Kinani: "The Clay Brick Mafia! This Year's Shortage Amounts to 3 Billion Bricks"]

[Text] The government built several brick factories to develop the brick industry on the one hand and to put an end to the practice of removing top soil from farm land. Proprietors of brick kilns have been justifying that practice. Before August, however, which was the deadline set by government for converting those kilns to produce other alternatives to brick or to shut down their operations altogether, brick factories were faced with turmoil and with numerous problems for which equipment supplying companies were responsible. A few Egyptians whose interests are linked with those of these companies were also responsible for the problems. The upshot of all that was that these factories were not able to achieve the targeted production capacity and, consequently, they were not able to meet Egypt's demand for bricks.

There is more than one example.

--The Valley Construction and Construction Materials Company began actual production in January 1982. Its energy consumption rates have been high: for every 1,000 bricks it produces, it consumes from 100 to 120 kilograms of heavy oil and about 110 kilowatt hours of electricity. These rates are exactly double those that were mentioned in the studies and investigations on whose bases the factory was built.

--The Misr Clay Brick Company in al-Tibin has numerous technical problems.

--The al-Sa'adah Clay Brick Plant in al-Tibin represents the proposed development for a brick kiln. It was built by a few people who are interested in the production of clay brick. The plant was built under the supervision of the Ministry of Reconstruction, the Construction Research Institute at the College of Engineering, a few Austrian experts and the Industrial Development Bank. However, operations at the plant have come to a complete standstill after numerous attempts to achieve the required production capacity failed.

--A complete clay brick production unit was built at the Bir Shams Plant, a subsidiary of the Sand Brick Company. This unit was built with the assistance of



British experts. However, operations at that unit were suspended because of numerous technical problems that prevented the plant from achieving the production figures that had been set for it.

--The (Sigwart) Company was the first Egyptian firm to operate a brick factory in Egypt with two production lines. Although it's been over 5 years since production at this plant began, the plant has not yet been able to achieve its [targeted] production capacity because of numerous technical problems.

#### Technical Problems

Although the deteriorating conditions of brick factories in Egypt were listed in a field study conducted in June 1983 by Dr Sharif Husni 'Isa, a researcher at the National Center for Scientific Studies, all official state agencies ignored the study. None of them paid any attention to the facts mentioned in that study. Not even the Ministry of Reconstruction, which is responsible for introducing and developing this new industry, took any action or practical step to salvage what could be salvaged in this industry, even though ministry officials had access to this study.

The French (Siric) Company built 11 clay brick production lines in Egypt at a cost of 10 million pounds per line. These production lines are scattered throughout the country.

The Misr Clay Brick Company in Hulwan has four production lines.

Ismailia Company has two.

Al-Fayyum Company has one.

Bani Suwayf Company has one.

Qina Company has one.

Al-Buhayrah Company has one.

And al-Nasr Contracting Company has one.

The first three companies have actually started production, but they have all failed to achieve the targeted production capacity of 6 million bricks per production line.

On the other hand, energy consumption rates--consumption of heavy fuel oil and electricity--were double the rates that were agreed to in the agreement that was made with the French firm. That agreement stipulated that for every ton of bricks produced, the rate of heavy fuel oil consumption was not to exceed 55 kilograms and the rate of electricity consumption was not to exceed 50 kilowatt hours. But operations proved that the company did not adhere to the articles of the agreement when it delivered the equipment.

These figures of course confirm the actual low productivity of all the plants that were built by the French firm, even as the cost of production rose because

of increased energy use. These three companies are now on the verge of bankruptcy because of their very large debts. Credit that has already been extended to these three factories amounts to almost 15 million pounds: credit for the al-Fayyum plant is almost 2.75 million pounds; for the Hulwan plant it is 5 million pounds; and it is almost 6.5 million pounds for the Ismailia plant. Banks have declined to extend further credit to some of these companies because of their poor financial standing.

#### Numerous Violations

This, of course, is due to the fact that the equipment provided by the French firm, (Siric) violated many terms of the agreement. The drying fans supplied by the French firm did not adhere to the terms of the agreement. These fans were somewhat flawed, and they could not do the job that had to be done for that quantity of bricks. In addition, wear and tear rates on the equipment are high. And that has caused a recurrence of down time at the plants. At the Hulwan Company down time was 47.7 percent of total operating time. In al-Fayyum, down time was 25.68 of operating time, and in Ismailia down time amounted to 42.12 percent of total operating time. That, of course, had a harmful effect on these companies' productivity.

#### August and the Dilemma

Because the 11 production lines that were built by the French firm in Egypt have the same equipment, it is not unlikely that these flaws will recur even in those companies that have not yet started production and have not undergone any technical modifications. This, of course, will have an effect on the extent to which existing brick companies and those that will be operating this year can meet Egypt's brick needs. It is estimated that Egypt needs 6.5 billion bricks [a year]. At the present time clay and cement brick factories are producing only 3.5 billion bricks, although that figure is expected to rise to 3.5 [sic?] billion bricks by the end of this year. At the same time the clay brick factories and kilns that are expected to shut down next August are producing 4.5 billion bricks. Accordingly, after August, the difference between our brick needs of 6.5 billion bricks and the alternatives to clay brick that are being produced, 3.5 billion bricks, will be 3 billion bricks.

In general, we oppose the removal of top soil from farm land to manufacture clay bricks, and we are asking for stiffer penalties for that crime. But we are affirming that the government will have a serious crisis on its hands after August unless it takes some action as soon as possible to save the clay brick factories from their poor conditions. It is only poor planning and reticent policies that are responsible for this poor situation. All the clay brick factories that were built by the government or the private sector are producing no more than 50 percent of their production capacity. This of course is due to the fact that no technical feasibility studies were conducted before these companies were established. Also time has shown that the economic feasibility studies that were conducted were not all that credible.

#### The Mafia in Egypt

This situation may be due to the nature of the agreement with the French firm and how the Ministry of Reconstruction has been awarding contracts to that firm

since 1976. Until a short time ago the French firm has continued to receive these contracts despite the flaws that have been discovered in the equipment. This situation may also be due to the fact that a number of Egyptians are performing valuable services for such companies. In two reports on such Egyptians [the Office of] Administrative Control has revealed that since it started investigating these violations in the equipment provided by the French firm, it has received several memoranda from some agencies as well as personal communications giving an account of the situation from the French firm's perspective so as to dissuade the Office of Administrative Control from revealing further violations. It turned out after that that the French firm's agent in Egypt, Mr Sharif Sayyid 'Iffat was behind these communications. On 29 March 1984 he sent numerous memoranda to the Office of Administrative Control expressing the company officials' charges that the fault did not lie with the equipment, but rather with the poor expertise of Egyptians.

On 30 April 1984 Engineer Abu Bakr Muhammad al-Jamal, an appointed member of the board of directors of the Bani Suwayf Clay Brick Company sent a memorandum to the Office of Administrative Control commenting on the technical problems of the lines that were operating. He made observations on these problems, and he held management partly responsible for them. But this is not true because he did not derive his information from visits he made to the plants that have been operating. Engineer Abu Bakr rather got his information from sources that are not seeking the interests of the public. At the same time the (Siric) Company itself later acknowledged the technical flaws in the equipment. That acknowledgement was made at an official meeting that was held on 1 October 1984 between the chiefs of the Egyptian factories and representatives of the French firm.

The French firm's experts also acknowledged in writing during their visit to al-Fayyum factory on 16 October 1984 that Egyptians were competent and that their technical standards were high.

Engineer Muhammad Nur-al-Din Mas'ud, who is employed at the Hulwan Clay Brick Company, also sent a report to the Office of Administrative Control that included a proposal to establish an industrial services company to look into the plants' need for spare parts. The National Bank for Development had turned down that proposal because of Engineer Muhammad Nur-al-Din's close ties with the French (Siric) Company. Engineer Nur-al-Din had worked with that company while he was employed in Libya. When the company came to Egypt to do business, it appointed him in a position at the Hulwan company where he performed valuable services. He raised the salaries of French experts from 18 to 30 pounds a day, and he provided them with several other privileges including a car for each expert and a microbus for their children's transportation. He also rented an apartment for each expert.

Dr Ahmad Tawfiq, chairman of the board of directors of the Ismailia Clay Brick Company provided false information to the administrative control organization about his company's productivity. He claimed that his company had realized more than 100 percent of the agreed upon production capacity. He did that in an attempt to deceive the administrative control organization so it would stop its investigation.

The report by the Office of Administrative Control confirmed the existence of financial improprieties in the Ismailia Company's management. These improprieties had caused the Suez Canal Bank to turn down the company's request for a loan. In addition, there was a deficit in the company's treasury on 12 December 1984 that nothing was done about until 18 May 1985. There was no accurate listing of many job orders that had been sent out to contractors, and there were many violations in the technical and financial reports that were submitted by the company to the board of directors at the board meeting that was held on 4 July 1984.

Although the Office of Administrative Control has called for an investigation of the officials who were ultimately responsible for receiving the equipment at the Ismailia and Hulwan plants because they covered up the French firm's violations, such an investigation has not yet taken place. At the al-Fayyum company the French firm's violations were not covered up. Although it's been over 3 months since that report was filed with the ministries of housing and utilities and local government, an investigation has not yet been conducted.

In the final analysis it is Egypt that is victimized!

8592

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BAHRAIN

DEMAND FOR HIGHER EDUCATION ON INCREASE

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 19 Jul 85 p 3

[Text]

MANAMA—The demand for scholarships for further education has tripled in the last 10 years from high school graduates, according to Safia Dowagher, Director of Scholarships at Bahrain's Ministry of Education.

In June, 3,400 students graduated from high schools while in the 1970s only a third of this number had completed high school. This year the ministry has 440 scholarships for undergraduate and diploma studies to distribute in time for college in September.

The government expects most of the nearly 3,000 students who will not receive scholarships to enter the work force while a few will be sponsored by parents or relatives for further studies locally, regionally or in the industrialised countries.

High-school leavers are not left totally unsupported and vulnerable to job market conditions. The authorities recognise that of the 3.2 per cent unemployed, an overwhelming proportion is of young Bahrainis. They see this as structural unemployment, which is being addressed by a series of vocational training programmes.

Safia Dowagher believes that on-job training is a viable alternative to a full-time college education. She

feels that this alternative can to a large extent be provided by private sector companies but she believes that these are not doing enough to train young Bahrainis.

She finds Gulf Air's efforts in this area commendable and fully supports its system which requires employees to sign a contract before training commences, binding them to work for the company for a fixed duration after training.

Now that the severe needs for qualified Bahrainis that existed in the 1960s and 1970s has been brought to a level where it is possible for both the private and public sectors to find qualified nationals for at least half the jobs available, the momentum of a decade ago to offer college education to Bahrainis has eased off.

Resources too are not as readily available, and scholarships from the ministry here and neighbouring governments as well as university places in regional and friendly countries are becoming progressively harder to come by.

The authorities here however are not unduly alarmed and see this trend as a stabilising of education opportunities as compared to the so-called boom years of the last decade when all high school graduates, irrespective of performance, felt entitled to a full scholarship.

Bahrain's most pressing manpower need meanwhile is for teachers since the focus is increasingly on expanding and improving the standard of primary and secondary education. In keeping with this need, the government is offering 129 scholarships to the Bahrain University College for BA degrees in education: all teachers in primary and secondary schools have to have a bachelor's degree in arts or science.

About twice as many boys as girls will receive these scholarship to meet the shortage for male secondary school teachers. Scholarships for boys to the Gulf Polytechnic also outnumber those for girls, partly because some of the technical courses are closed to women but also due to social factors. It is still quite common for women to spend several years studying at government expense and upon graduation, or a few short years later, to leave work and opt for a full-time housewife's role.

This seems somewhat ironic since recent final high school results throughout the Gulf show that girls do startlingly better than boys. For example, this year in Kuwait, the first 50 top places were earned by girls. This is probably because girls devote more time to studies, being traditionally unable to do much socialising outside the home.

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THE still to be completed Arab Gulf University, with a projected enrolment of 10,000 students by the year 2004, is offering Bahrain nine places in the two-year old faculty of medicine. This is Bahrain's quota decided by the university board.

In addition to scholarships at Bahrain's own universities, the government has about 300 to distribute, in this case almost equally amongst girls and boys, to colleges in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan.

The rush for these scholarships is tremendous: quite often it stands at 10 applicants per seat.

CSO: 4400/234

BAHRAIN

FACILITIES FOR STRATEGIC FOOD STOCKPILE OFFERED

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 2 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Ahwa Al-Busaidy]

[Text]

MANAMA — At a recent Arab Gulf Cooperation Council ministerial conference, Bahrain, along with the five other member-states, gave the green light for a Gulf-wide six-month strategic food stockpile plan.

The scheme came to prominence when the 42-month-old Gulf war began, and became even more vital when the tanker war started 15 months ago.

The last development led the AGCC leaders to consider precautionary measures in case the war led to closures of the air and sea routes on which the Gulf states are heavily dependent to bring in their imported food supplies.

The plan's implementation is to start sometime next year in Bahrain. A six-month emergency food supply will cost Bahrain BD10 million. According to a storage expert here, emergency supplies will predominantly, at least 70 per cent, be of the dry cargo kind, such as rice, flour, and sugar.

Other food items, such as frozen meat, would be regarded non-essential in an emergency and subject to restrictions based on a minimal maintained stock.

AGCC experts have been taking into account the possibility of the six states importing jointly. Such a move would reduce purchasing cost as well as transportation expenses.

It may even cut storage expenses once the food is in a Gulf state. Bahrain has one of the largest storage facilities in the area, Bahrain-New Zealand (Banz), with a total 15,000-ton capacity for storing frozen, chilled and dry cargo.

Banz, a commercially run company, has a 51 per cent government and 49 per cent New Zealand shareholding. It is located in the Mina Sulman area.

The company's management, keen to participate in the government's strategic food supply plan, submitted details of its facilities to the minister of commerce and agriculture, Mr Habib Qassim, before he left for the AGCC conference, at which the final decision on the emergency supplies was taken.

According to a Banz spokesman, the company can provide storage for six months food requirement of the island. It also has enough unused land area to erect prefabricated dry cargo storage facilities within a few weeks.

This excess capacity, the spokesman said, can be utilised by other Gulf states, especially the eastern province of Saudi Arabia after the causeway is completed in December.

However, although the company has been pressing the government to use its storage facilities, a decision is still to be taken by the ministry of commerce and agriculture.

An alternative to using Banz's facilities would be for the government to build storage areas, since the largest privately owned food storage company has a 2,000-ton capacity which is too small for the plan's purpose.

According to recent local Press reports, a 50,000 ton silo, which may be linked to the strategic food programme, is planned.

Not all of the Gulf states can boast of an established storage company the size of Banz, and with an experienced staff. The five-year-old company ran at heavy loss for the first three years, the first two under a management contract with another company.

Since then, Banz has been managed by mostly Bahraini management staff with a few individually-recruited expatriates. Currently, 70 per cent of its facilities are utilised by local traders. It

began to make a profit in 1984 and also expects to profit in 1985.

Some of the Gulf states will have to extend existing storage areas or build new ones before the storage of emergency supplies can begin.

Several of the storage facilities around the Gulf, including Banz, are located in bonded areas. Goods kept in these areas have the advantage of being exempt from customs duty until they are taken outside the area.

Such an arrangement would be ideal for the strategic plan since stocks will be stored for long periods. It also provides an added advantage to transshipping emergency food to other states when they are ready to be used.

Out-of-state and local customs duty, which differ in Bahrain, will be applied when the stocks are required.

Banz chairman, who is also under-secretary at the commerce and agriculture ministry, Hassan Al Nusuf is currently discussing with the minister storage plans for the emergency food supplies.

Retail food prices may be reduced once the plan becomes effective as the emergency stocks will have to be replenished and the old stock sold before their validity expires.

CSO: 4400/234



IRAQ

## COMMANDERS DESCRIBE HAWR AL-HUWAYZAH BATTLE

### Analysis of Battle

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 10 Apr 85 p 3

/Article by Staff Maj Gen 'Abd-al-Rahim Taha al-Ahmad: "Hawr al-Huwayzah Military Gamble and Iranian Miscalculations"/

#### /Text/ 1. Prelude

In all the battles and wars that have taken place throughout history since ancient times, the mobilizational risk in military plans has been an acceptable act of war because it is a carefully calculated act that is not carried out at any level beyond the mobilization level, as in the case of a "mobilizational raid," a combat patrol at the strength of a company or an operation at the level of a "unit" or a "formation." But a "military gamble" /muqamarah/ is an act committed by fools, be they politicians or military men, because it is not subject to military calculations or to a sound military assessment of the situation and is governed by the law of chance. This is why a military gamble is doomed to failure. Even if it achieves some of its objectives temporarily, it is doomed to lose because it does not achieve its objectives within the framework of the total military calculation.

The rash offensive on which Khomeyni's backward gang embarked in Hawr al-Huwayzah on the night of 11-12 March 1985 and which was carried out by the stupid military command was a serious field operation which led to the destruction and annihilation of most of the units that implemented the operation and which amounted to 15 divisions less 1 brigade.

Having lost everything and no longer possessing any credit with which to deal with its peoples or with the world, this gambling gang resorted to its latest gamble, motivated by those who are Arabs in name only and by the Zionists, in an attempt to score a victory in the field or an operational or mobilizational victory to restore its morale, considering that it had lost everything in its previous gambles. "Every time, the frustrated hurl the remnants of the criminals in the hope of achieving a result against Iraq. The Zionists and some other frustrated circles

registered as Arab nationals try to persuade the ignorant and the suspect in Tehran with all means and methods that if they make another attempt, they may achieve an important result." (1)

Last February, the Iranian enemy gambled with more than seven military divisions in Hawr al-Huwayzah and the result was that those units were crushed and defeated most abysmally. "They came this time, as they did last time, by way of marshland in the hope that the defenses west of the marshland would not be as strong as the defenses they faced on the dry land in the other attempt on the operations theatre. They were not able to image the Iraqi reaction when the homeland is threatened and they miscalculated, thus paying the price in the torn bodies, some of which you saw on television, and retreating in defeat." (2)

What are the reasons and motives for this serious gamble in which the Iranian army suffered its worst defeat? What are its evil intentions? How were the Iranian units which carried out this miserable gamble annihilated? What are the consequences of this gamble to the future of the war and how can this war be ended? This is what we will answer in this analytical study, which relies on a tangible scientific military reality.

## 2. Aggressive Intentions of Hawr al-Huwayzah Gamble and Role of Arabs in Name Only and Zionist Regime

The latest gamble in the field embarked upon by the enemy in Hawr al-Huwayzah on the night of 11-12 March 1985 was one of the most serious gambles which has been carried out by the Iranian enemy, at the instigation of the Zionists and the Arabs in name only, against our struggling country from 4 September 1980 until the present, whether in terms of the units which the enemy threw into the battle, amounting to 15 divisions less 1 brigade, or in terms of the operation's evil and aggressive expansionist objectives which sought to achieve the following:

A. Political: Try to undermine Iraq's security and sovereignty in this southern sector.

B. Military: The objective was to reach and cut off Baghdad-al-Basrah highway, to obstruct any cooperation between the command of the heroic 3rd Corps and the brave 4th Corps and to stop any cooperation between Iraq and the Arab Gulf countries.

C. The gamble was preceded by the Iranian regime's intensification of the shelling of the border cities of al-Basrah, Mandali, al-Shihabi, Zurbatiyah and Panjwin for the purpose of creating the internal cover for the treacherous act of aggression and to justify the regime's latest military gamble. One day before the operation, Hashimi Rafsanjani made a statement intended for deception and camouflage, saying: "Iraq is trying to lure us into a battle for which we do not possess the capabilities."

Moreover, Ali Akbar Belayati, the Khomeyni regime's minister of foreign affairs, sent a cable to the UN secretary general hours before the offensive notifying him of Iran's agreement not to strike the Iraqi cities.

D. At the level of armaments cooperation between the Zionist entity and the Iranian regime, the Zionist entity repaired a number of the U.S.-made Chinook aircraft, most of which had been out of service because of the lack of spare parts. Moreover, a number of pilots of these planes were trained by Zionist experts and 10 of the aircraft, each with a capacity of 60 troops with their weapons and gear, took part in the operation, thus securing the strength of a military force estimated at 1 regiment.

E. As for the regimes of the Arabs in name and citizenship only and the traitors of the Arab nation, they had supplied Khomeyni's regime with a number of long-range missiles to strike Baghdad, the capital, and Kirkuk to undermine the morale of the heroic Iraqi people. They also supplied the said regime with quantities of light, medium and heavy weapons, with some rocket launchers and with a number of attack boats and 106-mm anti-tank weapons.

### 3. Why Decision on Gamble in the Field Was Made by Khomeyni's Gang

The decision to gamble in the field made by the Iranian enemy was not the product of this day or month. Rather, it was a decision that had been taken 13 months earlier. To be specific, it was made in the wake of the first gamble in February 1984 when Iran lost in the operation more than 25,000 people killed, not to mention those who drowned in the marsh and those captured. As for the reasons for the latest gamble, they are:

A. The attempt of the mullahs' regime to absorb the growing popular wrath surfacing in the wake of the big losses suffered by Iran in February 1984--losses which shook the country politically, morally, economically and militarily and which led to the emergency in the internal theatre in which religious opposition forces demanded that the charlatan stop the war. These forces were led by Nurtada Hayiri, a religious opposition leader and son-in-law of the greater charlatan of Qom and Tehran. Reason is what motivated Hayiri to express a legal religious opinion against Khomeyni, saying: "The death of any Iranian soldier is a crime against Islam." There is no doubt that such an opinion will lead to intensifying the opposition and to undermining the Iranians' morale. This is why Khomeyni and his gang hurled these hordes into the battle in an attempt to achieve some operational or mobilizational success so as to stifle the voices of the internal opposition whose activities have been increasing day after day.

B. The stagnant military situation on the front and the prolonged war have begun to drain Iran economically, and in human terms, morally especially in the wake of the escalation of the mobilizational operations decision by the Iraqi units to the front of the heroic 3rd Corps and brave

2nd Corps--operations which sought to annihilate the enemy is limited mobilizational attacks which led to undermining the morale of the enemy, many of whose units began to surrender without putting up any fight.

C. An attempt to break the sea and air blockade that has been struck by Iraq around Kharj Island for more than 13 months and that has led to reducing Iran's oil exports from 1.5 million barrels a day to only 800,000 barrels a day. This volume will drop even further in the coming phase thus paralyzing the weapons contracts amounting in value to \$9 billion a year and to the inability to pay the daily cost of the war which amounts to \$12 billion a year, not to mention the inability to make up for the major shortages in Iranian military equipment that have developed as a result of the major losses inflicted on the Iranian forces. This is why the regime planned this gamble to break the blockade on the island as the ultimate objective of this operation.

D. The attempt to undermine the sovereignty and security of Iraq and the Arab Gulf and Peninsula as a second objective.

E. Continue to shatter the unity of the Arab ranks and escalate the severe conflicts between the Arab countries through military escalation.

F. The attempt on the part of the charlatan regime to intimidate the Arab Gulf countries by embarking on a large-scale offensive to demonstrate the regime's ability to throw a large number of fighters into the battle in order to stem any call for aiding and supporting Iraq.

G. The decision on the gamble in the field came on the advice of "the Arabs in name only and of Hafiz Asad's and al-Gadhdhafi's regimes" out of their belief that Iraq's position had been weakened whereas, as the leader president said, the Iraqis' determination is escalating and "growing stronger day after day and year after year."

H. The decision on the latest military gamble in Hawr al-Huwayzah also came in response to the wish of some repudiated gangs which have fled Iraq and mired themselves in the mid of Persian treachery.

I. The decision on the gamble in the field also came in response to the will of the Zionist entity which considers Iraq its primary enemy and believes that preoccupying and weakening Iraq are fundamental to the security of the Zionist entity. Iraq is the biggest Arab force posing a threat to the Zionist entity in the Arab East.

J. At the level of the major strategies, the field operation came in response to those countries that believe that the continued conflict with Iraq weakens the Iranian regime as it weakens the Iraqi regime, that continuation of the war forces Iran to continue to purchase spare parts from some of them and that, moreover, the continuation of this war opens the possibilities of their controlling the power.

#### 4. Reason for Khomeyni Gang's Selection of Hawr al-Huwayzah Area for Their Gamble in the Field

In the wake of the enormous losses sustained by the Iranian forces in last February's offensive, amounting to 25,000 fatalities, not to mention the number of Iranians captured and drowned in the swamp, last year's plan called for advancing along a broad front and along several axes, one of which was al-Hawr. This weakened the Iranian forces along all the axes and made it easier to annihilate them. But the plan for the latest gamble confined itself to Hawr al-Huwayzah with the purpose of stressing the principle of force concentration, of economizing in the support fire and of achieving the principle of continuing the offensive's momentum. But this produced adverse results, as we will see later. Hawr al-Huwayzah area constitutes the shortest distance leading to al-'Aziz, which is located halfway between al-Basrah and al-'Imarah. If the /Iranian/ units reach al-'Aziz, then this would mean blocking the Baghdad-al-Basrah highway.

The Iranian enemy also imagined that the defensive positions in Hawr al-Huwayzah area are thinly spread and easy to penetrate. This was underlined by the leader president in his speech on 28 March 1985 in al-Ramadi when he said: "This time also they came, as they had come more than a year ago, through al-Hawr in the hope that the defenses west of al-Hawr would not be up to the level of the defenses on dry land." But they miscalculated and paid a dear price for their miscalculation.

The other reason which motivated the Iranian regime to rush through this area was its belief that the Iraqi armor would not be efficient and effective against its infantry in this area because armor's function would be confined to barrage fire and because of the regime's belief that it would be easy for them to destroy the Iraqi armor. This is in addition to the fact that al-ahwar area is characterized by the presence of numerous plants, such as reeds which grow to a height of more than 6 meters and form a semi-jungle in some areas, the papyrus plant which grows to a height of 2-4 meters and (al-julan) plant which grows to a height of 1-2 meters.

These aquatic plants, which grow in the marsh and surround its banks, restrict visibility and observation and provide a good cover for the attacker who can conceal his attack and infiltration and achieve the element of surprise. Moreover, the infantry soldier can reach his target fresh, considering that he is transported by boats and small vessels until he reaches dry land. Moreover, gunfire cannot be aimed accurately because of the density of the plants in the area, thus reducing the losses.

#### 5. Why Did Iranian Military Command Carry Out Plan for Mullas' Gamble in Hawr al-Huwayzah?

Even though the Iranian military command was not convinced of the usefulness of the offensive and of the continuation of the war and even though it was aware of the danger of this field gamble, it carried out

the Hawr-al-Huwayzah gamble in participation with the command of the charlatan's guard. This command is also responsible for the major military catastrophe inflicted on the Iranian forces. Among the reasons that motivated the military command to agree to carry out this gamble were the following:

- A. Most of the units which took part in this operation, estimated at 15 divisions less 1 brigade, were from among the charlatan's guard forces.
- B. The Iranian military commands, whose military prestige, status and position have declined as a result of the domination of the "mullas' gang" and of the charlatan's guard over the Iranian Defense Council, over the army chief of staff and over the main corps and branches of the army and as a result of the establishment of the ministry of the charlatan's guards--these commands, whose influence has been diminished by all these developments, found their golden opportunity in implementing the operation, with the hope of achieving some victories that would enhance their reputation.
- C. The influence of the Zionist military advice on these military commanders as a result of the continuous relationship between the two sides, considering that these commanders have been trained by the Israeli Mosad since the days of the shah and that the Israelis have supplied them with expertise and aid, in addition to repairing 10 of their U.S.-made Chinook aircraft which had been out of service. This created among these leaders optimism regarding the possibility of achieving some successes.
- D. The conviction among some Iranian military commands regarding the inability of the Iraqi armor to engage in decisive interceptive action against the Iranian infantry in al-ahwar area because armor's function would be confined to barrage fire only.
- E. The conviction among some Iranian military circles regarding the possibility of achieving the element of surprise in al-ahwar area because of the reeds and papyrus plants that would conceal the infiltration operations and would enable them to reach dry land undetected.
- F. The conviction among some Iranian military commands that the negative features which had surfaced in the February 1984 offensive--such as the broad fronts which caused them to spread their forces, to supply clothing, new equipment, floating equipment and boats in large numbers, to secure fire support in the boats and some innovative equipment capable of carrying light fire launchers to insure military support and to provide better administrative support than last year--were eliminated.

All these factors collectively, as well as other factors, convinced the stupid military command of the possibility of carrying out the military gamble in Hawr al-Huwayzah--a gamble which resulted in the crushing of 15 divisions less 1 brigade.

## 6. Plan of Iranian Offensive in Hawr al-Humayzah

The Iranian offensive in Hawr al-Huwayzah started at 2230 on the night of 11-12 March 1985, and sought to carry out two main phases, with other phases to follow later, depending on the success of the two main phases. The first phase sought to penetrate the defense positions in al-Hawr area, using a large number of boats, taking advantage of the abundant presence of reeds, papyrus and the cover of darkness and relying on achieving the element of surprise. The second phase sought to block and control the "Imarah-al-Basrah highway, using a number of U.S.-made Chinook helicopters. The offensive relied fundamentally on human waves to perpetuate its momentum in order to get to the highway. Most of the forces were infantry forces, without much artillery or armored support. They did succeed in transporting some launchers and some anti-tank guns and were able to penetrate some Iraqi defenses in more than one location in the operations theatre. The size of the units which took part in the operation amounted to 15 divisions less 1 brigade.

## 7. Iraqi Offensive Plans and Management of Battle

Leader President Saddam Husayn was the engineer and designer of the field, operational and mobilizational operation which was decisive in the major battles, both in the field and operationally, on 18 March 1985. Prior to the battle, Leader President Saddam Husayn predicted that the enemy would launch its offensive from Hawr al-Huwayzah and from the areas which he defined and drew up on a piece of paper that is still present in the analytical conference /room/. He also defined the offensive's operations and the enemy's objectives behind crossing the river. This took place shortly before the battle. At 2230 on the night of 11-12 March 1985, the offensive for which the enemy had been preparing for 13 months took place. In the morning, "the green paper was still lying on the table as it had been left." The president inquired about the situation and it was exactly as he had expected it and as he had drawn it up (on the green paper). The first order the leader president gave was to form a field command from the armed forces general command to supervise the operations in the operations area under the command of Staff Gen 'Adnan Khayrallah, the deputy general commander of the armed forces, and comprised of the army chief of staff and his aides. The maneuver plan was drawn up by the leader president and relied on his instructions which called for "pinning down the enemy and preventing him from crossing the river." The leader said: "There must be no crossing of the river. They must be mowed down here, killing them or forcing them to flee." The fixation operation was a support effort intended to deprive the enemy of the freedom of action in a certain sector. This effort ordinarily takes the form of limited offensives with specific objectives that pose a threat to some of the enemy's sensitive areas, thus forcing him to defend such areas. Then follows the phase of containment which calls for using the minimum force to compel some of the enemy forces to stay in their area. This is done by engaging a defensive position or by making an opening before the enemy. The third phase of the maneuver underlined by

the leader was the "phase of destruction" which called for pouncing on the enemy with two columns: a northern column and a southern column. Nearly seven divisions, along with a number of other units, took part in the operation to destroy and annihilate the enemy. There also remained a field reserve which did not take part in the battle in anticipation of any emergencies. In the counteroffensive to destroy the enemy, numerous artillery battalions and multi-rocket launchers participated. The air force was assigned the duty of distracting the enemy's administrative rear and isolating it from the front units, in addition to destroying the exposed enemy forces, i.e., the duty of securing immediate air support for our units.

The operational missiles pounded the enemy concentrations, which were known to the leader. Upon entrusting them with this duty, the leader said: "They are gathered here to reinforce their units. Let us strike here." As for the helicopters, they were assigned the duty of supplying fire support for the units and of destroying the enemy's armor, vehicles and boats that had crossed the river. The plan proceeded as drawn up by the leader and the offensive lasted for 7 fierce days during which the leader followed it up step by step until the entire maneuver was implemented and the two columns met at the spot designated for them. The leader president ordered that the "Iraqi flag be flown high" at the meeting point so that it may flutter forever with dignity, glory and pride for the arms of the extraordinary men.

#### 8. How Iranian Enemy Units Were Annihilated in Hawr al-Humayzah

It is true that the resolve of the brave fighters, their high morale and their determination to crush the aggression and the operational plan drawn up by Leader President Saddam Husayn and implemented under the command of Staff Gen 'Adnan Khayrallah, the deputy general commander of the armed forces and minister of defense, had, as a plan for maneuvering against and pouncing on the enemy, the most telling impact on crushing the enemy. However, there are other aspects that pertain to the dimensions of the intense support fire which played an important role in annihilating the units which the charlatan of Qom and Tehran and his gang hurled into Hawr al-Huwayzah area on the night of 11-12 March 1985.

The total strength of the attacking forces which the charlatan threw as cannon fodder amounted to 15 divisions, less 1 brigade. Considering that most of these divisions were not regular army divisions, we will count each division as 10,000 strong. Thus, the attacking force was at least 150,000 strong. As for the assault area, it was 20 km wide and 5 km deep, i.e., the area of the land over which the battle took place was 300 square km. The size of the enemy units jammed into this small area was 150,000 men, even though the area is not suitable for more than 1 or 2 divisions to maneuver in. We can imagine the dimensions of the losses inflicted on the attacking Iranian units squeezed into the area when we learn that thousands of tons of iron were dropped on the battleground during the 7 days of the battle by the air force which took part in supplying fire support and in isolating the units--an air force which flew an average of 500 sorties a day, dropping thousands of tons of bombs.



The intense fire support provided by the artillery also hurled thousands of tons.

This is how the major catastrophe suffered by the Iranian enemy units happened. Let us now calculate the enemy losses regarding which Leader President Saddam Husayn said: "Ask them how many of them have returned," meaning how many of the Iranian enemy's men survived.

#### 9. Account of Iranian Enemy's Visible and Invisible Losses in Hawr al-Huwayzah Battle

There is no doubt that the annihilation of the Iranian enemy units with the decisive, painful and effective blows dealt by our brave fighters will have the strongest impact on the future of the war and will have its strong effect on deciding the war. Leader President Saddam Husayn said: "This battle will have far-reaching effects on the course of the entire war" as a result of the enormous losses suffered by the enemy. According to Armed Forces Communique No 1776, the enemy's visible losses amounted to 23,200 casualties. As for the invisible losses suffered by the enemy, they are those suffered within the enemy positions and are difficult to see with the naked eye. These are losses suffered as a result of artillery shelling, air bombardment, mobilizational missiles and helicopter assaults. These are casualties which the enemy can evacuate. The high percentage derived from the experiences of World War II calculates the invisible losses at one-third the visible losses. Considering that the enemy's visible losses amounted to 23,200 casualties, then the invisible losses amount to 8,000 casualties to be added to the 23,200 casualties, thus raising the total enemy casualties to 31,200. As for the wounded, their number is ordinarily, and at the international level, three times the number of killed. Thus, the number of enemy wounded amounted to nearly 90,000 men. Consequently, the Iranian enemy's total losses in al-Huwayzah gamble amounts to nearly 12,200 persons. Considering that the units entering the pocket were 150,000 strong, then those surviving amounted to 29,000 men who returned, dragging with them the consequences of frustration and defeat. This is the satisfactory answer to Leader President Saddam Husayn's question: "Ask them how many of them, meaning the enemy units, have returned."

#### 10. Facts and Conclusion

A. The process of studying the expected percentage of losses in personnel and equipment is one of the important activities conducted by the administrative chiefs of staff who calculate such expected losses in participation with the movement chiefs of staff before embarking on a battle to find out the feasibility of waging it. If the expected losses amount to 25 percent, then it is possible to wage the battle, provided that it achieves its mission. If the expected loss is 50 percent, then it leads to paralyzing the units. Consequently, the chiefs of staff advise the commander not to wage such a battle. If the losses amount to 75 percent, the case is totally rejected and must be avoided because it

leads to the total annihilation of the units. Considering that the loss percentage suffered by the Iranian units in Hawr al-Huwayzah amounted to 82 percent, meaning that the units were annihilated, then the question is: Did the Iranian chiefs of Staff or did they not conduct such a study and present it to their stupid command before embarking on Hawr al-Huwayzah battle? It is certain that they did conduct such a study but the gang of mullas gambled with the lives of the Iranians and exposed them to annihilation. Consequently, both the Iranian political and military leaderships are responsible for the annihilation of those aggressors.

B. The Iranian enemy must realize that Iraq's military, economic, political and social capabilities and its capabilities in all spheres are growing and escalating. The fate of any future military gamble of which Iran may be thinking in order to try to penetrate our international borders, regardless of the size of such a gamble, will be total annihilation, i.e., 100 percent annihilation, either through the use of sophisticated and destructive new equipment or through the employment of new methods in the art of war. Each battle has its special mobilizational and operational methods and its special weapons. The leader president said: "Our resolution and the resolution of the command and of the armed forces are not just to foil the enemy offensive and to prevent it from achieving its evil aggressive objectives, which is certain, God willing. What is more important is to annihilate the attacking force totally.

C. This decisive battle will have serious field consequences to Iran's future, whether politically, by intensifying the sharp differences between the forces struggling for power, or militarily, because it has led to destroying nearly 13 divisions and paralyzing 2 others. Forming any division and bringing it to combat level requires a full year in time of war. A paralyzed division needs 6 months to be reorganized. Economically, the loss which Iran incurred in heavy and light equipment and weapons in its latest defeat will affect Iran's economy in the near future and will accelerate its collapse. Considering that the cost of a single regular division is \$15 billion, we consider that 12 irregular divisions were destroyed and that the cost of each irregular division is \$5 billion, then the total financial loss incurred by Iran in this battle amounted to \$60 billion. Moreover, the war costs Iran \$2 billion a month, i.e., \$24 billion a year. The costs of the weapons deals amount to \$9 billion a year. Considering that Iran is suffering from a fearful deficit in its budget and that its oil exports have decreased considerably in the wake of the air and sea blockade imposed on Kharj Island, with the oil revenues dropping to no more than \$10 billion a year under the best circumstances, then what will Iran do to meet such big expenses, to perpetuate the war machine, to secure the living requirements of its peoples and to make up for its deficit?

Iran is approaching an economic catastrophe with a beginning but with no end. Either it will have to reduce its armaments expenditures, raise the taxes on the Iranian peoples, which is a futile step because it will secure no hard currency for it, resort to more foreign loans at very high

interest rates and sell oil at very low prices or it will have to accept the peace opportunity offered to it by Leader President Saddam Husayn in his latest speech in al-Anbar in which he said: "What is required is for the Iranian people to live free on their land and for the Iraqi people to live free on their land without intervention in the internal affairs and provided that the policies of both countries be the type of policy that insures stability and peace in the area."

D. The severe and ceaseless pounding of the Iranian cities in the hinterland will continue and intensify as long as the Iranian enemy insists on war. Moreover, destruction of the vital installations and the blockade on Kharj Island will continue and escalate until they bring about total paralysis. As for the blockade in Iranian air space, our air force will continue to be the master of Iranian air space and will roam freely, imposing full control over it. In the sphere of decisive mobilizational and operational battles, the offensive operations will continue in order to destroy and annihilate the Iranian forces, not just with weapons but with the art of operations that distinguishes our rank and file, until the enemy is no longer able to fight, until his spirit of aggression dies and until he comes to peace meekly and submissively.

E. The extraordinary military genius of Leader President Saddam Husayn in the sphere of field, operational and mobilizational planning is what decided the "crown of the battles" because his excellency, with his expertise, experience, piercing intellect and penetrating foresight, knows the enemy's malicious intentions. When the president was discussing the enemy's intentions with the command members one night before the start of the offensive, his excellency stressed that the enemy would advance from al-hawr area. When one of the brother officers said that this was unexpected of them because it would cause them heavy losses and saddle them with numerous difficulties, his excellency answered: "They do not think in this manner. Illogic is one of the enemy's characteristics, and so is disregard for human life. If they had any regard for human life, the war would not continue. They throw their men to their deaths for an illegitimate and an unattainable goal."

#### FOOTNOTES

- (1) Leader President's Speech in al-Anbar on Thursday, 28 March 1985.
- (2) Ibid.

#### Summary of Points

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 18 Apr 85 p 3

/Article by Staff Brig Gen 'Abd-al-Rahman Khaz'al: "Second East Tigris Battle: Analytical View"/

/Text/ 1. The second East Tigris battle in Hawr al-Huwayzah from 12-18 March 1985 has characteristics that distinguish it from the other successful battles. It has been called the crown of battles to underline its importance and its consequences in the course of the Iraq-Iran war. Therefore, this battle does not end with its immediate positive results but represents the start of a coming phase in our war with the Iranian enemy because it is tantamount to an arrow that has hit the enemy's heart and affected the enemy's center of gravity. Its impact on the enemy has been big, whether in material terms, embodied in the enemy's human and military equipment losses, or in intellectual terms, embodied in weakening the enemy's will to fight. This battle has provided a suitable object for the interest of military thinkers who have found in it rich material for their analyses and projections, enabling them to derive lessons and future expectations regarding the outcome of the Iraq-Iran war that has been going on for more than four and one-half years.

2. Iraq has proven practically that it has no ambitions in Iranian territories and that its objective as declared and underlined by Leader President Saddam Husayn, may God keep him, in his well-known message to the commander of the 4th Corps on 29 March 1985, is: "The main objective of the battle going on between us and Khomeyni's regime is not to keep the land. As long as we have underlined our readiness to return the land peacefully, then the land in itself does not constitute an objective. The main goal is to protect Iraq's territories, people, freedom and accomplishments. Therefore, our presence on Iranian territories is considered in light of this central objective and not in light of any other consideration." Thus, the appeal to the Iranian leadership's intellect to put the greater emphasis on reason and logic continues. This is why Iraq has taken an effective defensive position within its borders and has underlined its highly flexible positions in dealing with all well-meaning efforts to end the fighting. But this also has not been enough and the war has continued in the form of the successive Iranian offensives in all sectors east of al-Basrah, Maysan and Tigris, in the northern sector and in the central sector. In the face of all these offensives, Iraq has had to defend its soil, using its intrinsic capabilities. Iraq has, on every occasion, taught the enemy new and tangible lessons through the losses it has inflicted on the enemy's personnel, weapons and equipment, not to mention the moral lessons directed to the intellect of the Iranian leadership--lessons to the effect that it is futile to continue the battles. When we pause briefly before the nature of these battles, we notice an important aspect to them, namely that the heavy losses inflicted by our brave forces on the Iranian side in every battle have had a negative impact on the enemy's field command. The response of our armed forces in every battle has exceeded in its severity their response in the preceding battle. Then came the second Tigris battle which constituted the crown of the battles and in which a previous phase ended and a new phase of the war began--a phase in which the waiting, the anticipation and the enduring patience embodied in the effective defense turned into striking with a sledgehammer or with a thick club. It is a phase of disciplining the insane and the crazed in the hope that they will understand what it means to play with fire.

3. The crown of the battles has been distinguished by a certain characteristic and by a number of events and circumstances that have turned it into a new phase in which the effectiveness of the enemy's ground forces will recede and in which these forces will be pinned down to unenviable positions, as has happened with the enemy's air and naval forces whose effectiveness has been curtailed and which have ended up totally disappearing from the operational theatres. As for the circumstances which distinguished this battle, they are the following:

A. The enemy had prepared all the requirements of this battle and had continued planning and preparing for it since the second East al-Basrah battles and the subsequent first East Tigris battles. Therefore, the enemy had more than a year to prepare for this battle and he declared repeatedly that the decision was imminent and that the battle would be the decisive battle. The enemy was optimistic in his statements and threats and in declaring his enormous concentrations. When the battle started, he declared his full control over Hawr al-Huwayzah and over other vast areas and strategic roads. He made other statements reflecting the degree of its interest in this battle and in the results for which he had hoped by succeeding in the battle.

B. The enemy chose Hawr al-Huwayzah as the area for its offensive and the arena for its movements after long hardships and after he had repeatedly tried his luck in major and important battles on dry land and in most sectors. In every new battle, the enemy emerged with major losses and with a failure not different from the losses and the failure of the preceding battle, if not harsher losses and failure with a greater negative impact. This is why he thought long this time of staying away from dry land and of choosing al-hawr area, basing his decision on the following:

First, having tried his luck repeatedly, the enemy tried to steer clear of Iraqi armor, which are vastly superior to his. So he chose al-hawr area which, to his belief, is unfit for the advance of armor and an area where the activity of armor will be confined to barrage fire and to movement on the bridges found on the rivers, canals and waterways existing in the area. The enemy imagined that he would thus be safe from our blows.

Second, the enemy gave serious thought to avoiding the violent blows dealt by our air force and our assault helicopters and found that the reeds and papyrus growing in abundance in the shallow parts of the marsh are a good means to conceal his preparations, hoping that they would help reduce the constant losses inflicted upon him by our air force and our assault helicopters.

Third, the sparseness of the population living in al-hawr would give him enough freedom to move and hide, thus staying clear of our observation and securing the element of surprise needed for the offensive he had planned.

Fourth, the enemy believed that the units defending al-hawr would not, by virtue of the nature of al-hawr, be as concentrated as the units defending dry land. To avoid his numerous previous defeats in which some of his attempts were killed in the cradle and within a few hours of his launching them by our heroic ground formations on our borders, the enemy decided to steer clear of our dry land defenses this time and to turn to al-hawr.

4. As a result of all these considerations, the enemy decided this time to hurl his forces at Hawr al-Huwayzah, using it as a main channel for the advance of his offensive on the advice of the Zionists. Then followed the crown of battles to put all his projections in the eye of the storm as a result of the determination and resolution of our command and base. Our units confronted him individually and collectively from every direction and by air and land with such speed that stunned him and turned him into scattered smoke trembling in the wind and incapable of evacuating his remnants. It was a new phase, the phase of striking with the sledgehammer.

5. The crown of battles has had its negative ramifications on the enemy in two areas:

The first area is embodied in the big material losses inflicted on the enemy's military equipment and weapons and the human losses inflicted on the well-trained forces specially prepared to wage such battles. The enemy's best military units from the various branches entered the battle, some of them thrown into it for the first time, in addition to the Khomeyni Guard formations, with the size of these units equaling 15 divisions. These were the best forces the enemy had and that he could throw into the battle. They formed the center of weight of the enemy's units. With their destruction, the balance of the enemy's ground forces shifted and the battle was tantamount to a blow in the heart from which the enemy could not recover quickly. The conditions under which his air and naval forces live. Each of these forces is exhausted and is trying to find a breather to dress its wounds and to regain its balance.

The second area is no less important than the above-mentioned area. But it is more severely directed this time at the Iranian military thinking which is floundering and trying to find its cherished object in this or that battle. The prolonged planning for this battle, the major preparations made for it and al-hawr's natural conditions, which we have already pointed out, made the enemy attach a lot to the outcome of this battle and to consider it a definite success. This is why the surprising results of this battle struck their commanders like lightning and made them flounder, not knowing what consequences this battle will drag behind it. The outcome of the battle has also affected enemy morale generally and this will sooner or later have a considerable impact on the enemy's will to fight. This enemy will realize anew how incapable he is of waging a successful battle against Iraq. The crown of battles, which has initiated a new phase, will then have established the proper bases for the major, and perhaps final, military decision in this war. This is

because the ground forces are one of the main centers of weight on which the enemy relies to continue this war. The crown of battles has hit this center in the heart and this blow is equal to killing Rustum in the first al-Qadisiyah battle and its subsequent negative ramifications in terms of weakening the enemy's morale and his will to fight. Therefore, the crown of battles equals in its impact the words of that Arab Muslim fighter Bilal ibn 'Alqamah when he shouted, "by the God of al-Ka'bah, I have killed Rustum." This was important not because Rustum was killed but because he was tantamount to the center of weight or the heart of his forces. This is what the crown of battles has done currently after more than fourteen and one-half centuries since the killing of Rustum.

6. On the Iraqi side, military thinking was reflected and interlocked with political thinking, moving from phase to phase in the direction of the clear objective of defending Iraq. In every phase, this defense has administered to the patient lying on the Arab homeland's eastern borders the proper medicine in the hope of curing him of his malignant disease. The crown of battles, as well as the previous battles, has underlined three main points:

First, the brave, patient and wise leadership embodied in the person of Leader President Saddam Husayn, may God keep him, which has turned the Iraqis wherever they exist into a united and effective force moving in the direction of perpetuating the spirit of victory and reflecting an inseparable state of unity between the army and the people.

Second, a field command with an enhanced ability to manage sophisticated large-scale battles waged in a modern way and similar in type to the unique battles in military history, whether in terms of the size of the participating forces, of the interlocked and balanced capabilities of the forces or in terms of the extraordinary speed with which the situation was decided in our favor, with the big losses sustained by the enemy and with the likely consequences on the course of the battles and of the war for which all the Iraqis have sung "O battle follow wherever we go."

The third point is the firm cooperation and coordination among all branches of the armed forces. The battle seemed like a single picture with bright colors for which unequalled firepower was secured in the battlefield--firepower which scared the enemy and ended its presence in the entire operations arena, thus overturning the balance on which the enemy had relied to perpetuate the offensive's momentum. It is a battle that has made the enemy regret his act, claiming that it was not a decisive battle while actually wishing he had not embroiled himself in it. However, it is too late. History has crowned the second East Tigris battle in Hawr al-Huwayzah. It has truly been a battle to crown all battles. Finally, may God's mercy be upon Bilal ibn 'Alqamah who determined the goal and the center of weight and sought him with a fatal stab more than 14 centuries ago, with his foe collapsing and dying under the weight of his wounds. This is how the crown of battles has been after 'Alqamah.

ISRAEL

TIES WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA NOTED

Nicosia FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 22 Jun 85 pp 28-29

[Text] Israel currently has diplomatic relations with six African states: South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Liberia and Zaire. The latter restored diplomatic ties with Israel on 15 May 1982, and Liberia restored relations in August 1983. Liberian President Samuel Doe was the first head of an African state to visit Israel, on 22 August 1983. He was followed by President Mobutu of Zaire in May 1985.

Beginning in 1981, official contacts with Zaire led to the opening in Kinshasa of an official mission responsible for Israeli interests. On 5 November 1985 AFP, quoting a senior Israeli official, stated that "12 other Israeli missions are currently operating in Togo, Kenya, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, and Ghana." The official refused to cite the names of the other seven countries, but he continued, "The experiment in this area does not raise expectations that diplomatic relations will be restored in the near future."

During his recent visit to occupied Palestine, President Mobutu stated that he believed that other African states would renew diplomatic ties with Israel in the future. Also, Mobutu informed Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir that, "It is just a question of time until other African states renew ties with Israel."

During the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, optimism and expectations were high that certain countries would restore relations with Israel. Israeli sources were saying that the likely countries at that time to restore relations were Zaire, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Gabon, Togo, the Central African Republic and Ghana. This optimism, however, was not warranted due to fears on the part of African countries that a restoration of relations with Israel would jeopardize Arab aid offered to these countries. Since the 1973 war the Arab states have provided sub-Saharan African states with more than \$12 billion. Nonetheless, Israel has succeeded in restoring relations with Zaire and Liberia and no Arab pressure has been applied to these two countries, which will encourage other African states to follow in their footsteps.

The Africans were also afraid that the Palestinian resistance would carry out operations against states that renewed relations with Israel, but the absence



of a Palestinian reaction against the states that have renewed ties has vitiated this reservation.

The strange thing is that the Saudi businessman known as Khashoggi--the broker who profited at the expense of the cause of our people when he cooperated with Numayri and organized the transport of the Falashas from Ethiopia to Israel via Sudan--invested \$100 million directly in Zaire after it restored ties with the Zionist entity, as if the Arabs were rewarding Zaire for renewing ties with Israel. There was no Arab or Palestinian reaction to this broker-businessman. He moves about freely in the wake of his crime, as does President Numayri.

Thus it appears that the African fears have disappeared and that the restoration of relations with Israel on the part of African states has become a "matter of time." The African states have already taken a step in this direction. A number of countries have followed the example of Sierra Leone and Kenya, who have permitted Israel and representatives of its interests to operate through the embassies of third countries.

In August of this year the daily Israeli paper of the Labor Party, DAVAR, reported that Guinea and Cameroon have decided to allow Israel to open unofficial diplomatic bureaus in their capitals.

Since early 1975 Israeli experts have resided in Conakry in the buildings of the Organization of African Unity, whose construction was financed by the Arab states so that Conakry could host the African summit conference. In an interview with French radio on 13 March 1985, President Lansana Kunte stated that the Israeli presence is limited to a research mission, but he added, "We have not committed ourselves at any time to restoring relations with the Jewish state. This must be clearly understood." In any case, the Israeli mission, as he later added, enjoys diplomatic status at the level of an embassy.

#### Supervisors, Experts, Advisers

In Addis Ababa, the chairman of the Israeli company Amiran is an officer in the Israeli intelligence service and is viewed as a representative of Israel in Ethiopia. He behaves on this basis, meeting with ambassadors and foreigners and holding discussions on behalf of Israel.

The magazine JEUNE AFRIQUE reported the names of three Israeli individuals who are secretly playing the role of advisors to African leaders. These three are David Libvan in Senegal, Yitzhaq Yulitz in Gabon and Me'ir Mihwas in Cameroon. The magazine said that the Israelis complain about being considered security experts, but there are a number of leaders of African states who seek help from Israel specifically for security problems.

Numerous Israeli companies are playing an important role in Africa. Trade between Israel and Africa is witnessing a significant increase. The value of trade between Israel and Africa in 1982, with the exception of arms sales, was \$87 million. In 1983, however, it totaled \$130 million. Nigeria represented the primary Israeli market in Africa and accounted for half of Israeli exports

to the African continent. Nigeria is followed by Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia.

The role of the Solel Boneh company in Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and Kenya is clear and tangible. It has built thousands of housing units, hotels, schools, colleges, factories and hospitals. The numbers indicate that 80 percent of Solel Boneh's activities are conducted in Africa. It employs 15,000 African workers and 400 Israelis, and provides 6 schools for the children of Israeli families in Africa--1,200 students are enrolled in the schools.

The value of Israeli military exports to Africa in 1983 totaled \$83 million and included missiles, ships, planes, machine guns and communications equipment. In addition, a number of projects have been undertaken in various locations in Africa. An Israeli company has carried out some projects in Basusukru, the birthplace of Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny, and has built the Abidjan cathedral. Israeli businessman Leon Tamam, who also holds British citizenship, announced in 1984 his plan to employ \$500 million in Zaire. Tamam arranged for a secret meeting in Monte Carlo aboard his private yacht between Mobutu and officials of civilian and military industries in Israel. Tamam himself is a relative of Israeli President Herzog, who received the president of Zaire during the private portion of his recent visit to the Zionist entity. Tamam has actually invested millions of dollars in Zaire in the agriculture and husbandry sectors.

#### Nisim Ga'on

In Liberia, the Israeli company (Elyon) International has obtained a 38-year concession in the forestry sector. Another Israeli company has signed an agreement to build the Central Bank of Liberia offices, and the company is conducting a study for a cedar project for the Ministry of Agriculture at a value of \$20 million. In addition, Israel has begun to refurbish naval facilities in Liberia.

There are also the companies of Nisim Ga'on, a man of Egyptian origin but Israeli nationality, who has established two main companies that operate in the international grain and foodstuffs trade, especially in Africa, Eastern bloc countries and the People's Republic of China. These companies have contracted to construct hotels in Nigeria, build roads, import various goods and distribute them, and engage in construction through contracting subsidiaries. Israel has benefited handsomely from this since a significant portion of the construction materials, labor and raw materials come from Israel. He has concluded secret deals for Israel with countries that "do not have diplomatic relations with Israel." He accompanied Begin in his meeting with al-Sadat at Bi'r al-Sab', and his contacts with the Israeli intelligence service are very strong.

In the Ivory Coast, President Houphouet-Boigny met on 4 January 1977 in Geneva with then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. It was expected at that time that relations would be restored between Israel and the Ivory Coast.

The president of the Ivory Coast also met in Geneva with Yitzhaq Shamir on 14 June 1983. Other contacts have been made between the director of the

president's office and Israeli diplomats. The Ivory Coast president has also met with a number of other Israeli officials, including David Kimche and Avi Primor, the deputy director general of the Foreign Ministry responsible for Third World relations. He is Israel's Africa man. The meeting with this official took place in October 1984 and represented an attempt to arrive at a consensus for the restoration of relations between Israel and African states.

#### Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, in addition to the Israeli companies Amiran, Farma and a shipping company, Israeli trade with Ethiopia has been ongoing. This is mentioned in the official Ethiopian statistical publication. In the statistical book issued by the Ethiopian government for 1982, Ethiopian exports to Israel in 1981 totaled 3,794,000 birr. The U.S. dollar equals 2.7 birr. Ethiopian imports from Israel totaled 10,957,000 birr. In addition to this, there have been various contacts in regard to visits and assistance. Ari Ari'el, the president of the Israeli Magen David Adom, said on 9 January 1985, "The Ethiopian government has accepted Israeli aid to help those suffering from starvation." He added, "A ship carrying food and medicine will depart on 17 February 1985 from Elat port on the Red Sea for Asmara." Ethiopia has obtained on a number of occasions weapons and spare parts from Israel and announced that it had received weapons in 1981.

In Conakry, former President Ahmad Sekou Toure sent an invitation to visit to Shlomo Halil, former Israeli ambassador to Conakry and current president of the Knesset. In less than 2 months after this--at the beginning of March 1984--Halil returned to Guinea accompanied by Avi Primor and three other officials. The Israelis stated that Sekou Toure had informed them of his desire to start a program of cooperation and capital investment, but he died on 26 March, before a study could be completed of his program.

Avi Primor returned to Conakry at the beginning of 1985 and met with Guinean Foreign Minister Fasini Toure and Colonel Diaza Toure, who occupies the post of prime minister. The new Guinean president did not condemn the contacts, but confirmed that representatives of the Guinean government had met with Israeli officials.

Sharon visited the Central African Republic in November 1981 and Israeli cooperation between the two sides was begun. There has been agricultural cooperation between the two countries since August 1983.

There is an Israeli mission in Cameroon that is training the Presidential Guard, and there is agriculture cooperation between Israel and Cameroon.

#### Chad

In Chad President Hissein Habre, who came to power through the support of Egypt and Sudan, met with General Sharon in June 1982. Sharon promised military support for Hissein Habre in a number of forms, including advisers who accompanied the Zairean forces that were sent to Chad. Hissein Habre, like other African chiefs of states, however, is hesitant to take the bold step of restoring relations publicly, fearing a loss of Arab aid.

Israel has achieved important successes in Africa. Currently it has trade and military relations with 22 African states, more than 4,000 Israeli experts and advisers working in these countries, and about 16 Israeli companies operating in Africa.

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ISRAEL

ANALYSIS OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN WEST BANK

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV Business Supplement in Hebrew 21 May 85 pp 12-13

[Article by Aharon Pri'el: "Israel Sells More to Judaea, Samaria and Gaza than It Buys from These Territories"]

[Text] Agricultural production in Judaea, Samari and the Gaza Strip is, of course, intended to supply the needs of the local populace. It is also destined for export, principally to Jordan and other Arab nations. In 1984, income from agriculture in these areas, averaged over the course of a year, accounted for more than one third of the total revenue earned by residents of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza.

Agriculturally, this was the worst year in the last decade. The drought that had hit the area seriously affected the heretofor stable position of agriculture in the economy of Judaea and Samaria. The same was true in Israel, and, according to the statistics reported, the situation was the same in Jordan, too. "We are witnessing a prolonged process of decline in the economic viability of the agricultural sector in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip," said Yore 'Artzi, staff officer for agriculture in Judaea and Samaria.

In 1984, cultivated agricultural terrain amounted to 1.6 million dunams, of which only a minute portion, 95,000 dunams, was used for irrigation crops. Out of the total area, 110,000 dunams were used for growing vegetables, 55,000 dunams for growing melons and cucumbers, 1 million for cultivated crops, half a million dunams for field crops. Olive groves--the major agricultural endeavor in Judaea and Samaria--spread over 765,000 dunams (7 million olive trees, producing 62,000 tons of olives which yielded approximately 25,000 tons of olive oil). Twenty-nine thousand people were directly employed in agriculture, less than in previous years. This is indicative of the move from agriculture into other areas of endeavor.

The olive growing sector in Judaea and Samaria, says Yore 'Artzi, has, over the last few years, undergone a minor revolution, since the establishment of 50 automated presses. Simultaneously, many changes were introduced in the growth and cultivation of olives to improve the quality of the olives and olive oil and to increase yields. The changes that transpired in this sector--principally the establishment and operation of the automated presses--caused changes in the society and traditional lifestyles of village residents.

Agricultural production in Judaea and Samaria represents only approximately 16 percent of the total agricultural production in Israel. According to the organizational and operational structure, as well as the nature of the crops, agriculture in Judaea and Samaria is not and will never be in competition with Israeli agriculture, two exceptions being the tomato and eggplant crops. Even then, it is only during the 3 short winter months that there is any competition.

#### The Point of Conflict with Israel: Agriculture

Agriculture in Judaea and Samaria is divided into three main sectors: one third is animal husbandry, one third is cultivated crops and one third is field crops and vegetables. The vegetable sector (tomatoes and eggplant) and the cultivated crops (grapes and plums) are the "point of conflict" with Israeli agriculture, constituting the focal problem in the network of reciprocal relations between the two production systems. "With the exception of a short period for growing tomatoes and eggplants in the winter season, Arab agriculture in Judaea and Samaria does not impact on Israeli agriculture and Israeli agriculture does not impact on Arab agriculture. In order to deal with this "conflict" and create a market balance between the two production systems, we introduced tomato and eggplant crops into the production planning and quota framework a year ago, explains Yore 'Artzi. But, as the agricultural organizations in Israel claim, "This arrangement does not always work and the floating markets in Israel for agricultural produce from Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip cause huge losses to Jewish farmers." Floating markets, they claim, do not always occur by license, and massive smuggling is part of the game.

On the other hand, Arab farmers from Judaea and Samaria, in a conversation with a MA'ARIV correspondent, claimed that "without the cooperation of Jewish merchants, it would be impossible to export our produce into Israel."

Agricultural output from Judaea and Samaria in 1984, by sector, was as follows: 25,000 tons wheat (half the yield on 1983), 16,000 tons barley, 12,000 tons potatoes, 67,000 tons tomatoes, 16,500 tons cucumbers, 18,000 tons eggplant, 7,300 tons dried onions, 80,000 tons watermelons and melons, 62,000 tons olives, 36,000 tons grapes, 10,000 tons almonds, 14,500 tons plums, 11,000 tons dates, 16,000 tons bananas, and 74,000 tons citrus. On the average, approximately half of the vegetables grown were earmarked for export to the Arab world via the open bridge policy, effectively with full cooperation from the authorities in Jordan and beyond.

Moshe Levi, head of planning for the office of the agricultural staff officer in Judaea and Samaria, explains that "it is worthwhile and desirable from an economic point of view to exploit the relatively advantageous position held by Judaea and Samaria Arabs in agriculture, which is almost entirely based on unirrigated crops which do not require watering." He rejects the claim that fresh agricultural produce from Judaea and Samaria harms farmers in Israel. "Since the agricultural administration was introduced in Judaea and Samaria's planning program in a few conflicting sector, farmers in Israel have had nothing to worry about. To the contrary, in terms

of shortages, imported vegetables from Judaea and Samaria can, from the consumers' perspective, bring down prices and create a market balance."

In 1983, the vegetables produced in Judaea and Samaria amounted to 173,000 tons, of which 133,000 tons were earmarked for local consumption, 25,000 tons were exported to Jordan, and the remainder went to Israel and Gaza, "by virtue of unwritten agreements." Due to large yields of tomatoes and eggplant in 1984, almost half the yield was left in the field, because there was no one to sell it to.

#### They Buy Everything They Can in Israel

The data prepared by the agricultural staff in Judaea and Samaria on trade in 1983 between Israel and Judaea and Samaria point to a huge gap between Israeli exports to Judaea and Samaria and the quantities imported from these areas.

In 1983, Israel exported agricultural and industrial products, food and agricultural equipment amounting to 22.4 billion shekels, versus 7.3 billion shekels in imports from Judaea and Samaria, of which 1.2 billion was agricultural produce--mostly fruit, vegetables and oil. In 1982, Israel's exports to Judaea and Samaria amounted to 9.2 billion shekels, mostly agricultural products, of which 1.1 billion was fresh produce. In the same period, Israel imported merchandise and products from Judaea and Samaria amounting to 1 billion shekels, of which only 134 million shekels was fresh produce.

"These statistics indicate that the agricultural sector in Judaea and Samaria does not represent a threat to Israel's agricultural market. The residents of Judaea and Samaria consume more of certain products that they produce. That which they lack, Israel supplies."

Approximately 40 percent of the egg and milk product supply in Judaea and Samaria is imported from Israel. "They buy everything Israel can sell them. After all, the prices of these products, due to the fact that they are subsidized, are 50 percent lower than the prices in Hebron or Nablus," explains Moshe Levi.

The general manager of the vegetable council, Simha Ofer, believes that agricultural production in Judaea and Samaria does "endanger Israeli agriculture to some degree." But this is true only for a relatively short period, the months of February-April, and only with respect to tomatoes and eggplant. Last winter, the extent of tomato production in Judaea and Samaria came to 35,000-40,000 tons. If the total consumption in Israel had been 10,000 tons of tomatoes a month, Judaea and Samaria's farmers would have filled the demand during this period. Since large quantities of the produce from Judaea and Samaria is earmarked for export, "It is wise to maintain the current market system for production and in consideration of the scope of consumption by the local population in Judaea and Samaria, in order to prevent a collapse of prices in the local Israeli market, which in turn would create losses for our farmers."

At the same time, the Arab farmers in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza began to understand the importance of and the need for short and long-term planning.

#### Recommendation: Joint Planning

Following a brief submitted by the vegetable growers organization against the vegetable council and the Ministry of Agriculture, a committee for planning and marketing vegetables from Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip was established a year ago by the general manager of the Ministry of Agriculture, Me'ir Ben-Me'ir. The committee's recommendations were accepted by both sides as a compromise agreement, which went into effect as a judgment. Heading that committee was Professor Shemu'el Pohoriles, manager of the agricultural development and planning network.

The committee's recommendations were based on the assumption that vegetable production in Israel, Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip form an integrated economic network requiring production and marketing agreements that apply to both sides of the green line.

The overall production of vegetables in Israel and the territories, says Professor Pohoriles, amounted to 1.3 million tons, of which 976,000 tons came from Israel. Of this quantity, 142,000 tons were destined for export, with approximately 40,000 tons going to Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. Production in these areas amounted to 260,000 tons, of which 190,000 tons were for local consumption and approximately 70,000 tons were for export--40,000 tons to Jordan and 30,000 tons to Israel.

Since during certain production seasons (the reference being mainly to tomatoes during the winter months) there are excesses beyond the consumption capability of the existing markets, the situation calls for arrangements "that guarantee the smooth operation of the market." These arrangements must be based, according to the committee's recommendations, on the fact that a mutual flow of goods and services must occur between Israel and Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, "thereby creating economic integration and reciprocal ties between them."

The committee also recommended that since the majority of the vegetables which flow from Israel to the territories are of a higher quality than those which reach Israel from the territories, "It is possible that this situation will harm the effectiveness of Israel's planning, since planning in Israel takes only grade A produce into consideration. Preventing the exchange of other grades of produce would likely put pressure on prices in local markets and affect the growers' profits."

In 1983, production ceilings for tomatoes and eggplant were imposed in the Jordan valley; edicts and regulations were released on the marketing of agricultural produce from Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. Two years ago, it appears, there were still surpluses, although production ceilings on problematic crops had been established. Since the enforcement network has not successfully prevented excesses--i.e., has not been able to prevent smuggling--the committee recommended a joint planning program for all vegetable production in Israel, Judaea, Samaria and Gaza--all this based on the needs of the local market and exports to all destinations.



Together with an integrated planning policy for all areas, along the lines of the methods accepted in Israel, the committee also recommended establishing production ceilings for problematic crops (tomatoes and eggplant) as a first step, in coordination with the vegetable council, and the establishment in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip of a monetary fund for absorbing excesses, to be funded by farmers in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza and the civilian administration. The amount collected from the farmers would be a "territorial levy" to be set by the civilian administration. The compromise agreement further suggests that the control and monitoring network must be stepped up vis-a-vis the transport of agricultural produce at a number of defined crossings, which can be cited in advance, for stricter control.

The planning system in Israel and the farmers in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip are aware of the focal point concerning the future of agriculture in their areas: the open bridge policy. Simha Ofer, general manager of the vegetable council, points out that all exports across the bridges are planned for and controlled in effect by Jordan, as Jordan controls the quantities imported from Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. Any change in the delicate balance that exists today, based on exports via the open bridges, might cause an upheaval within the production network in Israel, Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, "with the knowledge that even the development recommended for Jordan's agricultural sector, which reached impressive proportions in terms of the level of sophistication and yields, endangers the position of agriculture in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza.

[Box on p 13]

#### Pohoriles: Planning is Required

Professor Shemu'el Pohoriles, manager of the agricultural planning and development agency, former head of the inter-agency committee for vegetable planning and marketing in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, said in an interview with the Business Supplement that cooperation and healthy economic relations between Israel on the one hand and Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip on the other, would benefit both sides, "who both have to gain equally from healthy and well planned reciprocal relations in economic spheres."

Judaea, Samara and the Gaza Strip, says Professor Pohoriles, represent the most serious market for absorbing agricultural produce from Israel, while Israel is a source of employment and income for 90,000 people who each day cross Israel's borders. There are even those who say that the number of Arabs employed in Israel is far greater.

Israel's agricultural production councils, Professor Pohoriles believes, treat the relations with Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip "like a grocery store," with no national, country-wide view of the situation, despite the fact that the economic benefits at this point are on Israel's side of the scales. This happens because of a short view of daily necessities and because only logistical considerations are weighed. "How can we sell another kilogram of tomatoes tomorrow?" The problem, he says, is that in the field of planning: "If you are involved in agricultural planning,

you also have to guarantee a market. It is impossible to establish production ceilings and ignore the implementation thereof."

In his opinion, any political solution that might be offered will have to take economic integration, which is almost organic between Israel, Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, into account. They will not eat without us, and we in Israel will not eat without them."

The fact that Israel has had, since 1967, a cheap available work force, he says, has caused a slowdown in the technological development of technical equipment to replace manpower, which is a negative phenomenon.

Agriculture in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip underwent a revolution from 1968-1975--from traditional, old-fashioned methods to modern, sophisticated, high yield agriculture. The average rate of growth in these years reached 11 percent per year, greater than in Israel. The rate of development in Judaea and Samaria can be gauged by the number of tractors, which increased nine-fold during the period in question. Per capita annual income in dollars grew five-fold; and the use of advanced technology and knowledge from Israel caused a drop in the number of people employed in the agricultural sector in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip during these 7 good years--from 46 percent to 29 percent of the population.

In Professor Pohoriles' opinion, "An effort must be made to create an appropriate framework for marketing and for the prevention of surpluses. The "point of conflict" between Arab agriculture in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip and agriculture in Israel is marginal, cyclical and limited to only four products."

Economists at the agricultural planning and development agency reached the conclusion that this situation "need not upset Israel farmers or their organizations."

#### Cultivated Land in 1984

(in thousands of dunams)

	<u>Unirrigated</u>	<u>% Change</u>	<u>Irrigated</u>	<u>% Change</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Field crops	433	-19.4	4	-75.0	437	-20.2
Vegetables	59	13.4	52	- 5.6	110	3.7
Cultivated crops	41	9.7	14	49.0	55	17.0
Cucumbers and melons	995	0.2	30	--	1025	0.2
Total	1528	- 5.6	100	- 5.4	1627	- 5.7

Net Quantity of Vegetables Brought into Israel  
(in thousands of tons)

In the table: The quantity of vegetables brought into Israel net the amount that is exported from Israel to Judea, Samaria and Gaza (according to data from the bureau of statistics -- supply of vegetables by source and destination)

	Years: 1978/1979	1979/1980	1980/1981	1981/1982	1982/1983
<u>Vegetables</u>					
All vegetables	9.6	11.8	35.2	27.5	8.8
Potatoes	- 4.8	- 7.5	- 5.5	- 6.5	-6.8
Tomatoes	- 6.7	- 2.0	- 0.2	- 1.1	-4.6
Cucumbers, gourds	7.2	7.8	10.1	10.6	7.9
Eggplant	8.7	10.4	15.3	12.4	4.9
Squash	4.0	3.3	7.1	7.2	8.3
Cabbage	0.1	0.3	--	- 0.4	-0.6
Dry onions	- 0.6	- 2.5	--	- 0.7	-2.2
Other	2.1	2.4	8.4	6.7	2.5
Total	-13.8	-18.0	-20.8	-19.6	-9.5

Vegetable Production in Israel and the Territories  
(in thousands of tons)

Years	Israel	Production Judeaea & Samaria	Gaza	Local Supply Judeaea & Samaria	Gaza
78/79	809.8	141.2	51.3	125.8	47.9
79/80	778.7	145.5	61.3	125.9	57.8
80/81	894.6	159.5	72.3	114.4	63.4
81/82	935.0	182.3	76.6	123.4	66.0
82/83	946.1	172.9	74.8	131.1	70.3
Growth 78/79-82/83	17%	22%	46%		

Vegetable Consumption in Israel  
(in thousands of tons)

YEAR	1980/1981		1981/1982		1982/1983	
	Total Consumption in Israel	Imports fm Judeaea, Samaria, Gaza	Total Consumption in Israel	Imports fm Judeaea, Samaria, Gaza	Total Consumption in Israel	Imports fm Judeaea, Samaria, Gaza
Cucumbers	51.8	19.5	54.6	19.4	52.5	13.9
Eggplant	38.1	41.5	33.1	37.5	24.5	20.2
Squash	23.3	30.5	24.3	29.6	25.5	32.5
All Vegetables	519.6	6.8	497.4	5.5	514.7	1.7

9811  
CSO: 4423/63

JORDAN

## MAJOR INDUSTRIES FACE PROBLEMS

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 7 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Pam Dougherty]

[Text]

JORDAN's new five-year plan is due to be finalised by mid-October, but the government is not waiting for the plan to sort out the problems of big industry.

Prime Minister Zaid Al Rifat and the Financial, Economic and Planning Committee have had intensive discussions this week designed to find practical solutions to the difficulties of the South Cement Company (SCC), the Jordan Fertilisers Industry Company (Jfic) and the Arab Potash Company (APC).

All are relatively new companies, but were planned back in the late seventies when the world economy was healthy and big expensive projects seemed reasonable.

By the time the plants had come on stream, however, the economic climate had changed, and all three have been facing problems, though not always for the same reasons.

The Jfic is producing quite efficiently, but world prices for fertiliser have been dropping steadily. The APC had no problems with either sales or prices; it is, after all, chasing only one per cent of the world market. But technical difficulties

have prevented it from reaching full production. The SCC has problems which stem largely from a decision, taken at a time when Saudi Arabia was enjoying a construction boom, to increase its capacity from the originally planned one million tons per annum to two million tons per annum. This added to construction costs and ultimately to the sales price of its cement—just when Saudi Arabia's own plants were coming on stream and its construction boom was fading rapidly anyway.

Both the APC and the Jfic have now sustained heavy losses for two consecutive years and are facing heavy repayments on loans they received for plant construction and equipment.

The government has now decided that the two should raise their capital, APC by BD16 million over a period of two years and Jfic by BD34 million over three years. They will also seek to reschedule their debts which will give them some breathing space while they improve their markets and prices.

One of the first steps to be taken by the fertiliser company will be to explore ways of using cheaper, lower-

grade phosphates. Jfic and Jordan Phosphate Mines Company have been asked to work together to conduct experiments on this possibility and to submit a report on their efforts within four months.

As for the SCC, the chosen solution is to merge it with the older and more profitable Jordan Cement Company in the hope that coordinated production will help both to reduce their costs and thus improve their profitability. Not that the picture for the SCC is all gloomy. In April this year, it signed a contract with Egypt to provide one million tonnes of cement over the coming year. But that still leaves a rather daunting one million tonnes per year to be sold on a depressed market.

Perhaps the government is anxious to sort out the big industries so that it can concentrate on other areas. The current five-year plan placed emphasis on industrial development, but the government is now keen to turn its attention to social development and the 'human' infrastructure, with health and education already scheduled to receive heavy investment over the next five years.

CSO: 4400/234

JORDAN

## PUSH ON TO MEET HOUSING NEEDS

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 13 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Pam Dougherty]

[Text]

JORDAN'S Housing Corporation, the agency charged with developing low-cost housing throughout the country, is planning to spend JD140 million on building new housing units during the 1986-90 five-year plan—a piece of news that must have brought a smile to the face of many a national contractor.

The biggest single project is to be the Queen Alia International Airport satellite town on the edge of Amman which will have about 3,000 housing units.

Time was when such a project would have pleased big, foreign contracting companies more than local ones because the financing and management involved in such a job would have put it in the big league. But now the Housing Corporation is planning to follow a system already used by the Water Authority, of sub-dividing the work into more approachable lots.

The Queen Alia housing units will be divided into groups of about 200-300 and work will be done gradually over the five years.

The main beneficiaries of the new estate will be airport employees who will have the chance to buy a home close to work at a maximum price

of JD12,000.

Local builders should also do well out of other Housing Corporation work located near centres of agricultural and industrial production throughout the country. The hope is that by improving housing outside the capital there will be one more incentive for rural people to stay where they are rather than flock to Amman, whose residents already list access to reasonable housing as one of their major difficulties.

The corporation's work will be supplemented by that of the Urban Development Department, which specialises in the cheapest of low-cost housing for Amman, the military and the private sector. Overall expenditure on housing is expected to reach JD600 million over the five years of the plan.

Unfortunately, everyone has to admit that even this rate of expenditure can in no way satisfy the need. If the corporation could build 100,000 houses instead of its anticipated 10,000 to 11,000 over the next five years, it would come closer to the actual requirement. But the corporation just does not have the money, nor for that matter does the government or anyone else.

But at least the housing difficulties of 1,800 families will be on the way to a solution before autumn.

The first 1,800 beneficiaries of the hc's current major project, the Abu Nuseir New Town, are due to be named in late September or early October.

They will then have the chance to buy units on an estate that is winning praise for its elegance and good finish. The only drawback is that prices range from JD12,000 to JD24,000, and families will have to have an income of at least JD250-500 per month to be able to handle repayment and maintenance.

But even at that price the corporation does not anticipate any difficulty in selling the units or the other 1,800 which should all have been delivered by the contractors by the end of 1986. It has already received far more applications than there are houses available.

And the beneficiaries may not even have to find that full price, which at present includes the cost of all infrastructure development. Prime Minister Zaid Rifai has suggested that the various organisations involved, such as the Water Authority and the Jordan Electricity Authority, might like to pay for their various areas and the government could offer some help for roads and such things as, in hilly Abu Nuseir retaining walls.

KUWAIT

DIRECTOR EXPLAINS DEVELOPMENT FUND POLICIES

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 8 Jul 85 pp 1, 13

[Article by Muhammad al-Shayti: "Oil Market Conditions Necessitate the Re-examination of Kuwait's Role in Development and International Cooperation On All Levels"]

[Text] Kuwait Fund for Economic Development Director Faysal al-Khalid has said that oil market conditions necessitate a re-examination of Kuwait's role in development and international cooperation on all levels. Al-Khalid explained to AL-QABAS Kuwait's new idea of setting up 100 percent Arab-financed and Arab-built projects. He pointed out that the Kuwait private sector has the opportunity to work with the fund in constructing projects in countries which are recipients of Kuwaiti loans. He stressed that the fund does not provide material loans, and will never reschedule any loan for any country unable to pay. He discussed how the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have resorted to pressuring Liberia into repaying the delinquent installments it owes to Kuwait.

Kuwait Fund for Economic Development Director Mr Faysal al-Khalid has invited the Kuwaiti private sector to diversify its activities and specializations in order to work with the fund in constructing some fund-financed works and projects in a number of developing countries.

Al-Khalid told AL-QABAS that the fund also welcomes the private sectors of other Arab countries, not just Kuwait, to provide the services, products, contractors or consultants needed to construct projects in countries benefiting from Kuwaiti loans.

Al-Khalid stressed that the fund is determined to continue its efforts to encourage Kuwait-registered contractors and consulting offices and Kuwaiti producers to take part in these activities, saying, "We have made useful suggestions in this context, and have invited Kuwaiti contractors, consultants and producers to more than one meeting to discuss this matter. We have also taken effective measures to encourage this tendency. We have reviewed

the projects they have prepared for prospective financing, and have directed them to those authorities which they can contact to obtain more information on these projects. Furthermore, we have drawn up detailed plans for each project to make it easy to ascertain its various aspects, what it needs in the way of building materials, electricity, and consultants, and to facilitate the presentation of the appropriate bids to the agency receiving the loan."

Al-Khalid added, "Unfortunately, those involved have not responded to this trend, even though bids for many projects have been announced by Kuwaiti contractors and consultants, local producers, and even other Arab countries."

He indicated that this would not deter the fund from its effort to encourage and urge these people to participate and compete freely and honestly. This would prove the ability of the Kuwaiti contractors, producers and consultants to compete and find out the facts, and thus confirm their standing alongside contractors, consultants, manufacturers and importers of various nationalities.

#### No Material Loans

Mr al-Khalid rejected the notion that the fund itself buy local goods and services in order to provide them as part of the loan, saying, "Usually the loan does not belong to Kuwait or to the fund, and according to the fund's regulations and statutes, a specific commodity or good cannot be imposed on the loan recipient. Procurement is carried out according to the specifications drawn up for each project, and all construction material for the project is procured according to international bids, which leaves no room for providing direct material loans. The fund cannot switch over to managing the marketing of Kuwaiti goods, commodities, services or the like, for we are concerned with providing opportunities, which actually exist, to those involved in marketing Kuwaiti and even Arab goods."

#### No Rescheduling Of Any Loan

Referring to the fund's loans and how some countries are having trouble repaying the installments due, al-Khalid categorically denied that the fund intends to reschedule installments due, saying, "No loan will ever be rescheduled; these measures are stipulated by the fund's statutes. When we reach this point, we resort to a group of measures which include stopping payments to existing or contracted projects, not considering any new projects for the country involved, and informing other development organizations of the situation to get them to help us exert pressure on the delinquent country to meet its commitments."

Al-Khalid voiced his belief that all these measures remain effective even in case of coups or changes of government: "The first announcement by the new government states that the new regime promises to honor previous commitments. We make loans to countries, not governments, and no country ever abandons its commitments."

## Egypt and the Fund

Speaking of his recent visit to Egypt, which could be considered a preface to the resumption of Kuwaiti loans and aid to Cairo, al-Khalid said that there was never any Kuwaiti or Arab decision to cut off economic and development aid to Egypt, and that the visit was part of the fund's continuing work, its follow-up of established projects, and its review of new projects. No clear-cut decision was ever taken by the Arab countries to boycott Egypt economically, even though its membership in some Arab economic and development organizations, such as OAPEC, the Arab Fund, and so forth, was suspended.

Al-Khalid pointed out that there is no Arab resolution obligating Arab organizations to avoid economic cooperation with Egypt, because such cooperation is a development operation pertaining to the Egyptian people and not the Egyptian government.

## Evaluating Relations

As to whether there is a new policy for making decisions on granting loans to other countries, because of the unfriendly stand taken at the United Nations by some countries who voted against Kuwait, al-Khalid said that there are no new measures in the exact sense of the word, but that a higher committee has been formed to evaluate political relations between Kuwait and those countries receiving Kuwaiti aid, whereby these countries' political stands on Arab issues will be appraised.

As for Liberia, which received a Kuwaiti loan, resumed its relations with Israel, and stopped paying its installments, al-Khalid said that Kuwait, as well as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have been putting pressure on Liberia, in keeping with the Kuwaiti fund's system for following up delinquent installments. He stressed that this was the case even before Liberia resumed its relations with Israel.

Al-Khalid pointed out that Liberia's response was that it was unable to pay, not that it refused to pay. Liberia's finance minister has said that his country would repay its debts when it was able to do so, and emphasized that Liberia had received only one loan from the fund since 1975. As for Zaire, its pro-Israeli political stand is well-known, and it has not received any of the African loans provided by the fund.

## Arab Coordination

With reference to the meetings of the Arab aid authorities which begin in Khartoum today, al-Khalid said that they will complement the coordination consultations which have been going on among the directors of operations of these authorities. The joint Khartoum meetings will complement the consultations taking place among the heads of the Arab aid funds, authorities and organizations.

Referring to the coordination which exists among the directors, he described it as being so efficient that there appears to be no need to submit any matter to the organization heads.



## The Kuwaiti Initiative

Speaking of the new things being discussed at the Arab aid authorities' meetings this year, al-Khalid said that in keeping with the desire of some Kuwait National Assembly members and the existing tendency within the Kuwaiti fund, the fund will take the initiative in examining the possibility of reviewing and negotiating the creation of 100 percent Arab projects, meaning that their financing will be wholly Arab and they will be built in an Arab country by Arab contractors.

He said, "This initiative on the part of the Kuwaiti fund will be proposed to other Arab funds. We hope that the heads of the Arab organizations involved will consider working to crystallize and implement this initiative."

## Overseas Signing

As to why some loan agreements are signed outside Kuwait, al-Khalid said, "There are more advantages to signing them abroad rather than in Kuwait. From the media standpoint, there is less effect on the country receiving the loan, whose citizens would be the target of direct media influence if the loan agreement were signed in Kuwait."

He explained that there is a tendency to use this practice more and more, since it is better suited to the implementation of the loan, and it allows the finance minister or the fund director to be on the scene in the countries receiving Kuwaiti loans.

## Self-Financing

In response to a question as to whether the Kuwaiti fund had reached the self-financing stage, i.e. where loans can be granted on the basis of installments collected from earlier loans, as well as on revenues from fund investments, with consequently no need to supplement the fund's capital, al-Khalid said, "The fund is trying to use the installments now being received in order to grant new loans. However, the fund has not yet received all of its capital. Once it does, we will strengthen our present financial outflow and try to create additional outflows from our own capital revenues."

## Repercussions From the Oil Situation

As for the repercussions of the oil situation on Kuwait's ability to participate in international and Arab development authorities and in the Kuwaiti fund, al-Khalid said, "Conditions in the oil market, along with Kuwait's near-total dependence on its oil revenues, will have their effect on Kuwait's ability to continue playing an effective, leading role in international development and cooperation. This means that the time has come to re-examine and re-evaluate this role on all levels and to draw up new guidelines and bases for Kuwait's participation in this sphere." He referred to the many government committees which determine the volume of Kuwait's participation in international organizations and the extent to which it responds to foreign requests for loans and aid.

KUWAIT

SMALL STOCKHOLDERS FACE PROBLEMS REPAYING LOANS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 9 Jul 85 p 12

[Interview with Small Debtors' Committee Chairman Mubarak al-Mayyal, by Susan Abu-Ghazzalah: "We Are Not Evading Repayment of Our Debts, and We Are Not Afraid of Going to Court"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The recently-formed six-man Small Debtors' Committee, which represents a group of small-scale dealers on the securities market whose bank debts do not exceed 500,000 Kuwaiti dinars and who are unable to repay their loans, met with Minister of Finance and Economy Jasim al-Kharrafi and Chairman of the National Assembly's Financial Affairs Committee Deputy Mishari al-'Anjari and discussed the committee members' problems, especially with respect to the court rulings handed down against them because of their inability to repay their bank debts which have come due.

In order to look into the accomplishments of this committee which made itself public early last month, particularly since the finance and economy minister's recent report recommended that the homes and incomes of the hard-pressed debtors not be touched, AL-QABAS met with Committee Chairman Mubarak al-Mayyal and conducted the following interview with him.

[Question] Why was the Small Debtors' Committee formed?

[Answer] This committee was formed after the small investors in debt to the banks became generally aware that no one was speaking up to help them overcome their tribulations arising from their inability to repay their bank loans because of falling prices for the stocks they hold. In view of this group's conviction that any solution put forth for the stock market crisis would have direct repercussions on their own case, the committee feels that this group of people must work together to find the right solution to their problem, especially since they represent a large group of citizens.

[Question] Some people believe that the conditions applied to small debtors are not applied to everyone, and that these conditions are peculiar to a certain group. What do you say?

[Answer] This belief has no basis in fact, the proof being the conditions we have placed for accepting any debtor as a committee member, which stipulate that the debtor must prove that he has dealt honestly and has invested funds obtained either from long years of work or from credit facilities from the banks. Everyone knows that this group was never a factor in the securities market crisis. For this reason, when we announced the committee during our June press conference, we said that this body represents a group of people who deal honestly and who still hold all their shares which, even if valued at less than their face value at the time they were bought, are not owed to anyone. I would also like to make it clear here that there is absolutely no room for speculators in this group, and everyone to whom the conditions apply can become a member.

[Question] It is said that you never sought anyone's advice when applying for bank credit, and that you are now evading repayment.

[Answer] We certainly cannot deny that, and neither can we deny that if the banks had not been certain that conditions were good at the time the investors obtained the credit, they would not have taken a chance on giving these loans, considering that the banks have made a complete study of the situation and have a very good idea of what is happening on the economic scene. We are fully convinced that bank officials desire nothing but the general good. As for the rumors that we are evading repayment, they are mistaken, and the exact opposite is the truth. We have contacted the officials to explain our point of view, and we are now trying to repay our debts as best we can. We hope that our problem will be seen as a common one, although conditions in 1985 are not like those of 1981 and 1982. Everyone must deal with reality and be more positive in proposing appropriate solutions. This refutes what is being said about our avoiding payment.

[Question] Some people say that you are afraid to go to court, that you don't want to do so, and that you are avoiding coming before justice. What is your answer?

[Answer] This statement is untrue. We are not afraid of going to court, and are in fact fully prepared to prove the opposite. It was for this reason that conditions were drawn up for membership in this group; previously we had been accused of restricting membership to a certain group. Let me ask something here: Couldn't a solution be found to which everyone would agree, instead of going to court? Are we not entitled, as citizens, to have the government, the National Assembly, and everyone else involved in the matter look into our problem and help find a solution to it? Furthermore, cases involving big stock market dealers have been solved in the past. If you combined all the debts of the small debtors, you would find that they do not equal even a portion of the debts of a single large dealer. Therefore, it is unjust and illogical to leave a problem involving so many citizens hanging in the air until now without any solution.

[Question] What do you think is the solution?

[Answer] First of all, I will mention my general ideas here, and will leave the details and proposals which the Small Debtors' Committee might propose to a better time, when they are requested. I believe that there are four main factors which, if present, would make the solution eminently possible: truthfulness, cooperation, sacrifice and good intentions. I believe that this problem must be broken down into parts and solved piece by piece, beginning with the small debtors, since solving this part is easy if everyone cooperates. The first step is to collect all these debts into one place instead of leaving them spread among all the banks.

[Question] What do you think of the proposals presented in the finance minister's report, which will be discussed in the National Assembly?

[Answer] We don't want to hold back events which are no doubt a positive step towards dealing with the financial crisis. As for what the report says about the committee, particularly the part dealing with settling the debts, we have achieved two of the requests which the Small Debtors' Committee made to the banks and which we explained to the executive and legislative authorities: protecting the integrity of home and income. The minister of finance and the chairman of the National Assembly's Financial Affairs Committee both understand this problem, and our country's amir has given priority to it from the beginning. As for the demands that the debtors and the banks begin settlements, we have some suggestions which we will explain to anyone concerned, so they can discuss them and give an opinion. But this does not negate the fact that the small debtors have become reassured that what had been upsetting them has come to an end, and that their problem is on the way to being solved.

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CSO: 4404/423

KUWAIT

# JOINT COMPANIES ESTABLISHED WITH CHINA, TURKEY

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 4 Jul 85 p 11

[Article: "First Meeting of the Board of the Arab-Chinese Fertilizer Company"]

[Text] A Petrochemical Industry Company spokesman announced yesterday that the first board meeting of the Arab-Chinese Fertilizer Company, in which Kuwait and Tunisia hold shares, was held recently in China.

The spokesman told the Kuwait News Agency that the Petrochemical Industry Company is represented by Board Chairman and Delegate Member 'Abd-al-Baqi al-Nuri, Deputy board Chairman Husayn Ibrahim al-Jasim, and Deputy Delegate for Marketing Affairs Tawfiq al-Ghurbali, while Tunisia is represented by delegates from Tunisian-Kuwaiti joint companies.

The spokesman pointed out that the Arab side holds 60 percent of the company's shares, while the Chinese side holds 40 percent.

He mentioned that the board took up an agenda which included the review of the company's final certificate of registration by the Chinese authorities, the passage of the company's basic statutes, the outlining of the jurisdictions of the board, the president and the vice-president ('Abd-al-Baqi al-Nuri being the company's vice-president), and a discussion of the jurisdictions of the Tunisian director general and the Chinese deputy director general.

The spokesman added that the board determined the estimated budget, which will be effective until the end of 1985. The most important budgetary clause deals with deciding on the company's location, preparing the site, and allocating the money needed to construct the project, which should be completed within 30 to 35 months.

In its first session, the board also looked into some administrative matters, including the formation of a committee to study the company's organizational chart and set the employees' grade and salary scale. Another committee was formed to present alternative ways of implementing the project.

The spokesman said that the Kuwaiti-Tunisian delegation left China on Monday 1 July for Istanbul, to meet with the Arab-Turkish company which had been established by an agreement signed on 17 May 1985 in Istanbul in the presence of Tunisian Prime Minister Muhammad Mazzali, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, and Kuwaiti Oil and Industry Minister 'Ali al-Khalifah al-'Adhabi al-Sabah.

The spokesman added that one of the most important topics covered at the Istanbul meeting was the passage of the law by which the company was established according to the previously-concluded agreement, as well as the presentation of the necessary documents for the company's registration to the authorities and their final publication. The meeting also looked into the nomination of board members and the appointment of the director general and his deputy, and prepared an agenda for the upcoming general assembly and first board meeting. He pointed out that the Arab side holds 60 percent of this company's shares and the Turkish side holds 40 percent.

The Arab shareholders are the Petrochemical Industry Company; the Arab Petroleum Investment Corporation (APICORP), an OAPEC company based in al-Khubar, Saudi Arabia; the Arab General Investment Company (SHA'A') headquartered in Dubai; and the Tunis-based Moroccan Chemical Industries Company, 40 percent of whose stock is held by the Petrochemical Industry Company.

8559

CSO: 4404/423

KUWAIT

BRIEFS

AUTO REGISTRATION REGULATIONS--Interior Minister Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah has issued a decree stipulating that no company, organization or bureau which sells automobiles, either new or used, can deliver the automobile to the buyer until it is licensed at the General Traffic Department and registered in the buyer's name. The decree states that such companies, organizations and bureaus must change the way they process the cars they sell within 1 month of the effective date of this decree at the latest. The minister also issued another decree pertaining to vehicles which some authorities, companies and organizations designate for employee use. This decree stipulates that the driver of the vehicle must be an employee of that agency, and his residence permit [iqamah] must be guaranteed by it. These agencies must officially inform the General Traffic Department, in writing, of every automobile registered in its name which is designated for employee use. The letter must give the name of the employee, his driver's license number, the date and number of his residence permit, and his place of work. These new measures are part of the tightened security measures which the Kuwaiti authorities are applying now in order to counter and take preventive measures against acts of sabotage and terrorism. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 7 Jul 85 p 1] 8559

CSO: 4404/423

LEBANON

SHI'ITE, CHRISTIAN LEADERS VIEW PRESIDENCY

Interview With Amal's Birri

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 13-19 May 85 pp 20-21

/Interview with Nabih Birri, cabinet minister and Amal Movement leader, by 'Abd-al-Hadi Mahfuz, Hashim Qasim, 'Ali Hamadah and Maha Samarah/

/Text/ Minister Nabih Birri, leader of Amal Movement, sat behind his desk joking with and welcoming the "young men." The room in which he received us was modest but it abounded with significant stories and signs. On one of the walls hung the picture of Imam Musa al-Sadr whose name was mentioned repeatedly during the interview. In one corner of the room was the photograph of rebel Adham Khanjar who sparked the 1925 rebellion which was led by Sultan Pasha al-Atrash in Jabal al-'Arab in Syria. Birri then pointed to a small booklet written by the late Maurice al-Jumayyil under the title of "Israel's Schemes and the Ostrich's Policy." Commenting on the book, Birri said: "Maurice al-Jumayyil realized the problem early." Birri also pointed to an Arab information pamphlet entitled "The Permanent Committee for Supporting the Lebanese National Assistance," and commented that there are still Arabs who are against Israel and that this information effort is their contribution to bolstering Lebanon in its battle against Israel. He then picked up a poetry book by Ahmad Harb, for which Birri had written the introduction, and said: He is a good poet. He then started reading the introduction he had written, enunciating the words with evident musical rhythm and stressing such words as land, wheat spikes, bullets, epics, heroic myths and "the south's oranges are grenades." He concluded his reading with the words: "Commitment is the craft of history."

Following is the text of the interview:

/Question/ Military and political developments in the past 2 weeks have given rise to contradictory conclusions, with some saying that we are at the crossroads of the birth of cantons and others saying that we are at the crossroads of the birth of the unity of Lebanon's soil, people and institutions. Where are we?



/Answer/ We are now closer to unity than ever before. The idea of cantons is out of the question and we will exert all our efforts to fight it.

/Question/ How do you reconcile this view which asserts that we are in the phase of unity with the demographic separation about which people talk?

/Answer/ The catastrophes that have happened are caused by the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and of other parts of Lebanon. The more the Israeli withdrawal operations are speeded up, the more united the Lebanese will become and the closer to each other they will move. Unity is not just the unity of the soil but also the unity of feeling, sentiment and conscience. If we examine what has happened in the past 3 years profoundly and seriously, we will find that those advocating the partition scheme have diminished, declined and retreated.

/Question/ What about the demographic separation and the estrangement of feelings? Are these accidental issues?

/Answer/ There is an exaggerated clamor and there is noise (in the verbal sense). Let me ask: What is happening in Tyre? I believe that not a single slap has been dealt even though the city has a high percentage of Christians. There has been no talk about al-Nabatiyah and South Sidon. The question here is: Why? The answer is because the credit belongs to Lebanese patriotism. On the other hand, what has happened in Mulaykh and Kafr Hunah? What has happened in the Shi'ite villages? Three individuals continue to be present in Mulaykh and all the Muslims have been expelled from Kafr Hunah, with only a little girl called 'Arrubah (a name reminding me of the Arabs) staying there. The people who were kidnapped from these villages are in the hands of Lahd's army and the hands of the Lebanese Forces. Despite my personal contacts with ex-President Camille Sham'un, I have not been able to gain the release of these people.

There is an important point. The Western world is aroused for sectarian reasons whereas we are not allowed to be aroused religiously. The world may be violently agitated if we hang a picture of Imam Khomeyni or of Imam Musa al-Sadr. The gist of these words is that the West moves religiously and yearns for the days of the Crusades. But we stress that we are not against the Christians and that we will defend all the faithful. It must be pointed out here that the voices that have been raised recently did not rise when entire villages in the south were annihilated during the Israeli invasion and throughout the period of its presence. I am eager to point out that we must always define the cause. The Lebanese Forces and Lahd's faction have been introduced into Safad al-Battikh, a joint village in Bint Jubayl District, and the Shi'ites have been evicted from it. This will reflect on the village population in the future. I say these words because they underline phenomenon that has occurred in the towns of Rum, Jun, al-Jiyah and elsewhere. We all

know the results. This is why we must all exert efforts to return the evacuees to their homes and villages. I have submitted a plan with Walid Junblatt providing a solution for the problem. But what is surprising is what the army and the Lebanese Forces have done on the ground.

/Question/ Is there a tendency toward military escalation, especially in light of the construction of fortifications, earthen barriers and the delineation of the new boundaries?

/Answer/ There are no preparations on our part. In the wake of the assurances made by Ja'ja' regarding West Beirut, we consider these assurances in light of the proverb which says, "He who loves you singles you out." What is more important than this is the ultimatum issued by the army commander, an ultimatum coupled with the actual following measures on the ground:

The announcement of Measure No 3.

Loading the tanks in the direction of Beirut and the mountain.

Focusing the artillery emplacements in the direction of Beirut and the mountain.

Moving the operations room from the Ministry of Defense to an underground site.

Eliminating all the roadblocks existing on the roads.

The army's building of sand barriers and hills near the Olivetti and Gallerie Sam'an.

All these steps have motivated us to alert our forces and to summon the reserve.

/Question/ Does what you have mentioned mean partition?

/Answer/ Partition means the spreading of the embers.

/Question/ Let us leave aside what Dr Samir Ja'ja' has said. People are not pleased with the departure to the border strip.

/Answer/ What happened was unexpected. What surprises me is the coup-like position of the army. The issue may be one of oneupmanship between the army and Samir Ja'ja' as to who will hold and control the land. But the army's latest measures, especially the army's movements, draw one's attention.

/Question/ There are those who say that the president of the republic has returned to Ja'ja' and that Ja'ja' has returned to the president of the republic.

/Answer/ It is my opinion that the issue of the presidency in this era has ended.

/Question/ Meaning?

/Answer/ After the 12 March movement, especially in the wake of the formation of the Salvation Committee, the rule has fallen into the hands of leaders of the capital's eastern sector, who do not include the current president of the republic. President Amin al-Jumayyil has become marginal. It is well known that Amin al-Jumayyil did not rule only in his capacity as the president but also in his capacity as controller of the Phalanges and of the Lebanese Forces (both of which he inherited). With the uprising of Samir Ja'ja', Amin al-Jumayyil lost the Lebanese Forces but retained the Phalangist Party. As a result of the dialogue, the Salvation Committee came into existence. One sees the following: First, military affairs have been left entirely in the hands of Ja'ja'. Second, the so-called Phalanges Security Agency is considered to be under the control of Samir Ja'ja'. Third, a political decision-making committee has been formed. This committee is comprised of pro-Ja'ja' leaders, including strongman Eli Hubayqah and, of course, Karim Baqraduni. If the military and political decision making are controlled by one hand, then this means that the decision making has come to be in the hands of the Lebanese Forces and is no longer in the hands of the president of the republic. If we tackle this issue from the angle of what had previously happened at the national and Islamic levels, we find that the national and Islamic lines agreed to the presence of the Phalange's son in the presidency because he could control the Phalange, stop the shooting and carry out the desired political reform. But in the wake of what has happened, I believe that the presidency is in a vacuum and is in a dilemma.

/Question/ There are statements to the effect that President Amin al-Jumayyil is the last Christian president of the republic. What is your opinion?

/Answer/ I do not support this opinion. These are statements made to scare the Christians and to put them at a dead end so that they may reject reform.

Let me remind you that Imam Musa al-Sadr, our leader, stated in the 1977 working paper the need for Lebanon's president to be a Christian. Moreover, the scary projection concerning the establishment of an Islamic republic only seeks to obstruct political reform and stop the process of development. This projection is meant to scare the Christians and, subsequently, undermine their rights. I must point out that the dispossession from which the Shi'ites suffer is also experienced by Christian sects in several areas.

/Question/ There are reiterated statements to the effect that political decision making will no longer be in the hands of the Christians from now on.

/Answer/ Yes, political decision making will not be in the hands of the Christians alone from now on. But it will not be without the Christians, either. It has not been in the hands of the Muslims and it will not be in their hands alone.

/Question/ Some believe that Jazzin is the yardstick of unity and partition. What do you say?

/Answer/ These are cliches. Jazzin is a Lebanese town and no harm should touch it. What is needed is for the army--an army acceptable to its inhabitants--to take over its security. This is what we have conveyed to Jan 'Aziz and to Jazzin's leaders.

/Question/ What is Amal Movement's relationship with Beirut?

Is it a relationship based on Amal Movement's visualization of the city's future, or is it a relationship based on the nature of the city itself, a city with its own history and position? This city supported martyr Kamal Junblatt's national position and advanced political vision without any effort on Kamal Junblatt's part to change its character or to put pressure on it.

/Answer/ Some projections go far to sow sedition not only between Muslims and Christians but also among the Muslims themselves and within a sect as well. Beirut is the capital of Lebanon and is tantamount to a heart into which the blood flows and in which the arteries intersect. It belongs to nobody and its decision making belongs to the nationalists. All its sects and parties supported 'Abd-al-Nasir. I believe that 'Abd-al-Nasir's pictures were hung in al-Nab'ah and that al-Nab'ah is part of Beirut. Beirut supported Kamal Junblatt, embraced the Palestinian revolution and adopted the 6 February uprising. This 6 February uprising still governs West Beirut. Those who rebelled on 6 February were not from a single sect and I say that the Sunna officers and soldiers who stood with me on 6 February were larger in number than the Shi'ites who stood with me.

/Question/ How do you reassure the Christians in the western part of the capital, especially in the light of some attacks, some unruliness and some excesses and particularly in a politically feverish climate?

/Answer/ Since the 6 February uprising, the Christians in West Beirut have not been subjected to any special hardships. There have been offenses that have touched all the people. The most significant offenses taking place have not been caused by hatred for the Christians. The strikes against the suburb have motivated people to move to live in Beirut. The thief is "the only patriot" because he makes no distinction. All are hurt. If you meet a Sunni, he says all that is happening is against him. If you meet a Christian, he repeats the same words. The same goes for the Shi'ite bourgeoisie which asks me to protect its buildings from forced occupancy.

/Question/ Syria is a historical, geographic and political reality. How do you view the relationship of the Lebanese, all the Lebanese, with Syria, especially after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon takes place?

/Answer/ Our relationship with Syria is a historical relationship. Lebanon and Syria gained their independence at the same time. This is in addition to the ties that bind Lebanese and Syrian families and to the common national holidays. It is the relationship of twin brothers. It is in the interest of both countries for this relationship to continue to exist and to be good. It must continue and grow in a distinguished manner.

/Question/ What about the Syrian army after the Israeli withdrawal?

/Answer/ Regarding the presence of the Syrian army on Lebanese soil within the framework of the Arab deterrence forces, this army will continue to be present until the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon is completed. When this is done, the Syrian government will withdraw the Arab army at the request of the Lebanese government.

/Question/ Some people speak of a confederal formula with Syria.

/Answer/ Not to my knowledge.

/Question/ What do you propose for overcoming the "presidency's dilemma?"

/Answer/ I am afraid to say that I am about to reach the conclusion that there can be no solution through the sectarian system. The solution might be difficult with the presence of a Phalangist in power. It has become certain to me that in view of the given internal facts, Amin al-Jumayyil cannot change or alter his position.

/Question/ Will we be facing a constitutional vacuum?

/Answer/ On the contrary, Lebanon needs to change its charter. It needs a different and advanced look at the future that secures an honorable and fair life for future Lebanese generations.

/Question/ Do your words mean that the 1943 charter has ended?

/Answer/ If the 1943 charter is good and suitable, then what has been happening since 1975, and what was it that happened in 1958?

/Question/ Do you believe that the 1943 charter is the major cause of the 1958 events and of the Lebanon War?

/Answer/ The 1943 charter is the main cause of the war. Some people attribute the cause to the Palestinians, but the Palestinians are present in all the Arab countries. In 1958, the Palestinians were not the cause. When the Lebanese, all the Lebanese, reach agreement, nobody will be able to interfere in Lebanese affairs.

/Question/ You have spoken of a distinguished relationship with Syria. Would you explain this?

/Answer/ A distinguished relationship is one brother's relationship with another.

#### Interview with al-Hashim

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 13-19 May 85 pp 22-23

/Interview with Joseph al-Hashim, minister of post, telecommunications and public health, by Nabil Barakis/

/Text/ In his private office at the Voice of Lebanon premises, Joseph al-Hashim, the minister of public health, telecommunications and post, spoke about everything free from the concerns of his ministry because the present time is one of politics, not of administration. Minister al-Hashim, who shoulders more than one concern, is trying to solve the problems under the most difficult conditions. The problems that have faced him and are facing him are not problems to be solved at the level of ministers and politicians but are much bigger problems, including the problems of the party to which he belongs with the "uprising." In the three-member committee, comprised of al-Hashim himself and of ex-Minister Michel al-Murr and lawyer Karim Baqraduni, Minister al-Hashim tried to attain a formula of understanding and agreement. This is in addition to the problems of his district and to the problems he faces as a result of the critical situation in the cabinet, considering that he is close to the president of the republic. This is on top of the problems facing President Amin al-Jumayyil, the concern of the broadcasting station as the pampered child, the concern of the mountain, the concern of the party, the concern of the evacuees, the concern of al-Shuf District and the concern of the cabinet, of the political meetings and of the departments and ministries.

In his office, al-Hashim spoke while looking at a picture of him with the late Pierre al-Jumayyil.

#### At Crossroads

The interview began with the political situation and with the existing congestion. He said:

I want to call it the national, not political, situation because the issue has gone beyond conventional political considerations and now concerns the fate of the homeland, as a land and as a people, and the fate of the state. I believe that we are standing at a crossroad: either witnessed in the area of Sidon and in the district, or make it a crossroad leading toward unification. I do not see that this can be achieved with ordinary means. I here ask the generals on the ground,

some of whom are cabinet ministers: Will they voluntarily give back to the state and to the mother government the power they have usurped from the state and the mother government? The unification of Lebanon's soil and people demands an extraordinary ability bolstered by a practical and moral international resolution.

/Question/ Besides the political congestion, what is your opinion of the military congestion?

/Answer/ It is an effect and not a cause. I have been raising the issue of political security and military security for months. Each is linked to the other. How do you expect the security situation to subside as long as the political tension and assaults by officials, politicians and vengeful information media never stop lashing at the regime, the state and the army to spread further the disunity, the division and the doubts and to achieve premediated objectives whose manifestations have become obgious? When the government security officials are the ones who commit the deplorable acts at the security, legal and human levels, then how can security become stable? It is vengeful security and political tension translated into vengeful military tension.

#### Underlining Positions

/Question/ Did your failure to attend the cabinet session cancel the session and obstruct the government's work?

/Answer/ I wanted to underline a position vis-a-vis the theatrical that has gone on for too long in the form of some ministers citing personal security considerations as a justification for not attending the cabinet sessions. Does security concern certain people and not others, or are they evading in order to perpetrate security violations and then disavow their responsibility for protecting the citizens' security? Or is it that only their security has to be taken into consideration and that they have nothing to do with the security of the country and of the citizens? In any case, an end must be put to these pretexts so that everyone may reveal his true colors.

#### President's Resignation

/Question/ There is more than one political and government leader urging the president to resign and depart. What is your response to this issue?

/Answer/ If the issue concerned the president of the republic as a person, the president himself would have taken a position and declared a decision. But the issue pertains to the presidency of the republic and not the president of the republic. The importance of the president of the republic in his position at present is to preserve the presidency of the republic, not his personal presidency. If the president of the republic resigns, will another president be elected or will the voices and the trumpets turn against the presidency of the republic in order to topple it? There is the likelihood that the president's resignation may lead to a vacuum in which many are awaiting to seize control of both the presidency and the republic.

/Question/ But there are government figures from within the cabinet itself demanding such a step.

/Answer/ What government figures in the cabinet? Have you ever heard of a government including opponents who fight the government, the regime and the system with the force of arms and still being called a government and cabinet? We are aware of the wagers of those making this demand. There are those who wager on knocking out the system through a constitutional void and there are those who wager on the lust for power even though nothing but skin and bones remain of the milking cow. There are those who wager on their own mini-states which they cannot establish under the presence of a constitutional government. This is the truth. Why the hollow claims? The most important reason making some people attack the president of the republic is perhaps the fact that the president has not wished to abandon his wager on the unity that combines all the people on all the land. I do not wish to cite here numerous proofs and pieces of evidence concerning a number of cabinet members. Can those who are in the government place an obstacle in the face of implementing the security plans, whether in Beirut or along the coastal highway, without us understanding what opposition to the Beirut security plan--an opposition which led to striking the city--means and what the obstruction of the security plan for the Sidon highway, an obstruction that has led to striking the district and the Sidon area, means?

#### Withdrawal Complications

/Question/ The faster the Israeli withdrawals take place, the faster the security incidents develop. How do you link these issues with one another?

/Answer/ We thought that speeding up the steps of the Israeli withdrawal would lead to speeding up the unification of Lebanon. But the outcome has been the opposite, considering that we have witnessed with the second withdrawal the completion of the separation and eviction processes. There are 100,000 evacuees whose eviction has coincided with the second Israeli withdrawal. They say that the unification will take place when the second withdrawal is completed. Should we ask by whose hands this separation and eviction have taken place?

/Question/ There is a call for the return of the inhabitants of /al-Kharrub/ District and Sidon.

/Answer/ It is a truly strange call. How can we tell people to return when they see with their own eyes heads cut off and bodies torn apart? How can they urge them to return when they are bulldozing their homes and houses? Under what security protection can they return? Under the protection of the same axes that have been wielded at heads and bodies?

/Question/ How do you see the picture of the future Lebanon after all that has happened and is happening?



/Answer/ All call for Lebanon's unity but do nothing to unite it. On the contrary, they work to entrench the partitions. I have stated, and the world got falsely shocked because of the statement, that if the Lebanese truly want partition, then why should they achieve this partition over pools of blood and mountains of skulls? This does not mean that we advocate partition. On the contrary, we are still wagering on Lebanon's unity and struggling for this unity. But Lebanon's unity means its sovereignty and its independence. How can this unity be achieved when Walid Junblatt declares in a press interview published recently that the formula he proposes is the federal or confederal formula and when he says verbatim: "What do Lebanon's independence and sovereignty mean? They are ridiculous words and slogans devoid of any meaning."

Despite this, we will continue to implement our convictions concerning our single homeland that is controlled by all. We will not capitulate to calls that will be accountable only to history.

#### Syria's Position

/Question/ What is the true Syrian position toward all that is happening?

/Answer/ As far as I know, the Syrian position is a position that supports Lebanon's unity and legitimate government. What we experience on the ground is the action of some Lebanese leaders who act rashly in an attempt to exploit their relationship with Syria. On our part, we are still convinced that upon completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Syria will take a positive stance on its fraternal responsibilities toward Lebanon. Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad is well known for his candor, truthfulness and noble positions. I still recall what he told us during our latest visit to Damascus 2 months ago, namely: President Amin al-Jumayyil has been the best president to rule in Lebanon from the time of independence until the present. This is also what we heard from Syrian Vice President 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, which confirms that what some leaders here say does not reflect the real Syrian position. What is more, Syria will fulfill its obligations to Lebanon as a homeland and a state and its obligations to the president of Lebanon.

/Question/ What does Syria ask of Lebanon and what does the Lebanese regime ask of Syria?

/Answer/ Special and firm fraternal relations are a common demand. However, the weak and powerless Lebanon that has been an arena of war, killing and terrorism throughout the past 10 years asks Syria to assist it in regaining its territory, authority, security and stability. As to what Syria wants of Lebanon, I do not think that there are ambitions or aspirations, contrary to what some people portray. But in order for joint coordination to exist on regional political affairs, this is something normal.

## Christian Front

/Question/ Let us return to the internal arena. Where have your moves regarding the Christian front reached?

/Answer/ We have made long strides in this regard. We are in the process of completing the contacts and efforts to make the Christian front a united front, not from a sectarian starting point but from a nationalist starting point. Those who are divided among themselves are also disunited from others and all fall into the game of division and partition.

/Question/ After all that has happened to the Christians, who will guarantee their existence and role?

/Answer/ I believe that a guarantee for one sect is a guarantee for all sects. It has become evident through the 10-year war that no sect has been subjected to acts in isolation from other sects. Protecting any sect or spiritual family in Lebanon means, by necessity, protecting the other sects and assaults on any sect are likely to include the other sects. The guarantee to the sects lies, therefore, in protecting all of them within the framework of the unique characteristics distinguishing Lebanon. Otherwise, if the war of sects in Lebanon persists it will become like a way of fishes, with the big fish devouring the small ones.

/Question/ Do you believe that the formula is still fit?

/Answer/ There is constant confusion in the word "formula". Do you mean the 1943 political formula or the coexistence formula? We cling to the coexistence formula but the political formula must undergo changes. These changes are noted in the cabinet /policy/ statement.

## Solution Soon

/Question/ How do you view the situation in Lebanon after the third withdrawal?

/Answer/ What we hope for is one thing and what happens contrary to our wishes is something else. Judging by previous developments, the picture looks glossy. However, we believe that the explosive Lebanese situation has become tiresome to all the regional and international forces. This night must have an end. Therefore, with the latest Israeli withdrawal, there must develop a clearer visualization of Lebanon's position, whether geographically or in terms of its people and its political formula. This is why I said at the outset of the interview that Lebanon now stands at a crossroad and that its arrival at the end of the tunnel is not very distant.

We hope that with the vigilance of all concerned, we will overcome any negative consequences that may expose Lebanon's position or unity to any risk.

8494

CSO: 4404/395

LEBANON

AFTERMATH OF CAMPS WAR EXPLORED

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Jul 85 pp 34-37

[Text] The horrifying events in Beirut bring even Lebanon into a new dimension of violent excess: as all sides recoil from the shock, ARABIA's special correspondent takes stock of the situation from several different points of view.

A different interpretation is proffered about the "war of the camps" in Lebanon by each of the sides involved. Yasser Arafat considers it as a part of a deal between Amal and Israel to make peace in South Lebanon. Nabih Berri, the Amal leader, and other members of Amal politbureau and ulema maintain that Amal has been acting preemptively against an Arafat conspiracy. The Syrian media has agreed with this latter view, accused the "Arafat gang" of what has been going on, and has sided with "the Palestinian people, rather than defeatist Arafat policy." Damascus radio explained that Arafat triggered the war as a cover for the Reagan-Hussein talks in Washington.

The Amal and Syrian propaganda failed when the Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF) refrained from asserting that Arafat was behind the war. Rather, it exclusively accused Amal of planning to disarm all Palestinians and not only the Arafat faction. PNSF further considered Amal counter to Palestinian existence in Beirut. Yet more isolation of the Amal-Syria position came from the Lebanese National Democratic Front (LNDP), led by Walid Jumblatt, which refused actually to participate in the war beside Amal, whereas a month earlier it had cooperated in controlling West Beirut and defeating Sunni "Al-Murabitoun" forces.

Colonel Gaddafi added to the worsening of the Syrian position. Although a Syrian ally himself, Gaddafi ignored the allegations against Arafat and accused Amal of conspiring with the Israelis. He added that what is going on in Beirut is proof that Arafat was misunderstood from the beginning and that he became a victim of a conspiracy to

disarm the Palestinians in Lebanon. This came as a surprise to many, including those who had expected sudden changes in Palestinian-Libyan relations.

Among the ironic developments is the anti-Arafat Fatah dissident Abu Musa's taking refuge with Sheikh Saeed Sha'ban in Tripoli (as Arafat once did) while opposing the Amal attack on the camps. Tripoli then became the biggest pipeline for the distribution of anti-Amal, anti-Syrian leaflets by the PNSF.

Ten days after the attack on the camps, Arafat, backed by Egypt, succeeded in securing a UN Security Council meeting and a subsequent statement of sympathy with the Palestinians in the camps and a demand for a ceasefire. By contrast, it took 24 days to secure an Arab League meeting. Some political commentators regard the two meetings as anti-Syrian developments of Arab and international policy. On the other hand, the Arab press was unanimous in supporting the Palestinians and denouncing the Amal position. The Iranian reaction was distinctively prompt. They sent a Foreign Office delegation to Beirut and Damascus on the fourth day, followed by a higher level one on the ninth day of the fight.

Syria, in contrast to its attitude in 1976, maintained a stubborn stand against Arab and international pressures to stop the fight before the agreement reached by the Lebanese and Syrian leaders. Syria's approach seems to suggest that Lebanese affairs are now an "internal" Syrian issue and that "external" interferences are no longer acceptable, be they by the Arabs or by the rest of the Muslim World.

Sheikh Saeed Sha'ban, leader of the Islamic Unity Movement (IUM) announced a week before the attack on


the camps that Amal intended to provide the second security belt (or buffer zone) for Israel in South Lebanon, reinforcing the one already provided by the Maronite forces led by Colonel Lahad. He based this argument on the detention by Amal forces of some Muslim units that were moving towards the south to fight against Israel. After the beginning of the camps war a severe public confrontation followed between Sheikh Saeed Sha'ban and the Amal leadership in which some Shiite ulema were involved beside Amal. The Sunni circles maintained two positions. The first was rumoured in private talks and it saw the war as a Sunni-

member of the CP politbureau, considered that it has all been because of the reactionary policies that the PLO is trying to implement in Lebanon. This was in line with the refusal of the Lebanese CP to sign a statement issued by the Arab Labour and Communist Parties because it included a denunciation of the Amal position and also Arafat, whom the statement held responsible for the events.

The position of Islamist forces was also characterised by a rejection of Arafat's policies, but they equally denounced the war against those in the refugee camps. This was expressed by Sheikh Maher Hamoud, member of Muslim Ulema

## Before...

June 6, 1982



- ① Tripoli: Syrian military control; Palestinian military influence; Sunni and Palestinian political influence
- ② Franjehland: Syrian military control; military influence and political control exerted by the former President Suleiman Franjeh, a Maronite rival to the Phalange party founded by Pierre Gemayel, father of the present president
- ③ Marounistan including east Beirut: military and political control by the Gemayels' Phalange; Israeli military and political influence
- ④ West Beirut: PLO military control; military influence exerted by a mainly Muslim and Druze

## conflict: Sunni political control


- ⑤ Presidential enclave at Baabda, including headquarters of Lebanon's national army
- ⑥ Druzistan: Syrian military control; military influence and political control exerted by the Jumblatt family, led by Walid Jumblatt; patches of Maronite political influence, exerted mainly by the family of the former president, Camille Chamoun
- ⑦ Sidon: PLO military control; military influence and

## political control exerted by Sunnis

- ⑧ The south: PLO military control; military and political influence exerted by Shias, Communists and the Popular Syrian party (PPS)
- ⑨ The Bekaa valley: Syrian military and political control; Shia, Sunni and PPS political influence
- ⑩ Haddadland: Israeli military and political control largely via Major Saad Haddad, a Lebanese Christian proxy; Maronite military and political influence

## ...and after

May 22, 1985



- ① Tripoli: Syrian military and political control except in city centre dominated by pre-Arafat Sunni fundamentalists
- ② Franjehland: same as 1982
- ③ Marounistan including east Beirut: military control exerted since March 1985, mainly by pre-Israeli rebel faction of Maronites' Phalange; political contest for control of the Phalange between rebel faction and President Amin Gemayel's Syrian-blessed faction
- ④ West Beirut: Syrian, Shia and Druze military control; Syrian, Shia and Sunni political influence
- ⑤ Presidential enclave at Baabda, including headquarters of Lebanon's national army plus Phalange militias loyal to President Gemayel; Syrian political influence
- ⑥ Druzistan: Druze and Syrian military and political control
- ⑦ Sidon: Sunni and pre-Syrian PLO military control; Shia military influence; Sunni political control
- ⑧ The south: Shia military and political control, exerted mainly by secular Amal party; Communist, PPS and Hezbollah (fundamentalist Shia) military influence
- ⑨ The Bekaa valley: same as 1982, but some pre-Syrian PLO military influence
- ⑩ Lahadland: Israeli military and political control via General Antoine Lahad and his Christian-led South Lebanese Army; Maronite military and political influence

Shiite clash, related to Syria and targeting the Lebanese (or possibly regional) Sunni existence. The second view was more publicly announced. It pretended to an appreciation of the Syrian position while requesting a ceasefire and a unity relying on Syrian involvement. The LNDF tried to bring pressure for the ending of the attacks on the camps. Thus it advocated both support for Amal and a ceasefire. The Lebanese Communist Party (CP) was the nearest faction of the LNDF to Amal and Syria. Nadeem Abdussamad,

Gathering of Lebanon. He said that "those who direct the war from beyond the sea (meaning Arafat), and those who have taken up arms because of ignorance and evil intentions (meaning Amal) are both responsible, both criminals in the eyes of Islam and history."

The political leader of the Islamic Group (the Muslim Brothers) in South Lebanon, Sheikh Araqa Dan, summed up his group's position by saying "despite our denunciation of the PLO's quadruple alliance between King Hussein, Mubarak,

Arafat and Saddam, we have to distinguish between the methods used and the people involved."

Sheikh Mohammad Ali Al-Juzu, the mufti of Mount Lebanon described the situation as "a celebration for the Phalanges and Israel, because Muslims are voluntarily killing Palestinians in their camps." He described it further as "a terrible act, shameful in terms of our history, culture and values. It is a new era, of deterioration and collapse of our Islamic values of fraternity." "Before we disarm the Palestinians," added Sheikh Al-Juzum "we should disarm Lahad's army and the Lebanese Forces the Phalanges." He is in this, closer to the undeclared Sunni view in Lebanon. The mufti of Lebanon, Sheikh Hassan Khalid, representing Dar-ul-Iftaa (Islamic Counselling House), reasserted the necessity for ending the fight by a weighty influence from Damascus. He refrained from emphasising opposition to or support of either party to the war.

There were three Shiite positions in Lebanon. The first was represented by Sheikh Mahdi Shamsuddin, Deputy Chairman of the Higher Shiia Council and Sheikh Abdul-Amir Qeban, the excellent Ja'afarite mufti. They defended the Amal appeal for the disarmament of Palestinians. This came as a surprise to many who did not expect the two Sheikhs to hold an opinion which is very damaging to the Shiia-Sunni or to the Shiia-Palestinian relations. During the later Amal-Palestinian conflict in Burj el-Brajneh, Sheikh Shamsuddin stood beside the Palestinians and Sheikh Qeban considered the attack on the camps as an Israeli act.

The second Shiite approach to the problem was expressed by Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah. It showed reservations towards the incidents and called for a ceasefire since no Islamic interest is served. Sheikh Fadlallah described the war as a "disaster" which "will result in a confused political arena." He warned against the emergence of any sectarian dimension because the reasons are political. He added, "we do not want to live with a Palestinian complex. We would like, rather, to handle the difference in the assessment of the Palestinian political realities." Despite its implied reservations about the Amal attack on the camps, this view is considered by many Sunnis as unsatisfactory. Some took it as a weak stand which avoided putting the dots on the i's, especially as regards Amal. Two statements could be classified with this second Shiia view, but with greater emphasis on criticising the fight. These were announced by the Islamic Jihad Organisation and Hizbullah. The Islamic

Jihad statement criticised Muslims for misinterpreting the Quranic verse, "...firm and unyielding towards all deniers of truth, [yet] full of mercy towards one another." [48:29]: ie they have reversed the meaning and become strong against each other, compassionate towards the deniers of truth.

The third and final position among the Shiite groups came from Tehran where Ayatullah Muntaziri expressly denounced the Amal attack on the camps and considered it as a non-Shiite act which damaged the Shiite reputation. He also warned against the aftermath. However, the other Lebanese Shiite views were also represented in Iran. *Kayhan* newspaper, for example, was close to Amal. Ali Khamnei, on the other hand, called for a ceasefire but strongly criticised the Arafat policies. Similar to Muntaziri's view was that held by Sheikh Ayatullah Mahdi Krubi who represented Imam Khomeini in the Buniat Shaheed (The Martyr Foundation) and presided over the Iranian delegation to Beirut. He criticised Amal and considered it as a dissident from Shi'ism.

It is the first time for 10 years that Syria has been involved in a Palestinian fight without any Palestinian allies. A good example is the position of the general leadership of the Popular Front, led by Ahmed Jibril, which is the most pro-Syrian Palestinian faction. They fought with Syria in 1976 against other Palestinian factions at the time. This year, however, the press officer of the Front, Mr Fadl al-Sharour implicitly indicated the existence of a crisis with Syria; but the leader of the Front, Ahmed Jibril, called upon the Palestinians to carry on fighting until they fall martyrs to agents and conspirators and he strongly criticised Amal. The Popular Struggle Front adopted the same view, together with Fatah dissidents, when Abu Musa described the war as a "crime" and a "conspiracy" serving the backward allies of King Hussein, Arafat and Mubarak. He was also sceptical about Amal's call for the separation of the Lebanese problem from the Palestinian cause, describing it as "suspicious". George Habash, the leader of the Popular Liberation Front, left Syria and travelled between Algeria, Libya, and the Gulf, where he rejected the allegations that Arafat was behind the war of the camps. Naef Hewatmeh, leader of the Democratic Front strongly criticised Amal, defended the position of the camps and their endeavour to regain national unity amongst the factions of the resistance movement. The DF made contacts with the Central Committee of the Fatah Movement looking for points of compromise and re-negotiation.

From the total implications of the camps war, the following remarks could be made about the Palestinian position:

The existence of a gap between Syria and Amal on the one side and the Salvation Front (with the exception of Al-Saqia'a) which comprises the People's Front, Popular Struggle Front, the General Command of the Popular Liberation Front, Al-Saqia'a and Fatah dissidents. The Fatah dissidents fought beside al-Fatah in the camps war but continued to denounce Arafat and advocated alliance with Syria. Consequently, it is not wise to expect that the camps war would cause any divorce between the components of the Salvation Front and Syria or lead to a Palestinian unity.

- Most analysts think that Arafat has benefited from the attack on the camps; they provided decisive evidence against his opponents in internal Palestinian politics who have aligned themselves with Syria. He could also thereby isolate Syria from many factions, including some of its allies. Public opinion among the Palestinians has also been affected by the bloody slaughter of their countrymen in the camps; it could lead to Palestinian cohesion and an allegiance to Arafat based on defence of their very existence.
- There will be a renewal of attempts to regain Palestinian national unity. The Democratic Front will spare no effort towards this end, although the future is not promising. The general political differences remain the same as they were before the camps war, and they might possibly get even greater in the future. Any understanding that might occur during the war will probably prove temporary.

On the Lebanese side of the issue, observers make the following remarks:

- A deep wound has been inflicted by the sectarian aspect: Sunnis and Shiites have been polarised by the Amal attack on the Palestinian camps, especially where this was regarded as an extension of the attack on, and control of, Sunni Beirut a month before the war. This explains why Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah was at pains to avert any sectarian implications drawn from events surrounding the camps. However, it is difficult to avoid religious sectarianism in the circumstances of Lebanon, especially since there are no inter-Shiite differences to render the main issue a purely political conflict.
- Despite the disagreement of most Lebanese groups with the Amal-Syrian position towards the camps war, they remained in recognition of Syria as a potentially decisive element in any

settlement. This damaged the Syrian reputation, because of its failure to realise that potential, but it also gave it ample chance to play a greater role in Lebanese politics. This was the basis of the Lebanon/Syria summit held amidst the war days. Rumour had it that an agreement was reached between the two presidents, Gemeyel and Asad, to the effect that Syrian "Deterrence" forces could be deployed over all main roads and links in Lebanon. This would be a material gain for Syria on the Lebanese territories, and an establishment of a Syrian right to participate in Lebanese politics.

- If the rumours are true and that agreement is to be implemented, with "the Lebanese file closed" as the Syrian premier put it, then the relations between Syria and the Lebanese factions will enter a new and sensitive phase. The situation would become more acute if key positions in the state structure were allocated to the religious sects; or when security measures come into effect, leading to disarmament and decrease of the local powers of the militia's leaders. Many expect that this will make new battles flare up all over the place. Changes in Arab politics could also affect the Lebanese situation, especially the results of Egyptian-Jordanian contacts with the American administration.

The question to be asked now is whether Syria would be able to "close the Lebanese file", even after the entrance of Syrian deterrence forces into the various Lebanese areas, or whether that file will remain open to influences from the Arab and international worlds.

LEBANON

# COMMENTS ON NATIONAL UNITY FRONT

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 12-18 Aug 85 pp 17-19

[Article by Reem Drouby]

[Text] Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, a prominent Shiite cleric, spoke bitterly against sectarianism, which he said "deprived the people of all rationality," and against the sectarian system in Lebanon, which "caused the misery of the people."

The unofficial leader of the pro-Iranian Hezbollah (his bodyguards asked our reporter to put on a black chador before meeting him), he spoke very moderately about the weaknesses of the Syrian-backed West Beirut security plan, saying no security plan could possibly succeed if it is not accompanied by a general political plan.

Fadlallah showed no sympathy for the newly-formed National Unity Front, saying "in Lebanon most political axes tend to move from an original concern for the welfare of the people to the ultimate service of the few," and adding that whereas "we are firmly convinced that a front should be founded on shared convictions that would allow it to confront the internal and outside challenges," the members of this front "often threaten to wage a war against each other, to the point that outside factions have to intervene to prevent this war."

When we asked him how the arrival of over 40 Syrian tanks to the Amal Movement and the mainly-Shiite Sixth Brigade should be interpreted, he answered "This is not necessarily a sign of war.... But in Lebanon, everything is possible."

Fadlallah, whose popularity has grown to such a point that many people who were formerly loyal to the Amal Movement, headed by Minister Nabih Berri, have since joined Hezbollah, described his relationship with Berri as "normal, nothing more than normal."

Following is the full translation of the interview, which was conducted in Arabic.

Are you satisfied with the implementation of the West Beirut security plan?

It is only natural that we should seek to provide the citizen with an atmosphere of stability and security because lawlessness, in addition to the harm it does to the individual also reflects negatively on the political reality. All of us in West Beirut suffered from a sectarian situation which resulted from a specific political situation. In other words, the security situation provided fertile ground for those who sought to create sectarian tension, which is a highly dangerous situation since it deprives the people of all rationality.

Consequently, it was natural to think of the Syrian-backed security plan as one that would significantly curb a number of security problems and thus achieve two things:

--Making the militias feel that there is a powerful force above them;

--Making the people feel that there is a moral, political and security haven they can resort to.

We believe the security plan, with the moral support of Syria, may have achieved these two points, and was thus partly successful. However, no security plan can be completely successful if it is not accompanied by a general political plan.

**So you agree with Mufti Hassan Khaled who told Monday Morning that the security plan is only implemented during the day, and is thus incomplete?**

Violations of the security plan do not take place at night only, but in broad daylight too. Thefts and attacks are still perpetrated in the daytime in West Beirut.

But we must realize that it is extremely difficult to achieve total security in West Beirut which is witnessing tension on the demarcation lines and within the region itself, between the Syrian force and its opponents. Consequently, despite the violations, we would still say the security plan was positive in that it curbed the number and scope of transgressions.

**Syria has sent a number of tanks to the Amal Movement and the Army Sixth Brigade. Are we to assume that a battle is imminent?**

The arrival of tanks is not necessarily a sign that a battle will take place. In fact, it could very well mean the opposite, since it creates a balance of military power that would make those who seek a battle think twice before launching it. The presence of tanks may have nothing to do with the security situation, and may be a purely political move.

**So you do not think the arrival of the tanks is linked to the possibility of a battle?**

I said this was not necessarily a sign of a battle. But in Lebanon, everything is possible.

**Do you expect a battle to erupt inside the Palestinian camps in Sidon between the Arafat loyalists and the Salvation Front?**



I have said in a previous statement that an inter-Palestinian battle is very unlikely, because one does not feel that either faction in the camps has enough military power to fight the other, nor indeed that the ground is fertile for a battle. A battle involving the people of Sidon is also unlikely, since these are trying to avoid getting involved in a battle.

**And how would you comment on the situation in Jezzín?**

The situation in Jezzín is not an internal Lebanese affair, but part of the Israeli policy. It is linked to the border strip which Israel is using as a pressure element that may lead to an agreement similar to the May 17 accord. In this sense, we cannot speak of a military or peaceful solution to the Jezzín issue, which is a regional or rather international issue linked to the political reality in Israel and its role in Lebanon.

**What is your position toward the National Unity Front, and how would you comment on its major demand, that of abolishing the sectarian system in Lebanon?**

We have grown accustomed to the formation of fronts in Lebanon, but also to the fact that these fronts are launched by the elite and do not represent the people. Consequently, though this front may have political plans, the people can only interpret them in a sectarian fashion.

Moreover, we have noticed that the relationship between the individual members of this front does not constitute a coherent «front» mentality, but that indeed its members often threaten to wage a war against each other, to the point that regional and non-regional factions have to intervene in order to prevent this war.

We believe that any front needs to have a coherent «front-like» mentality. In Lebanon, most political axes move from an original concern for the welfare of the people to the service of the few, rather than the other way round. Therefore, we cannot set our hopes very high, regardless of the nature of this or any other front, when we are firmly convinced that a front should be founded on shared convictions that would allow it to confront the internal and outside challenges that may destroy the country.

As to abolishing the sectarian system, we approve of this issue since we believe the Lebanese problem is that the political scene is not open for all the citizens to express their thoughts, but that indeed there are as many political scenes as there are sects and political axes in Lebanon.

The sectarian mentality in Lebanon is such that every citizen is affiliated to a specific sect alone, and each sect considers itself to be an independent state with its own concerns and ideas, indeed, with its own cocoon in which it hides and closes itself to general thoughts and principles in the rest of the country. Moreover, the sectarian system paved the way for certain mentalities and practices that caused the misery of the people. Therefore, we believe the sectarian system works against the welfare of the Lebanese. Even those Lebanese who feel that the sectarian system provides them with certain guarantees are wrong, for what sort of guarantee is it that causes the death of tens of thousands of people every ten years, what sort of guarantee is it that forces the people to flee their country, what guarantee is it if the president of the republic must fight tooth and nail to remain in his post? We must live in a stable country where each citizen feels that he loves and is loved by his fellow-citizen, and this cannot be achieved under a sectarian system.

**Do you think the National Unity Front will indeed unite the nation, or will it rather consolidate the split between the various Lebanese factions?**

The mere birth of fronts here and there does not necessarily lead to battle or a meeting. The major factor is the political background of a front. The question lies in whether the front wants to group the factions on this or that side in order to facilitate dialogue, because it is indeed easier to talk with a very large group of people who agree on one thing than with 10 different persons with 10 differing points of view. It is also easier to establish a dialogue with a front when you know this front's political aims. Does it seriously seek to participate in a dialogue, or is it merely grouping various forces in order to secure its victory in a military battle? The picture is certainly not clear yet. Moreover, we must take into consideration what may happen in the coming few days as a result of the Arab summit which will probably reflect on the Lebanese scene. And we must also observe the results of the meeting between the American and Soviet leaders, because all of these may affect Lebanon.

**Minister Walid Jumblatt recently declared that he had banned the Lebanese flag and national anthem in the Shouf and Aley. Does that mean partition, or is it just one means of protesting against the system?**

You should ask Jumblatt about this. I am not here to comment on his acts or answer for him.

**Would you comment on the response of the Phalangist Party to this statement, namely that Jumblatt should be tried for high treason?**

This matter concerns the Phalangist Party and Walid Jumblatt.

**How would you describe your present relationship with Minister Nabih Berri?**

This relationship has not changed. It is still normal and nothing more than normal.

**How do you view the major clauses of the plan presented some two weeks ago by Sheikh Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddin, and which calls for a change of the government system?**

We have already said that we do not believe in the sectarian system. We must agree on abolishing this system, and only then can we start suggesting plans.

**Do you think the meeting between former President Suleiman Franjieh and the leader of the Lebanese Forces, Elie Hobeika, will facilitate national entente?**

The truth is that I still cannot comprehend the nature of this meeting, nor do I know what happened during the meeting or what will happen after this meeting, because in Lebanon we have grown accustomed to people who declare one thing while totally different things are going on behind the scene. However, I do have my reservations concerning Hobeika who is the best symbol of the Israeli presence in Lebanon.

Moreover, we have not forgotten the role he played in Sabra and Shatila.

**Do you expect Israel to complete its withdrawal from the South soon?**

This issue is very obscure, since it does not depend on the Israeli policy alone, but is linked to the political and strategic alliance between Israel and the U.S.

**Why didn't you participate in the Mukhtara and Baadaran conclaves?**

Some of those who did participate in the conclaves told me it was just a matter of «returning a visit», and had no official character. ●

CSO: 4400/238

LEBANON

UAE DAILY INTERVIEWS LEBANESE OFFICIAL

GF041650 Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 4 Jul 85 p 13

[Interview with Akram Shahib, member of the leadership of the Lebanese Progressive Party [PSP] by AL-KHALIJ correspondent Husayn Hamiyah in Beirut--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Husayn Hamiyah] As the secretary of the coordination committee, how do you evaluate its work?

[Akram Shahib] Following the agreement in Damascus between the Palestinian Salvation Front [PSF] and the brothers in the Amal Movement with the participation of the Lebanese National Democratic Front and with Syrian supervision, the committee came to Beirut.

I was selected as secretary. We began serious work from the first day. We managed to enter the camps in order to observe the situation, what had happened, and what was still happening at the time.

We began to prepare the ground to conduct a dialogue in response to the destruction and shelling which caused the death and injury of those who fight among themselves. We all must work to maintain our joint strategic unity against the isolationist, phalangist, fascist, and Israeli project. In other words, the current conditions we are witnessing now must be contained and transitional. We must unify the powers and efforts of the Lebanese and Palestinian people to confront the joint enemy. We are convinced that if a split is to be created between the Amal Movement and the Lebanese national powers during this war, or to be created among the PSF--which represents the aspiration and the hopes of the Palestinian people--the Lebanese national powers, and Syrian, then the Lebanese national project will be finished forever.

We can say that following the Israeli invasion, we were only able to regain the regions which have been occupied by the Israeli enemy backed by the Lebanese war machine--the Lebanese forces and the Phalangists. What we have achieved so far the mountains the suburbs, the Beirut wars, and the courageous national resistance in the south is part of our efforts to regain the lands which we lost in 1982.

We still have a long political project ahead of us. This project includes the national hopes of the people and can only be achieved through a complete alliance between the Lebanese national rifle represented by the Lebanese National Democratic Front and Amal on one side and the PSF on the other side along with Syrian support. Then we will be able to continue to confront the isolationist challenge. In this way we can mass our strength to end the fighting and maintain the cease-fire. Then we can devise a joint formula and protective medicine [as published] for the future between Amal and the brother Palestinians. We have managed to create suitable grounds.

These grounds undoubtedly will bring closer views and will close the great gap. We managed to put an end to the clashes. We immobilized the armed men. We obtained provisions after aiding the wounded. We brought medical help, foodstuffs, flour, and cooking oil. What is more important, 13,000 refugees who left Sabra and Shatila camps began to return without hinderances.

I must say frankly that the cooperation of the Amal brothers was total at all levels. We must acknowledge that the Palestinian people are supporting their brother Shi'ites.

[Hamiyah] Do you think that the complete implementation of the articles of the Damascus agreement will be a firm guarantee to eliminate the possibility of future setbacks?

[Shahib] The Damascus agreement came after 30 days of discussions. This agreement is to stop the fighting. It is a protective medicine for the future. We hope that it will deter any setback in the future. The committee will continue its work now and in the future. I think that all parties are well aware that the Palestinian-Lebanese war undermines the Palestinian and the Lebanese national causes.

CSO: 4400/223

LEBANON

## GUNMEN FIRE ROCKET AT FORMER PREMIER SALAM'S HOUSE

### Caller Issues Warning

NC071448 (Clandestine) Radio Free Lebanon in Arabic 1345 GMT 7 Aug 85

[Text] Gunmen in a speeding vehicle fired a rocket in the direction of former Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam's house in the Burj Abu Haydar-Al-Musaytibah area of West Beirut at 1510 today. The rocket hit a blue Volvo parked on the street leading to Salam's home. According to an unidentified person who telephoned the office of Tamam Salam [son of Sa'ib Salam] after the attack, this operation is a warning connected with Tamam Salam's recent statements. If Tamam Salam makes any further pronouncements on current political developments, the anonymous caller threatened, other measures will be carried out against him.

Security sources earlier had reported the detonation of an explosive device under a Peugeot 404 vehicle parked near the house of the former Prime Minister.

Tamam Salam had attacked the National Union Front on the eve of its establishment, describing it as just a new copy of the defunct National Movement with all its negative points and failures. He also referred to it as a new formula to disguise a dominating and hegemonic role over general political affairs.

### Tamam Salam Responds

NC071517 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic  
1415 GMT 7 Aug 85

[Excerpt] Commenting on the attack against former Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam's house today, Tamam Salam said: We are not accustomed to being frightened by agent bomb throwers, by their threats, or by their unethical methods. We will maintain our responsible positions toward our good people and voice our opinion freely, irrespective of the price. He added: It appears that democratic reform and the safeguarding of public liberties, which our opponents have advocated, are represented by this kind of cheap and cowardly action. We pray God to protect our country and its citizens against the intentions of evil people.

Voice of Lebanon has been contacted by an unidentified person claiming to belong to what is called the Al-Sadr Brigades. According to this person, it is this group that is responsible for today's attack against former Prime Minister Salam's house.

CSO: 5600/4547

LEBANON

BRIEFS

EXPLOSIONS NEAR SAUDI, MOROCCAN EMBASSIES--Two explosive charges went off tonight, one near the Saudi Embassy in al-Namurah and another near the Moroccan Embassy in Bi'r Hasan. The explosion near the Saudi Embassy took place at 1745 and left two children wounded. The second explosion near the Moroccan Embassy occurred at 1800 and resulted only in material damage. It should be pointed out that the targets in both cases are embassies of countries participating in the current Casablanca summit. [Text] [Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1615 GMT 6 Aug 85 NC]

ABC DIRECTOR RELEASED BY GUNMEN--A spokesman for the ABC network has stated that Director Shakib Humaydan has been released. It should be recalled that Humaydan was kidnapped by gunmen early this week while on his way to Beirut Airport. [Text] [(Clandestine) Radio Free Lebanon in Arabic 0455 GMT 8 Aug 85 NC]

CSO: 5600/4547

OMAN

### THIRD ECONOMIC PLAN OUTLINED

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 13 Aug 85 p 11

[Text]

**MUSCAT**—The broad outline for Oman's Third Plan has been prepared and indications are that its total investment allocations will be higher than in the Second Plan (1981-85).

According to the Central Bank of Oman's periodical, Al Markazi, the Director-General for Planning Ahmed Rukaishy, says the Plan will lay emphasis on certain specified areas as against the broad-front approach adopted since 1976.

The stress is shifting to income-generating projects, to augment oil revenues and to alleviate the economy's sole dependence on oil.

In addition to stepped-up government spending, there is genuine expectation that the private sector will take a leading role in developing agriculture, fisheries and manufacturing areas.

Mr Rukaishy indicated that the petroleum sector will provide the main financial resources for the Plan.

But projects already on stream such

as the refinery, copper smelter and the cement plant, are also expected to provide additional revenues. Many other projects have been completed and more are on way to completion.

With a well-developed economic infrastructure, it is expected that private investment will increase significantly during the Third Plan period.

Mr Rukaishy said the performance during the second plan was upto the expectations.

The CBO report added that actual public investments from 1981 to 1984 for the income generating sectors other than petroleum and mining were RO24.6 million for agriculture and RO69.7 million for manufacturing. In the water resources sector total realised public investment for the same period amounted to RO29.9 million.

The investment performance in the above sectors was encouraging—90 per cent for agriculture, 119 per cent for manufacturing and 80 per cent for water resources development.

Total realised public investment during this period (1981/1984) amounted to RO1589.4 million against the

projected figure of RO1460.5 million.

The GDP growth rates during the second Plan have also been impressive. Taking the year 1983 as a base, GDP growth rates for the year 1984 were 0.5 per cent for agriculture and fisheries, 37.5 per cent for the manufacturing, 20.6 per cent for construction, 36.6 per cent for electricity and water, 16 per cent for transport and communication and 11.2 per cent for the total GDP.

Emphasis on diversification was much stressed during the Second Plan and it achieved fairly good results.

For example, in 1975, the relative share of crude in the total GDP was 67.2 per cent whereas by 1984 it fell to 46 per cent. The manufacturing sector, whose relative share in the total GDP in 1975 was only 0.3 per cent boosted its contribution to 3.03 per cent by 1984.

In spite of the dominance of the petroleum sector in the economy, other sectors are striving hard to improve their relative shares in the GDP and this trend is expected to continue during the Third Plan to conform with the development strategy that stresses the need for diversification.

CSO: 4400/228



OMAN

ECONOMIC TIES WITH INDIA

Dubayy KHALEEL TIMES in English 15 Aug 85 p 13

[Article by P.S. Ramanathan]

[Text]

MUSCAT—Crude oil exports to India, estimated at around 4.6 million barrels during 1984, has left Oman with a decidedly favourable balance of payments, it is believed.

Early last year, when oil shipments started from Mina Al Fahal, they averaged 50,000 barrels per day, but by December the daily average had gone up by over 12,600 barrels.

Though final figures are not yet available, trade sources estimate Oman's surplus at around RO26.75 million.

It is the first time that the Sultanate has recorded a surplus in trade with India, and the trend is expected to continue.

India exported goods worth RO21.5 million, in 1984 as against RO19.5 million in 1983.

The increase has been marked in Oman's non-oil exports, from RO600,000 to RO7.25 million. From among this country's traditional items, India imported dates worth RO340,000, accounting for 66 per cent of the shipments from here.

Among others, India purchased machinery and equipment, including aircraft spares re-exported from Muscat, worth RO6.2 million.

"There is increasing scope for trade cooperation and the

Third Plan of Oman should mark the beginning of a new era of mutual advancement," Indian Ambassador Dr I.A. Sajjad said in an interview on the eve of his country's 38th Independence Day.

"As a developing country, India has evolved projects of varying magnitudes in agriculture, fisheries and manufacturing, and our experience can be kept at the disposal of Oman," Dr Sajjad said, referring to the two-pronged orientation being thought of for the economy here during the Third Plan, scheduled to commence next year.

"In the industrial arena, there is a host of units, specially of small and medium scale, both in the government and private sectors, and the potential for cooperation is very vast," he added.

Regarding Omani copper, the Indian envoy said, "We import a great deal of the metal from different parts of the world, and on the terms being agreeable, we could absorb a certain quantum from Muscat as well."

A number of Indian companies are studying joint-venture possibilities with entrepreneurs here. Last year a number of business delegations visited Oman in this connection.

Industrial exports

Currently, the lone joint venture enterprise is Lal-Vol, involving Lalbuksh Irrigation and Well Drilling Company and Voltas International, which is engaged in water resources development and setting up irrigation projects.

Otherwise, Indian industrial products' presence is mainly confined to ceiling fans water pumps, generator sets, fish freezer plants and motor vehicles.

There is a symbolic presence of Indian textiles and garments in the market.

Manpower continues to be the largest single contribution of India to Oman. During 1984, the inflow of Indian manpower to Oman is said to have increased by 30 per cent on the previous year. At around 200,000, the Indians' share of the manpower market is currently around 74 per cent.

Strong ties

In the political arena, both Oman and India belong to the non-aligned bloc and strongly believe in the right for advancement of nations, away from the sphere of influence of Big Powers.

"Our relations have been congenial and heartening for centuries... and they shall grow from strength to strength in the changing environs of Oman," Dr Sajjad said.

OMAN

EMPLOYMENT FIGURES FOR OMANI, EXPATRIATES

Dubayy KHALEEL TIMES in English 12 Aug 85 p 2

[Text]

MUSCAT—The number of Omani nationals in the government sector increased by 9.8 per cent last year to 59.35 per cent.

Of the 62,043 employees in different government services, excluding defence, police and general telecommunications organisation, Omanis numbered 36,824 and expatriates 25,219, according to the directorate-general of National Statistics.

The 18.2 per cent growth rate of expatriates in the government sector last year is more than three fold, compared to the figure of 5.8 per cent in 1982.

Comparatively, the Omani employees' growth rate in the government sector was the lowest in the last four-year period. The respective growth rates and Omani employees' strength were: 1981—14.7 per cent 26,886; 1982—10.3 per cent 29,647; 1983—13.1 per cent 33,543; and 1984—9.8 per cent 36,824.

In the private sector, there has been a 11.8 per cent drop in the growth rate of expatriates as compared to 1983. Whereas in 1983 the expatriates' number was 235,645 as against 186,821 in 1982 (increase of 26.1 per cent, the number at the end of 1984 was 269,410, accounting for a 14.3 per cent increase.

While nearly 80% of the Omani population depended on agriculture and fisheries for their main source of income, 83 per cent of the expatriates were employed in trading and construction sectors.

Sixty-nine per cent of the expatriates received less than RO70 as monthly wages, 12.3% received between RO71 and 90, and 5.8 per cent between RO91 and 120.

Those drawing more than RO1,000 per month constitute 0.3%, between RO701 and 1,000 0.7%, between RO401 and 700 2%, and between RO251 and 400 3.2%.

CSO: 4400/228

OMAN

FOREIGN TRADE INCREASE

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 12 Aug 85 p 1

[Text]

MUSCAT—There has been a 7 per cent increase in Oman's foreign trade.

The increase, of RO165 million in 1984, is the result of an increase in value of Omani exports by RO58 million and a rise of RO107 million in imports, reports the Central Bank's periodical, Al Markazi.

Exports realised RO1.53 billion in 1984 (RO1.47 billion in 1983), oil accounting for RO1.4 billion (RO1.35 billion), non-oil exports for RO17.2 million (RO10.6 million) and re-exports RO109.4 million (RO112 million).

Imports were valued at RO1.01 billion in 1984 as against RO906 million in the previous year.

Trade surplus at the end of 1984 was RO514.2 million (RO563.2 million in 1983).

Japan accounted for a surplus of RO621 million, 29.5 per cent higher than in 1983, mainly because it accounted for 62 per cent of Oman's crude exports. Other countries with which notable surpluses could be accomplished were South Korea RO217 million and Singapore RO98 million.

The Sultanate had trade deficits with Britain (RO146 million), West Germany RO90 million and the USA RO32 million.

CSO: 4400/228

OMAN

## FOREIGN INVESTMENT EXPECTED TO INCREASE

Dubayy KHALEEL TIMES in English 15 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by P.S. Ramanathan]

[Text]

MUSCAT—A spurt in foreign investment is likely in Oman, according to the Under-Secretary for Commerce and Industry, Ahmed bin Abdul Nabi Macki.

In a recent interview, Mr Ahmed Macki stressed that the Sultanate offered vast scope for investment in industries based on agriculture and fisheries and other natural resources like copper, marble and minerals.

Till the end of 1983, foreign investment in Oman was worth nearly RO52.5, civil contracting accounted for 50.2 per cent, the commercial sector for 21.77 per cent, industry 10.13 per cent, mining 8.39 per cent and agriculture 7.85 per cent.

Foreign investment is governed by the Foreign Business and Investment Law which stipulates that each company concerned should have a minimum paid-up capital of RO1.5 million, of which the share of Omani nationals should be no less than 35 per cent.

In practice, however, the Committee for Foreign Capital Investment insists that unless there are exceptional reasons in favour of a major project of special economic significance, the foreign equity participation should not exceed 49 per cent of the total capital.

Undersecretary Ahmed Macki pointed out that there were several incentives available for entrepreneurs, and there was no restriction on the free transfer of a company's profits or individual remittances outside the Sultanate. There was no personal income tax either.

On cooperation between a developing country like Oman and a developed country, Mr Macki said that such efforts could be fruitful and long-lasting only if the latter realised that "progressive industrialisation of countries such as Oman would increase their absorption capacities in diversified areas of the economy and thus benefit the developed countries, too."

A very effective and efficient form of cooperation in the industrial field can be the establishment of joint ventures here, but the Undersecretary cautioned that the developed countries should not ask for a ready-made list of projects suitable for their participation. They should themselves be prepared to be actively involved in undertaking surveys to identify potential fields of industrialisation.

The government and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry would make all efforts to create interests among local entrepreneurs for joint-venture projects. "The initiative and involvement of the

governments concerned in this process would create confidence in investors of both countries and ensure that foreign collaboration agreements between the parties are fair and equitable," Mr Ahmed Macki said.

Oman would welcome participation of foreign equity in industrial joint ventures, so that the overseas collaborator had a stake in the viability of the project and was not satisfied merely with supplying the plant and equipment.

Mr Macki also emphasised that a time-bound programme of transfer of technology and training of Omanis should form an integral part of joint-venture agreements.

The possibility of a 'tariff wall' going round the AGCC countries should be considered seriously by multinationals who have been supplying consumer items for many years now. Their long-term interest lay in substituting a purely trading relationship with the Sultanate by setting up joint venture for producing the items here.

Industrial activity in Oman, for all practical purposes, commenced in 1975. From traditional handicrafts, pottery, hand-made textiles, jewellery and metal work, the activity spread through carpentry workshops, automobile garages and cement brick-making units to capital-intensive projects, like the petroleum refinery, copper smelter and cement plants and many ventures of small and medium investment, producing items such as detergents, edible oils, foam products, packing cases and fibreglass boats

and water tanks.

There are now nearly 3,200 units with a total capital investment of RO281 million.

The manufacturing sector's contribution to the GDP has improved from RO2.1 million in 1975 to RO63.2 million by the end of 1983.

★ ★ ★  
THE government is to go ahead with its policy of establishing a number of industrial estates of the type that is nearing completion at Rusayl in the capital area.

While a second, somewhat smaller estate is emerging near Raysut in Salalah, in south Oman, feasibility studies are being conducted for other regions as well.

An American firm has conducted the survey for an estate in Sohar where the copper project is situated. Another study has been undertaken by a London-based Lebanese firm to evaluate the existing small and medium-sized industries and explore ways of expanding the national industrial sector. The latter study is expected to be ready by the end of this month.

Meanwhile, a visiting industrialist from India, Mr S.L. Kirloskar, has said that his consultancy firm has been entrusted with a second study of industrialisation by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In an earlier study, Kirloskar Consultants had highlighted the problems faced by the small entrepreneurs, specially from imported products. Mr Kirloskar, said that the southern region of Oman offered vast possibilities for setting up coconut-based multi-tier industries.

CSO: 4400/228

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

PNC SPEAKER ESCAPES ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT--Unknown elements attempted to assassinate PNC Speaker Shaykh 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'ih in Amman last week. Informed Palestinian sources told AL-WATAN that Shaykh al-Sa'ih was inside when a number of gunmen opened fire on his house in Amman; he was not harmed. The sources added that a comprehensive investigation is currently under way to identify the gunmen. [Text] [Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 4 Aug 85 p 1 GF]

CSO: 5600/4547

SAUDI ARABIA

PRINCE TURKI GIVES INTERVIEW TO FRENCH JOURNAL

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 27 Jul-2 Aug 85 pp 42-47

[Article: "AL-TADAMUN Publishes PARIS MATCH Interview With Prince Turki Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz: Forcing Settlements on Palestinians Is Injustice; Lebanon Crisis Complicated by Foreign Intervention"]

[Text] French newspaperwoman, Virginia Marlin, had an interview in PARIS MATCH this week with Prince Turki Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz which she conducted between Riyadh and Jiddah and prefaced as follows:

Excellent reader, keeps up with progress in the world with diligence and exactitude. Man of his time in opinion, handling of matters and decisionmaking.

This is Prince Turki Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz in whom, every time you meet him, you perceive change and growth in his personality and his concepts. He changes from week to week, day to day and even hour to hour. This is how Prince Turki Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz understands and lives development. The experiences of the past are the expertise of the future. Pitfalls facing man in his life must be guarded against in future days. He does not blame his time for the difficulties he may face, but rather he is hurt by it if it stops giving him advice and lessons.

He is modern. He adheres to the Islamic religion and believes in the teachings of his father, the late King 'Abd-al-'Aziz. He knows how to understand people's demands and fulfills their aspirations. This is what has endeared him to his righteous ordinary citizens, who see in him a human being, and to the hearts of his Arab brethren and anyone anywhere in the world who has come to know him. The humanity in his character is of such a nature that it cannot be imprinted and of such a nobility that it cannot be falsified. He is always quick-witted and alert and considers public responsibility both the fate and the torment of the chosen people.

One is attracted by his penetrating personality and precision in his responsible pronouncements. He was keen on expressing exactly what he meant without additions or omissions or ambiguity or interpretation. One is also captivated by his modernity, a portrait he polishes every day through his constructive initiatives in all fields. Following is the text of the PARIS MATCH interview published by AL-TADAMUN by permission of the French magazine.

[Question] For 3 years you have been touring the world and having contacts with some heads of state in America, Europe and the Arab countries. What impressions have you formed as a result of these encounters and what experiences have you had that can reflect positively on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?

[Answer] The fact is that I was away for 2 years and have not visited the United States for 3 years. As for the Arab countries and Europe, the Arab, European and American leaders, and all the other personalities I came in touch with, presented to me their points of view and opinions on Arab and world problems, and exhibited an interest in our Arab causes. Their opinions were different and sometime conflicting, however, for many of them felt that the Arab causes can only be solved through the unity of all the Arabs. It is painful to see that what is said in public circles is different from what is said within four walls. Most of the people I met had almost the same opinion; that every nation must shoulder its own responsibilities and must not endorse them over to someone else. As for the reflection of the experiences of the Kingdom, the Kingdom follows a selective policy, choosing the most appropriate experiences and comparisons to arrive at its adopted civilizational policy armed with knowledge and education and selecting what is suitable for it without any contradiction with its principles and commitments. Furthermore, the experiences of any country enrich other experiences in countries willing to benefit from expertise, lessons and counsel. The Saudi Arab Kingdom has not been remiss in this field.

[Question] What is your opinion of the Western countries from the standpoint of strengths and weaknesses?

[Answer] If by strengths you mean Western Europe's experiences and pursuits in the economic and scientific field and the precise coordination represented by the European Common Market, this has strong and visible manifestations. It is beneficial to Western Europe, which has recently been strengthened by the admittance of Spain and Portugal to the market group, thus creating a new colossal entity to which we give our blessings. This entity has turned into an international superpower which has been reflected in the various technical, military, nuclear, communications, computer and robot fields, not to mention commercial power which has become an important and awesome model even to the two great superpowers, who have begun to recalculate many matters. I hope a strong and advanced Europe will be a guarantee for the international balance within the scope of "geopolitics." As for weaknesses, they manifest themselves in these countries sometime in their commitment to ideologies which sometimes tear them apart, their unpatriotic affiliations and their division into groupings that are far removed from their European authenticity. This disparity came into view, and indeed erupted, in the European Parliament especially during its recent sessions. Furthermore, these countries' weaknesses have been manifested by the community's obligation to abide by America's position, blindly sometimes, thus losing their prestige and European identity. Another manifestation of their weakness in their inability to free themselves from superpower pressures, from the economic, military and sometimes political point of view. There is still much work to be done for European renaissance, for is it not strange that the 6-country Europe needed 29 years to become the 12-country Europe? Therefore, I believe we



must overcome all the currents which are impeding the march, looking only to the future which dictates that Europe must be united. In order for these countries to free themselves of their shortcomings and bear their full responsibilities which I have mentioned, they must return to their old deep-rooted traditions which would suffice to regain the community's esteem as a great international power. As for us, the Arabs, we consider Western Europe's strength positive and useful to us, and we hope it will grow because it is in the interest of the world as a whole, which appreciates the necessity of adding a third power to the existing two so that the two superpowers, the USSR and the United States, will not monopolize international decisions, but rather share them with a new power or a third party which we all hope will gain status and significance. Besides, Western Europe's entity, which is represented by the European [Common] Market and the European Community, has a democratic semblance because counsel among 12 countries is bound to immunize decisions from rashness and haughtiness contrary to what can happen when an arrogant country is autocratic in its unjust and obstinate position. The emergence of a new strong bloc limits the ability of the two superpowers to exercise dictatorship and to monopolize decisions on world peace as it sees fit or in a way that can lead to world destruction.

[Question] How did your first meeting with your brother, Fahd Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, take place after your recent return to the Kingdom?

[Answer] You are asking me about my meeting with His Majesty King Fahd and I am surprised at the way this question was put. My meetings with His Majesty are continual and constant and have never been interrupted. The meeting you refer to is just like all the others within the framework of the older brother or the father getting together with the younger brother, me. I consider this natural and there is nothing in the meeting you refer to out of the ordinary that should arouse the curiosity of reporters or others. His Majesty King Fahd Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz is like a father to us and to me personally. The meeting was a family matter within the scope of normal relations between members of the same family.

[Question] What is your opinion about the accomplishments the Kingdom has achieved under the leadership of your brother, King Fahd?

[Answer] His Majesty King Fahd is not new to the responsibilities of rule. Ever since the establishment of the Saudi state, he has taken upon himself outstanding responsibilities and has worked himself up to many positions until he reached the top of the pyramid of his own merit. From the time he took upon himself minor responsibilities in government leadership, he has been achieving continuous success and gains for the people and the state with the guidance of the Kingdom's founder and author of its principles, the late King 'Abd-al-'Aziz. King Fahd has led his Kingdom on the path drawn by King 'Abd-al-'Aziz for unifying the Arabian Peninsula. As for the accomplishments, they are countless and are conspicuous to the Arab and international eye. They have brought happiness to the Kingdom's population and the Saudis are pinning great hopes on them for scientific and civilizational gains which the people deserve and which King Fahd does an outstanding job in achieving. Enumeration of the accomplishments limits them to a certain framework. As

for His Majesty's accomplishments, they are general and include all fields, particularly the social and economic sectors. A tour of the Kingdom from the Red Sea to the Arab Gulf and from north to south enables the visitor to see for himself what has been accomplished in recent years.

[Question] Oil is the Kingdom's primary resource. We have noticed in recent years, however, instability in price, demand and the rate of the dollar. Is that why the Kingdom has reduced its budget by one-third, compared to the previous year?

[Answer] Oil is still the primary source on the list of government income sources which constitute the revenue portion of the budget. The oil market in recent years has undergone developments that resulted in a lower demand for oil due to economic recession in oil-importing industrial states where consumption has been rationalized and endeavors are underway to find alternative sources. Of course this drop in demand has reflected on OPEC. The Kingdom has offered significant sacrifices for its OPEC colleagues in the form of production cuts. It has pledged to be the "declining producer" in that when the production ceiling was set and production quotas allotted to OPEC countries, the Kingdom's share was to produce the difference between the allotted quotas and the production ceilings and amounts established by the forces of supply and demand. While the Kingdom's production in 1981, for example, was about 10 million barrels a day, its share in 1983 dropped to 4.5 million.

Naturally, this was reflected in the Kingdom's oil revenues which in 1983-84 dropped to 145 billion riyals, from 330 billion in 1981-82. In 1980-81, the Saudi budget was 245 billion riyals while in 1981-82, it was 298 billion riyals; in 1982-83, 313 billion riyals; in 1983-84, 260 billion riyals; and in 1984-85, 269 billion riyals.

After this preface allow me to correct the statement in your question that "the Saudi budget has been reduced by one-third compared to the previous year." Everyone knows that the actual expenditures in last year's budget amounted to 213 billion riyals and that the King has ordered a balanced budget of 200 billion riyals for the current year. This means that the estimated budget for the current year dropped only 6 percent with regard to actual expenses in last year's budget. The policy that Saudi Government drew up for balancing the budget means that we will not fall back on our reserves as we did in the last 2 years. Furthermore, this means an invitation from King Fahd to everyone to rationalize spending, to refrain from unnecessary spending and to give priority to the important projects and defer others to some time in the future.

[Question] Based on this new data, how do you envisage the Kingdom's future?

[Answer] I, like other citizens of this beloved country, public and private sectors alike, am optimistic about the Kingdom's future. In the last 10 years the Kingdom has witnessed great accomplishments whereby most of the basic facilities have been built. It has also witnessed growth in all sectors (hospitals, universities, schools, roads, telephone and telegraph, mail service, armed forces, housing, agriculture, industry, etc.). We have

succeeded in making good use of the wealth God has bestowed upon us to build this precious country and we shall continue to do so. We still have the material and human capabilities to accomplish this. The Kingdom has financial reserves and economic resources which will help us continue this building and development process. I will not fail to emphasize that, besides the available economic and financial resources which herald a bright future for this precious nation, there is another important matter which should not be overlooked, because it is one of the most important basic props in the development process: the political stability the Kingdom is enjoying.

[Question] Is it true that the national education budget is second in importance to the defense and aviation budget? And what does this mean?

[Answer] When this fiscal year's budget came out, the defense sector's share was 65 billion riyals, or 33 percent of the budget appropriations, while the education sector's share was 24 billion riyals, or about 12 percent of the total appropriations. The defense sector was ranked in first position while the education sector ranked second. More importantly, however, the figures for the education sector only reflect direct education appropriations while indirect appropriations constitute a large percentage as well, but need to be explained. When we talk about the defense budget, for example, we must realize that spending does not only involve the purchase of weapons and equipment, because a large portion of it goes to the education and training of the armed forces. Moreover, when we talk about the health sector, we find that a large part is spent on training doctors and various professions in this sector. The same thing goes for the budgets in other ministries and government agencies where a significant portion is spent on training and education. The Kingdom has focused on the national sector because one of the most important goals of the social and economic development plan is to build the human being, because it is very easy to buy equipment, build roads, set up hospitals and build schools and universities, but the difficulty lies in building and training the human being. Investment in manpower, if done properly and according to need, is one of the most important investments in development plans because it yields high returns in building society. It is well known that countries which may not have economic resources but maintain a very high standard of education and training are considered advanced countries despite limited economic resources.

[Question] It is said that oil is a source of energy on the way to extinction. Is the Kingdom preparing an elite group of Saudi experts and technicians to search and explore for alternate sources of energy in the future?

[Answer] Oil has been an important commodity ever since its discovery and will remain a production factor in the various industries in view of its being an energy source and, indeed, the most important one at present. It will maintain this status because the other alternatives have not been in great demand and are more costly to produce, particularly in the OPEC countries. The Kingdom is known to have established oil reserves which, in 1983, amounted to 166 billion barrels, or 24 percent of free world reserves. Nonetheless, the Kingdom has been depending less on oil through economic diversification and development. Therefore, the Kingdom has attained

self-sufficiency in many agricultural products and now has export capabilities. Furthermore, the industrial sector, be it the traditional light and medium industries or the basic industries (petrochemicals and their by-products), is making rapid progress. The Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, since its establishment, has been arduously searching for economic and other resources, to say nothing about gold and certain other minerals which are now being produced on the commercial level.

Economic diversification results and lower dependence on oil can be explained in a simple way. The true accrued growth rate of all the economic sectors, excluding oil, during the last 5 years from 1980-81 to 1984-85, the period covering the third development plan, was 7.7 percent annually, compared to the projected rate of 6.2 percent. This is a considerable accomplishment, for it reduces dependence on the oil sector. We can look at this from a different point of view. The oil sector's share of the GNP in the last budget was 27 percent, while that of the remaining sectors in the same year was 73 percent. This proves that the Kingdom is determined to diversify the economic and other sectors and reduce dependence on oil.

[Question] Is it true that the Saudi Government will impose taxes on Saudi citizens, although they have not been used to this practice, to equal the drop in oil revenues?

[Answer] There are no official intentions to impose such taxes. I reaffirm that this is not a consideration at present. Saudi rule, and King Fahd in particular, is concerned with anything that affects the people's interests and concerns. There is full coordination between the Saudi leaders and the Kingdom's citizens who are always displaying nobility and generosity.

[Question] Do you believe Saudi Arabia will be able to maintain its support of the Third World (Africa-Asia)?

[Answer] Saudi Arabia is aware of its responsibility toward the Arab and Islamic nation. It has not been derelict in any of its duties nor will it hesitate for a moment to continue doing its part with conviction and faith in human friendships without expecting any reward. I am confident that it will continue to meet its responsibilities as long as it is able to do so.

[Question] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is playing a leading role in the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], which can be compared to the EEC in Europe. What do you think of this comparison and do you think that the GCC has succeeded as an institution and an entity?

[Answer] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not consider itself the leader of the Gulf states. Rather, it has sought, through its endeavors to establish this federation, to crystallize, along with its sister states, the will of the people of the Arab Gulf states. As for comparing it to the EEC, it is possible in some aspects and impossible in others, with regard to living conditions and the fact that each group has its own aspirations. The Gulf states certainly have aspirations related to their geography and popular interests. As for comparing the Arab institution to the European institution, its most obvious manifestation is that the GCC, through its cohesion, its desire to safeguard the unity of its ranks and its common interests and full

coordination among its states, can guarantee its protection and safety, the exchange of information with its sisters and liberation from selfishness and parochial regionalism.

With regard to whether the GCC has achieved its intended goals, my reply to that is that it has achieved a large part of them. It is hoped that it will achieve the rest of the program as well as new plans which may develop as time goes by. Our hope, however, is for the GCC to be a path or a positive step toward a comprehensive Islamic and pan-Arab unity in the future.

[Question] Where does the GCC stand with regard to the ongoing Iran-Iraq war?

[Answer] The GCC's stated position is well-known. It calls for an end to the war between the two sisterly countries to spare innocent blood and stop the squandering of energies out of concern for the Islamic nation. This is what we want from the two countries and the success of the Islamic, Arab and international endeavors to stop the war are important to us.

[Question] How do you think the Palestinian question and the Lebanese crisis can be settled?

[Answer] The just solution to the Palestinian question is in the hands of the Palestinian brothers, through unity of word and rank and the choice of the path they deem right for regaining their legitimate rights. There is a responsibility toward this sacred question which cannot be relinquished by the Arabs, foremost and then by all Muslims and free people of the world. Forcing the Palestinians to submit to imposed solutions is not justice and is unacceptable to any logic anywhere in the world. At the same time, we must concede that no one can offer a solution on a gold platter. The Palestinians must be at the forefront of those selecting, imposing and wresting a solution to their advantage. They must find a unified formula for the solution they want so that no voice can harm the unity of their ranks. Only then will they know who is their friend and who is their enemy and this can only be done by total agreement among them.

As for the Lebanese crisis, we must say that this brotherly country was enjoying stability and prosperity as a result of an understanding among the Lebanese themselves. What happened in Lebanon does not relieve the Lebanese of responsibility. However, the truth must be spoken. Matters have been complicated and the crisis has been aggravated by outside intervention in Lebanese domestic affairs as far back as 1960. The solution, in my opinion, is to consolidate the internal front and raise foreign hands from Lebanon. I must emphasize here that the Lebanese people have been brave and steadfast in their eagerness to preserve their country and ward off partition. Despite 10 years of destruction and dispersion, Lebanon is still one country with one minister for each ministry and one army and a single establishment as well. In other words, the Lebanese have not been fragmented and are able to bear the responsibility of rebuilding their country. But hopes would be enhanced if the legitimate establishments were to resume their work in a sound and coordinated manner. I say again: Let every one take their hands off Lebanon and let us all support the unity of Lebanese internal ranks, something the Arabs have not neglected.

There is also the south Lebanon problem whose solution requires Israel to leave and the Arabs and the world to support Lebanon in rebuilding the south in order to achieve the desired stability all over Lebanon. Here I send my sincere regards to the heroes of the Lebanese resistance who gave their lives to resist the Israeli enemy and I congratulate the mother of every martyr.

[Question] What lessons did you learn from your late father, King 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sa'ud? And which lessons does King Fahd apply from the lessons he learned from his father?

[Answer] His absolute belief in God, in his country, in his Arab Islamic nation, in the proper moral teachings and in the necessity to fulfill all his popular responsibilities, beginning with his relationship with God and his Saudi family and respect for them and for himself. He is accustomed to looking upon his children as part of his Saudi children. The views of King 'Abd-al-'Aziz were too great and too universal for anyone to comprehend. The most significant thing I can mention here was his hatred for three things: lying, cowardice and stinginess. He also liked certain traits, such as firmness of opinion, truth, loyalty to friends, fulfillment of the public trust, respect for promises and compassion for the needy. As far as we, his children, are concerned, he always urged us to pray and do well in school. He asked of us a commitment to Islamic and human values on which he grew up and which he supported. King Fahd is also guided by God and by his father's life.

[Question] It is said that your late mother, Queen Hissah al-Sudayri, was a distinguished and prominent lady who was very intelligent and always had you under her wing and gave you valuable advice. She was always keen on having all of you, the seven brothers, together around the table every day. Is this the reason for your continued cohesion, cooperation and closeness?

[Answer] There is no doubt about that. What she taught us is still in our minds and we always remember it and apply it. We hope God will help us abide by it. What comes to my mind here is her loyalty, faith, religiousness and her desire to be balanced with herself and with the noble and lofty behavior expected of a woman of her standing. She, God bless her soul, was a sensitive woman who had more sympathy for the small person than the big one, for the weak than the strong. She did not stand for anyone reviling others behind their backs in her presence and always used to inquire about the health and safety of those who were absent. She was always, and this is an honor to us, level-headed and farsighted, which made her the mother of everyone, an example for all mothers in all that was important. I do not say this because she was my mother. This is the truth which is known to all the people of the Saudi Kingdom. And she definitely was the major cause for our cohesion and our firm desire to preserve the unity of the Kingdom and the family.

[Question] Departing from the tale of your honorable mother, do you think the Saudi woman will remain captive to the traditions from which the Gulf state women have been liberated, particularly since King Fahd is known for his progressiveness and appreciation for the role the Saudi mother is playing on both the family and national levels?

[Answer] First of all, the Saudi woman is not a prisoner of liberation. She actually enjoys all her rights. The question about women's liberation is out of place. I reject the term you used. Society looks upon the Saudi woman as its main nucleus. The Kingdom, ever since King 'Abd-al-'Aziz's era, has been providing knowledge for all its citizens without discrimination on the basis of sex. Official statistics confirm that the Saudi woman has a presence in the universities and the various aspects of everyday life in the Kingdom. We hope the Saudi woman will maintain her adherence to the epics of her worthy forefathers and her religion and ethics, and will pay primary attention to her effective role in her society. These are not unpleasant, but indeed commendable traditions. Any society which does not preserve its traditions will certainly fall. We hope that the faithful Arab woman will adhere to all these old moral values so that society will not disintegrate and collapse. There is a difference between freedom and moral decadence. As for culture and knowledge, they are values the woman must acquire to the degree that lifts her to her rightful place in terms of science and civilization. Islam grants the woman her full rights and qualifies her to meet her responsibilities in looking after her family and raising her children and puts a great responsibility on her toward her small family--her husband and children--and her larger family, her country. Everyone is satisfied with King FAud's efforts toward giving woman her rights and planning for a future that will provide her with strength, dignity and prosperity. I believe the Saudi woman must share in the development and construction efforts and must bear full responsibility on both family and national levels.

[Question] Is the strict order followed in the Kingdom the result of your belief in its benefits or of your fear and desire to appease the strict religious tide which has not kept up with the process of development during the turn of the 20th century and the ensuing open door policy?

[Answer] I have already declared my admiration for the role women are playing in the development and growth process in our country. We have no room for narrowmindedness, if narrowmindedness means abstruseness, withdrawal within the self and alienation from civilization. We have no restrictions on women. Those who say that we do not know how things really are. It is not true we are strict due to fear or a desire to appease anyone. As for the religious tide you are talking about, the source of every religious initiative is Islam and Islam alone. The Kingdom is the cradle of Prophet Muhammad's prophecy and there is no room for one-upsmanship in this regard. About the "religious tide which has not kept up with the process of development during the turn of the 20th century," every Muslim rejects his phraseology because the Islamic religion established the rules of development on the soundest foundations. Indeed, it called for development, education and knowledge and social integration before modern legislative systems were devised for it. The most advanced systems were inspired by the Islamic religion in its establishment and rules. All the Islamic provisions that preserve the people's interests and safeguard their rights are applied in our country on the basis of God's Book. The Kingdom spends hundreds of billions annually to achieve social security and workers' safety and rights. Indeed, it is very strict in preserving the rights of all citizens, particularly laborers. But if there are certain provisions and ideas some are seeking to apply in the Islamic world contrary to

what I have already said, they are in violation of the religious teachings and the Prophet's biography.

[Question] Every year Mecca receives over 2 million Muslim pilgrims from Islamic countries. Does this not create accommodation and security problems for the Kingdom's authorities, particularly in view of the fact that some of them are against the Kingdom politically? Are you not afraid of subversive infiltration under the guise of religious duty?

[Answer] God has bestowed upon Saudi Arabia the pleasure of receiving these numbers of pilgrims because he has honored this land with holy Mecca and the Prophet's mosque. As far as the government is concerned, this is not even a consideration because it does not create any problems, either as regards accommodations or the safety of visitors. The Kingdom has been accustomed to this since the Prophet honored it with his prophecy. We view every Muslim who comes here as a brother coming to perform his religious duties. We do not look at these guests from a political or subversive perspective. But if some exceptions occur, it is the government's right to put a stop to them out of concern for the pilgrims' safety as well as the safety of its people and its sovereignty. The government is concerned about the security and safety of the pilgrims and believers and is working hand in hand with the citizens to realize this end.

[Question] You are known as a universal man and a human being whose international ties and activities overstep all geographic boundaries, in addition to your Arab and Saudi responsibilities. Is this due to your belief in man's role and unlimited contributions? And what about your activities in the International Organization for Aiding Arab Students, of which you are the president, where you have registered some noble and pioneering stands?

[Answer] I thank you for your good opinion. If by "universal man" you mean a man who lives with and for all the people and can sense the pains and joys of all the people and share their feelings, I am happy to be that man, What is the meaning of the life of a man who lives in his ivory tower and does not feel the pain and problems of his Arab and human environment? About my ties, I am very proud of them. I think every human being must maintain ties with other peoples of the world, for no man is confined or restricted to his country. Accordingly, he must develop friendships to use and employ to the benefit of his country and his people and he must benefit from the knowledge and experience of others in the service of his homeland and his compatriots. Undoubtedly, the term man means the being who does not confine himself to his environment but extends his ties, relationships and emotions to every part of the world. As for the International Organization for Aiding Arab Students, this is the humanitarian idea agreed upon by leading Arab personalities, be they inside or outside the Arab world or in Europe or America, as well as a number of scientific personalities in American and European universities. It is not confined to any specific Arab country. It serves all outstanding Arab students unable to continue their higher education. Its basic goal is to enable them to attain higher degrees to be used in the service of their country, this nation and their brothers and to contribute to their scientific, industrial and intellectual advance without any form of fanaticism or ossification. Since all the members of this organization are from Arab lands, it is their duty to urge the organization to play a basic role in forming the



Arab elite. I am honored to have been elected its president with all the responsibilities that this position entails. However, as I have already said, this whole country is the country of the Arabs and Islam and every Saudi citizen is honored that the Arabian Peninsula's interests and concerns should extend from Yemen to Damascus.

[Question] Since your return to the Kingdom, your relations with King Fahd have been direct and constant. If he asked you, as some people within and outside the kingdom are saying, to take a government job, would you agree to such a request?

[Answer] My relationship with His Majesty, King Fahd, as I have already said, is a natural one and there is nothing new about it. It is a relationship between brothers and I consider myself enlisted in the services of my religion, my country and my king. I also feel that I bear responsibility within as well as outside the framework of official business. However, if I am asked to take on government responsibilities, I will respond if I am convinced that such responsibilities will allow me to perform a desired service to my religion, my king and my people.

[Question] You are a family man as well. How do you envisage raising your two children, Prince 'Abd-al-Hamid and Princess Samahir? How are you preparing them to live in the 21st century and what kind of relationship do you have with them? What kind of future do you want for them? What is the true nature of Prince Turki Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz as a prince and a human being?

[Answer] With regard to 'Abd-al-Rahman and Samahir, I hope I will succeed in instilling in them good values and to impart to them the traditions and qualities on which my father raised me so that they may grow up to be good citizens able to serve their country and their nation. Good upbringing is not so much in providing a comfortable luxurious life as in preparing children to grasp the correct modern concept and to mobilize their capabilities to face difficulties and meet urgent problems head on by making quick, decisive, but not offhand, decisions. The most important aspect of bringing up children is to encourage openness between parents and offspring by convincing them that we are more friends than wardens and pillars of support rather than patrons. This pattern of objective upbringing is suitable for all times. It promotes the children's values and ability to deal with the future comfortably without an inferiority complex. As for the future awaiting them and for which I am preparing them, it takes off from the necessity to prepare them to confront modern growing challenges in the 21st century whereby they will breathe the air of development, keep their distance from selfishness, get used to giving rather than taking, employ patience, and arm themselves with moral strength as a protective shield for them and for every Muslim and Arab subject. Furthermore, I believe they should be prepared to bear the responsibility of such a confrontation armed with the right habits, education and strong upbringing which can safeguard them against digression and deviation. Perhaps a main principle I use in bringing up my children, a responsibility shared by their mother, Princess Hind, is to instill confidence in their heart by being to them a brother with whom they can share their feelings and thoughts so that I may be their counselor, guide and friend and closely monitor their academic progress, because education alone can lift man to the standard he deserves.

The great wealth I can give them is to urge them to gain knowledge and education as weapons in their coming days. Moreover, my relationship with them is of a special kind due to the age gap and because I have to follow a special method of dealing with them which is in keeping with their age and which keeps up with their growth year after year, month after month and ever day after day. One understanding rule for good upbringing is my eagerness to have them abide by the Islamic religion and heavenly teachings and by the harmless and constructive civilizational expansion which must not be strange to us and which includes the following pillars: modern data and robotics and the exploitation of everything civilization has to offer in the various scientific fields. In communicating with them, I must also rely upon sound guidance, the basic principles of upbringing and the pure social customs we all follow. Likewise, I must promote in them their love for people and the desire to solve their problems and help the needy, whatever their needs may be. Man's effectiveness and worth to society is measured by his contribution to his fellow man.

This is with regard to bringing up children. As for Turki 'Abd-al-'Aziz the human being, he hopes to live up to this term with all the duties and sacred trusts that it entails. It enjoins many precepts and traits, which I hope I can live up to, the most important of which are: modesty, simplicity, understanding and a desire to understand the problems of the people and the brothers and to be the sincere interpreter of their demands and grievances. Being the son of 'Abd-al-'Aziz automatically obligates me to give much and to take on more responsibilities. This is not so much a blessing as a hardship and constant effort. Nurturing a great legacy requires great efforts and sacrifices by bearers of the legacy's serious responsibilities.

[Question] What does married life mean to you? How do you and your wife, Princess Hind, live and what role does she play in your life? Is she satisfied with her role as a mother or does she play a significant role in your life?

[Answer] It is a life of understanding, integration and mutual trust and a belief in the spouse's ability to step in and help in life's delicate moments. This is what happiness is, and marriage is a life of sharing. It is a partnership whose capital is happiness, contentedness and absolute understanding between the two partners. This is how my wife, Princess Hind, and I live, immersed in these concepts. When I mention all this, I consider the main requisite is love which binds married people together. Without love there can be no home, no happiness and no family. My life with my life partner is a life with a partner, a lover, a friend and the mother of my children, all at once. About the role my wife plays in my life, it is a constructive and parallel role in family responsibilities. We all fulfill equal responsibilities toward our family through ceaseless consultations fueled by communication and mutual trust. My wife's role is significant and outstanding in my life because she represents a factor of emotional stability whose most important elements are understanding, love, closeness and equitable contribution in bringing up children and preparing them for a bright future which is the primary factor in making them feel that their parents are the sanctuary for their troubles, a depository for their private and intimate affairs and a

source of rational and farsighted advice. This very simply roots out any complexes in children.

[Question2 One last question: What is the international "interaction" organization of which you are a prominent member? How did you accept this responsibility and what role does Kurt Waldheim play in it? Why does it only accept former prime minister and heads of state and why was Prince Turki selected to join it although he is neither a former prime minister nor a former head of state?

[Answer] You must mean the "International Joint Action Council," known as "Interaction." It is a council which includes expertise, contacts and influential personalities from among former prime ministers and heads of state who have an international understanding of world problems. They command international respect for their high-level contacts which enable them to influence the decisionmakers of the world by offering them advice, proposing treatments for difficult matters confronting them and offering judicious opinions for their solutions without opposing the governments, but rather enlightening them with advice and support devoid of any bias toward their own geographic areas because their main concern is defending against world problems. The recent seven-member Bonn summit revealed that six "Interaction" members 7 years ago participated in a similar summit also held in Bonn. The International Joint Action Council focuses its efforts on the adoption of practical steps to augment international understanding and promote measures concerning a number of important issues dealing with peace, security, international trade, world development, armament problems and aid for developing countries. The council proposes formulas and solutions to broached questions. Council officials have come to realize that effective participation by international and Arab personalities tends to enrich dialogue and enhance the organization's power, so they formed three bodies. [First] a 30-member body in charge of leading the organization called "the Supreme Council of Interaction" which is composed of former prime ministers and heads of state, all well-known world politicians who include Takeo Fukuda, Helmut Schmidt, Pierre Eliot Trudeau, James Callaghan, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Salim al-Huss, al-Hadi Nuwayrah and Ahmad 'Uthman. The second body is called the "Politburo" made up of 30 international personalities who are leaders in their own fields. They do not have to be former prime ministers or heads of state. They include Mahmud Riyad, former secretary general of the Arab League, and Sardar Swaran Singh, former Indian foreign minister. The third body is an informational one whose leaders are senior mass media personalities of the world, and is composed of 20 members. Interaction's headquarters are in Vienna, Austria, and it maintains a representational office in New York.

The organization's leaders are aware of the necessity to expand representation, so they added to its membership Manea Manescu, former Romanian prime minister, and Huang Hua, former Chinese foreign minister. The main requisite for selecting any person for membership in this organization lies in two qualities: 1) that he be free of all personal interests and consideration; and 2) that he be free of direct pressures because of his serious and responsible role toward the international community and the human interest and the achievement of world integration between North and South and East and West. As for the council's chairman, he is former UN secretary general Kurt Waldheim, who performs his responsibilities without outstanding skill. Its executive officer is

Martin Lase (Scottish). My affiliation with this organization was in response to a request by Dr Kurt Waldheim, who paid me a visit to convey to me the council's desire that I be an active member. I accepted with the hope of contributing, along with the rest of the leaders and thinkers, to the solution of broached Arab and international problems afflicting countries and peoples.

As for my presence in Interaction's Supreme Council, as the only member who is not a former prime minister or head of state, it is due to my selection as chairman of a body called "International Interaction," emanating from the organization a body which is concerned with Middle East issues and Arab affairs, in addition to its international concerns, out of their appreciation for my skilled activities in this regard. It is a unique and special position from the viewpoint of responsibilities and jurisdiction. I have been commissioned to form the council's board from Arab personalities. I am in the process of selecting qualified and able people to support Interaction's activities and hasten the enforcement of its resolutions. As chairman of this body, I was chosen to be in the Supreme Council which runs Interaction.

In its recent conference held in Paris a few days ago, the organization adopted very serious resolutions to push forward the wheel of prosperity and peace in the world. This meeting had international reverberations, both on the informational and political levels.

12502

CSO: 4404/421

SAUDI ARABIA

SABOTAGE GROUP DISCOVERED, ARRESTED

Group Uncovered

Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic 4 Aug 85 p 3

[Text] UKTUBAR has learned that Saudi authorities recently arrested a large sabotage group equipped with large quantities of weapons. The authorities seized the weapons which apparently had been smuggled with the help of an Arab country who cooperated with Iran. These weapons were to be used during the Hajj season. Sources close to Saudi Arabia said that the discovery of this group and its instigators was one of the reasons that prompted Saudi Arabia to insist on holding the Arab summit conference. King Hassan II of Morocco has announced that the conference will meet on 7 August whether or not all the Arab countries attend.

Source Denies report

GF041359 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1345 GMT 4 Aug 85

[Text] Jeddah, 4 Aug (SPA) — In response to a report published in the 3 August issue of the Cairo weekly magazine *UKTUBAR* that the Saudi authorities have revealed that they have uncovered a group of saboteurs and that they have seized quantities of arms, a security source in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has stated that the report is totally untrue. The security source urged the magazine's editorial board to strive to be accurate when publishing reports about Saudi Arabia so as to avoid distortion.

CSO: 5600/4547

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

FRG ANTI-TERROR FORCE TRAINS SOLDIERS--Specialists of the German border police's anti-terror force GSG9 and MEK are training Saudi soldiers against Khamene'i's suicide commandos. They were hired by Saudi King Fahd. The king also ordered the mass acquisition of German metal detectors to search pilgrims for weapons. Intelligence services have uncovered a Khamene'i plan for revolt, according to which Iranian assassins and agitators, equipped with forged passports and disguised as pilgrims, were to infiltrate the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, as well as the royal cities of Jeddah and Riyadh. A first contingent of weapons from Iran and Libya was already discovered in Jeddah. [Text] [Hamburg BILD in German 1 Aug 85 p 2 DW]

CSO: 5600/4546

SYRIA

BRIEFS

DEVELOPMENT PROJECT LOANS--Damascus--Two loans totalling \$67.1 million have been pledged to Syria. It will receive a \$45 million loan from Japan to finance development projects. The loan will be facilitated through the Japan Import and Export Bank. The announcement followed Thursday night's meeting between Syrian President Hafez Al Assad and Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe. In Luxembourg, the European Economic Community announced yesterday a \$22.1 million loan to Syria to help finance the extension of a conventional power station. The project is co-financed by the EEC's European Investment Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Saudi Development Fund, and the Kuwaiti Fund for Development of the Arab Economy. [Text] [Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 20 Jul 85 p 13]

CSO: 4400/238

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

PRAVDA CITES PDRY LEADER ON SOVIET AID

PM211101 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 June 1985 first edition carries on page 4 a 1,500-word Aden, June dispatch by own correspondent V. Peresada under the heading "In the Arabian South."

Peresada outlines the achievements of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [PDRY] in economic development and agrarian reform and describes its fight against the 1982 flooding and the drought of 1984, citing Muhammad Sulayman Nasir, PDRY minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, who notes the "large amount of aid" rendered by Soviet specialists in building dams.

The dispatch goes on to describe the campaign to wipe out illiteracy in the PDRY, briefly mentions a sea water desalination complex which is being constructed with Soviet assistance, and notes the development of the Yemen Socialist Party:

"Our party is steering its projected course on the basis of an unshakable principle: operating in the interests of the working masses and relying on the masses," Ali Nasir Muhammad, general secretary of the Yemen Socialist Party Central Committee and chairman of the PDRY Supreme People's Council Presidium said "We regard the party's link with the working people as the cornerstone in ensuring economic, social, and cultural development. In strengthening this link the Yemen Socialist Party will continue to direct its efforts toward improving the people's material and spiritual living standard. We assess highly the Soviet Union's international aid, which is helping the PDRY's successful advance along the path of progress."

Finally Peresada outlines the PDRY's foreign policy in which "tasks of safeguarding regional security are inextricably linked with concern for preserving world peace."

CSO: 1825/92



YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

HIGH LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION NOTED IN ELECTIONS

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 10-16 Aug 85 pp 16-17

[Article by 'Abd-al-Malak al-Sindi: "Yemenis Face a New Experience: Secret Ballots Did Away with Difficult Situations, so Yemenis Flocked to the Polls Enthusiastically"]

[Text] Popular support characterizes the first Yemeni elections by secret ballots: women participated in those elections, and citizens came from remote areas to vote.

From Wednesday, 17 July 1985 till Sunday, 21 July 1985 people in the cities and villages of the Yemen Arab Republic had the distinguished experience of going to the polls to vote by secret ballot--that was one of the differences--for their representatives. This is part of the parliamentary formula that has been adopted in this Arab country.

An official source told AL-TADAMUN that over 2.5 million persons who are legally eligible to vote (18 years) had gone to the polls to cast their ballots and elect their representatives to the General People's Congress and local councils for cooperative development.

In a country like the Yemen Arab Republic such a turnout is considered unusual. It reflects an unprecedented massive popular response. To put it more accurately, such a response has been emerging during the past 7 years. This is the period during which Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih has been serving as president.

Citizens took their children along when they went to the polls so the children could see their parents exercise what is a new democratic experience in the history of the Yemeni people. It were as though they wanted to develop a sense of democratic awareness among the young people. That phenomenon was further enhanced by the fact that thousands of expatriates became enthusiastic about voting in the elections, especially since the embassies informed them that anyone who wanted to go home to vote or declare his candidacy could do so. Procedures were simplified for those people so they could participate in that major Yemeni celebration. Two former presidents of Yemen, Field Marshall 'Abdallah al-Sallal and Justice 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Iryani, also took part in the elections.

New developments became evident in Yemen during the course of the elections. For example, many women voted in the elections and several of them were elected. Besides, citizens who live in remote areas and who used to be isolated from the rest of the country because of geographical factors and rough roads turned out to vote in numbers that attracted attention. Such a turnout shows the extent to which people became involved in that significant event. It was also noticed that the elections were conducted for the first time by secret ballot so that citizens would not feel constrained at all when they voted. It is known that in the past elections were conducted in public. People would be asked to raise their hands in a public gathering, and usually elderly religious scholars or regional officials were the ones who were elected. This time, however, the secret ballot ensured that the public would respond to this new experiment. Citizens were able to vote freely for those people in whom they had confidence.

Preparations for these elections had started 4 months ago. More than 4,000 citizens participated in the oversight committees which were administered by the Supreme Elections Committee. That committee is chaired by Lt Col Mijahid Abu Shawarib, deputy prime minister for internal affairs.

It is worth noting that people who have been elected to the General Assembly of local councils for cooperative development will also serve as members of the General People's Congress, which is the broad, popular political organization that represents all the people. The General People's Congress steers political activity within the guidelines set by the National Charter which was ratified by the General People's Congress that was convened in August 1982. Elected officials are supposed to undertake those activities that had been carried out by cooperative organizations. That in itself confirms the fact that the people are participating truly and fully in efforts to steer development and adopt local projects as well as the issue of local administration.

One of the aspects of this new experiment in Yemen is the fact that it links political activity with development efforts. Political activity is directed by the ideas embodied in the National Charter, and development efforts used to be a burden on the state and on some popular institutions, and these are represented by cooperative organizations and municipal councils.

It is worth noting here that the objectives of establishing these local councils include assistance in conducting statistical and field surveys and assistance in preparing economic and social development plans. These local councils would establish different facilities that would benefit the public. They would assist in raising the standard of agricultural and industrial production and fish resources; they would carry out sanitation, forestation and street lighting activities; they would assist in programs to wipe out illiteracy and provide care for mothers and children; and they would propose projects. There are other objectives that would benefit citizens and society besides those. Also, the long term objectives of blending political activity with developmental activity seek to make Yemeni society less vulnerable economically so it can depend on its own resources or on the initiatives of its citizens against economic subordination, which is a form of weakness.

Reference must be made to the fact that the next stage that will follow the elections is that of determining those measures that are associated with the

rules and regulations of the General People's Congress. One of the most important procedural problems is that which has to do with clarifying the relationship between the new members on the one hand--17,000 elected members, 30 percent of whom are appointed--and the 1,000 charter members of the General People's Congress.

More than one observer expects that the new democratic steps that have been taken in north Yemen will have a positive effect on the steps that are being taken to unite with the southern part of Yemen. These steps are still being taken by the joint committees of both sections of the country. Most recently meetings were held in San'a' and in Aden during the past 2 weeks.

8592

CSO: 4404/428

AFGHANISTAN

FARAH PROVINCE PROVIDED WITH HEALTH SERVICE FACILITIES

Kabul ANIS in Dari 24 Jun 85 p 4

[Text] In order to ensure health and well-being in the country, the progressive plans of the party and state in the medical sector are being implemented on a daily basis.

Farah Province is one of the country's provinces far from the capital, yet as a result of the attention of the party and state, hospitals, health centers and mobile health groups equipped with medical equipment have been put at the service of the sick and those taking care of the sick. The dimensions of health services in this province are expanding on a daily basis.

A source at Farah Province Public Health said: In order to provide better health services in Farah Province, the Ibn Sina District Epidemiological Station opened its doors last year on a 24-hour-a-day basis to patients, equipped with branches such as those of tuberculosis, anti-malaria campaign, vaccination, a laboratory, water and food hygiene, hygiene for schools, kindergartens and nurseries and a pharmacy selling representative medicines. The Public Health Clinic was inaugurated with sections for children's internal medicine, surgery, maternity and dentistry. The blood bank, which had been inactive, was re-activated last year and began work. The SDJA introduced social order brigades to the Public Health so that they could learn first aid, and they were given a three-month course in first aid so that they can carry out first aid in emergencies.

The source explained: In order for examination of the people's health to be conducted in isolated points of Farah Province, two Public Health doctors and their personnel along with complex groups go in turn to the districts in order to treat the citizens. For example, during the course of last year, 12,768 sick persons received various public health services in the capital of Farah Province, and 109,280 sick persons were examined and treated in the villages and all the districts of Farah Province.

The source said in conclusion: Last year 5,371 persons contacted the dental clinic, 4,000 children were vaccinated and treated, and also 345 tubercular patients were examined and treated. In the same way, 250 persons with malaria were examined and treated. Furthermore, 555 sick persons contacted the clinics of the family guidance society, and 380 sick persons were hospitalized at the various services of the Farah Province Public Health. Thus in the same period more than 100 sick persons received radiographic services.

AFGHANISTAN

ELECTRICITY SUBSTATIONS INAUGURATED

Kabul ANIS in Dari 23 Jun 85 p 2

[Text] The first stage of the transfer of 220 kilowatt-electricity from the border of the Soviet Union to Kabul was recently completed, and during a ceremony yesterday in the city of Mazar-e Sharif a 110-kilowatt substation on the Mazar-e Sharif line was inaugurated.

Upon completion of the project to carry 220-kilowatt electricity from the border of the Soviet Union to Kabul with a final capacity of 250 megawatts, the shortage of electrical power in the Kabul area, the country's northern region, industrial installations and areas lacking electricity will be eliminated.

Of the aforementioned capacity, 150 megawatts are intended for electrifying the city of Kabul and providing the energy needed by the 'Ainak Lugar copper project, and 100 megawatts will be used for electrification of the country's northern regions. The extension of this project's power line is taking place at the cost of 2.780 billion afghanis out of credits from the friendly Soviet Union, and the government's development budget.

BAKHTAR's correspondent reports from Mazar-e Sharif that those participating in the ceremonies included Raz Mohammad Paktin, minister of electrical energy, Seyyed Nasim Mihanparast Amerzun Shemal, secretary of the Balkh Province party committee, representatives from party and social organizations, and a large number of toilers from Mazar-e Sharif.

In the ceremonies Amerzun Shemal, the minister of electrical energy, the deputy of the economic advisory section of the Soviet Union's embassy, the secretary of the Balkh Province party committee, the deputy general consul of the Soviet Union in Balkh Province and the chief of the 220-kilowatt electrical power line project spoke in turn concerning the importance of this large project which is another shining example of the unparalleled and fraternal cooperation between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

The second stage of this project, which includes extending the power line from the Kholm District to Mes 'Ainak will be completed within the next five years with the construction of the Kholm substation and extension of the power line.

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

CLOTHES FOR NEEDY--During a ceremony items of assistance from the Helmand Province party committee, including clothes, shoes, tea and matting, etc., were distributed recently to qualified persons from the Garmsiran District of the province. During the ceremony, an official from the control and supervision section of the provincial party committee and the chief of the Helmand Province farmers' cooperative unions council explained the progressive aims of the party and state for the people's welfare and prosperity, and asked for the unity and solidarity of the people there in order to realize the lofty ideals of the Sawr revolution. In return, several of the toilers from that district expressed their appreciation for the good and humane attentions of the party and government, and as representatives of the others promised their all-out cooperation in order to realize the high and progressive goals and ideals of the party and government. At the end of the ceremony, necessary medicine was given to a group of sick persons by the health team of the Public Health Bureau. [Text] [Kabul ANIS in Dari 22 June 85 p 3] 9597

CSO: 4665/112

INDIA

## DEFENSE EXPERTS QUESTION U.S. SALES TO PAKISTAN

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 14 Jul 85 p 9

[Text] NEW DELHI, July 13 (PTI)--Defence experts here have questioned Pakistan's acquisition of the shoulder-fired heat-seeking surface-to-air Stinger missiles, an unspecified number of which is being rushed from the United States.

A report from Washington on Thursday said the United States is rushing to Pakistan 100 AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and an unspecified number of the Stingers "in response to repeated violations of Pakistan's air space and territory by communist aircraft approaching from Afghanistan."

The experts question the need for the Stingers on the basis that Pakistan already has 400 Swedish RBS-70 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and six French Crotale SAM systems besides a large variety of anti-aircraft guns ranging from 14.5 mm to 57 mm.

The experts say the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is not clearly demarcated and hence it would be difficult to say what precisely constitutes a violation.

In addition, the air violations are normally never more than a couple of kilometres and the intruding aircraft could be in Pakistan for only a few seconds.

Since the Stinger is shoulder-fired with a range of only seven km, the missile will not be really effective, for the area of the violation cannot be forecast.

The experts doubt whether Pakistan will take the risk of shooting down an intruding plane, and speculate about what happens if a plane fired at falls inside the Afghan territory or if the plane happens to be a Soviet one or Soviet-poloted.

They say the violation of Pakistan air space is not a convincing enough explanation for the Stinger offer. May be, the Stingers and Sidewinders are being offered to Pakistan to make up for the Rajiv Gandhi visit euphoria, they feel.

INDIA

ELECTION COMMISSIONER: ASSAM POLLS AFTER SEPTEMBER

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 16 Jul 85 p 1

[Text] NEW DELHI, July 15--Parliamentary elections in Assam would be held only after September, the Deputy Election Commissioner, Mr V. Ramakrishnan, said here today, reports UNI.

Mr Ramakrishnan said that since the monsoon in the State would last till September and since the electoral rolls were still being revised, it would not be possible to hold elections to the 14 Lok Sabha seats before September.

Before finalizing the election schedule, the State Chief Electoral Officer would be consulted on public and administrative convenience. The Chief Electoral Officer had been asked to expedite the completion of the draft and the final electoral rolls, to which there had been no resistance from any quarter so far, he added.

The draft electoral rolls of 124 out of a total of 126 Assembly constituencies had been published, according to information received here. All efforts were being made to adhere to the middle of August deadline for the publication of the final electoral list, he added.

Asked about the pending by-election from 17 Assembly constituencies where polling was adjourned due to violence during the last elections, Mr Ramakrishnan said no decision had been taken about them as yet.

About Punjab, he said the Election Commission was still awaiting the State Government's reply to its communication on holding elections in the State before the expiry of President's role on October 5. The State Government has been asked to consult the political parties and others concerned about conducting elections. If the reply comes before the second week of August it would be possible for the Election Commission to hold elections there, it is learnt.

CSO: 4600/1799



INDIA

SIGNIFICANCE OF TU DELEGATION PRC VISIT NOTED

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 15 Jul 85 p 1

[Text] THE recent first-ever visit to China in over two decades by a CPI-affiliated frontal organization--an AITUC delegation led by its president, Mr Chaturanand Mishra--has evoked considerable interest among the Left parties in Calcutta many of which consider the development politically significant.

The two-week-long trip by the high-level AITUC delegation on the invitation of the Chinese Communist Party was unique in the sense that these two Communist parties--the CPI and the CPC--since the split in the Communist movement in India in 1964, have not been in touch directly or indirectly.

In fact their relations had been so bitter owing to ideological differences that even visits exchanged between the two fraternal parties were considered a remote possibility in the Left circles. The CPC had called the CPI "a Soviet stooge and a capitalist roader" and the CPI, in turn, criticized the CPC for pursuing "an adventurist line and disrupting unity in the Communist world".

Mr Biswanath Mukherjee, the CPI leader, viewed the visit by the AITUC delegation as an effort by the two estranged Communist parties to come closer. he said in Calcutta on Sunday that despite serious and wide ranging political differences between the CPI and the CPC both the parties seemed eager to repair the ties "as both of us believe in Communist principles".

Mr Mukherjee said that the visit was a welcome development. The CPC had invited the AITUC delegation and "we have favourably responded to it. The development has the potential of turning into something big. But one isn't sure whether this would materialize", Mr Mukherjee observed.

The CPI leader said the present international situation demanded the resumption of visits by delegations of the two parties. He said this factor was bringing the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties closer.

Mr Mukherjee said that the CPI's stand on issues like Kampuchea and Afghanistan varied widely from that of the CPC. Both had a common meeting ground at the World Trade Union Congress. This had in no small measure helped both the parties in renewing their contacts. "But the thing to watch would be whether the CPC would be able to come out of its controversial political line on Kampuchea and Afghanistan", said another prominent CPI leader.

The CPI leaders said that resumption of contacts between the two parties had not been prompted by anyone's advice or pressure. "Although the CPI is loyal to the principle of Communist internationalism it is an independent party and decides its own policies according to its own understanding and requirements".

Both the leaders said it was significant that though the CPC maintained party-to-party ties only with the CPI(M) in India, it was showing interest in improving its ties with the CPI. The Soviet Communist Party, which has party-to-party ties only with the CPI, too has shown interest to develop closer relations with the CPI(M).

CSO: 4600/1796

INDIA

# CONGRESS-I SUPPORTS JAMMU, KASHMIR GOVERNMENT

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 21 Jul 85 p 1

[Text] NEW DELHI, July 20 (PTI)--THE Jammu and Kashmir government today got a fresh lease of life with the Congress deciding to continue its support to Mr. G. M. Shah, but the state government's performance will be closely watched.

The future support will, however, depend on the Shah government's performance, Congress sources said.

Mrs. Rajendra Kumari Bajpai, AICC general secretary, while assuring her party's continued support to Mr. Shah made it clear that there was no question of the Congress joining the state ministry. Neither was there any question of the Congress forming a coalition with the faction of the National Conference headed by Dr. Farooq Abdullah.

## PM's Meeting

Mrs. Bajpai announced the Congress's continued support to the Shah government after the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, met individually the party legislators and functionaries yesterday.

Mrs. Bajpai said that the central leadership after reviewing the situation had directed the state unit to undertake a vigorous drive to strengthen the party at the grass-root level.

Meanwhile, the state legislators and PCC leaders continued the exercise for the second day to evolve a strategy to preserve the Congress's mass support by sustained and assiduous efforts even while extending its support to the Shah government.

The PCC leaders also had a marathon meeting with Mr. Arun Nehru lasting about three hours as a follow-up of their meeting with the Prime Minister yesterday.

The state PCC president, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, also had a meeting with Mrs. Bajpai who is looking after the affairs of the Kashmir Congress.

However, reliable sources told PTI that the consensus after the meetings was to give some time to the Shah ministry to improve its performance and rectify other mistakes affecting the smooth functioning of the one-year-old alliance.

The sources said the Centre was concerned over the failure of the government to check corruption and the activities of the fundamnetalists and pro-Pakistani elements.

According to these sources, the Centre had also not liked to overture of Mr. G. M. Shah towards Begum Abdullah in the wake of the Congress criticism of "non-performance" of the state government.

The sources said that there was also unanimity against imposition of governor's rule in the state for a brief period.

The sources pointed out that a majority of the PCC leaders felt that Mr. Shah's overture towards Begum Abdullah was tantamount to breach of trust that the Congress reposed in him.

Dr. Farooq Abdullah, who is camping here, is keenly watching the outcome of the parleys the PCC leaders are having here with their central leadership.

According to reliable sources, he had sought a appointment with the Prime Minister to place before him his party's stand vis-a-vis the Shah ministry.

CSO: 4600/1810

INDIA

#### GANDHI PLANS FOR UK VISIT IN OCTOBER HINTED

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 21 Jul 85 p 1

[Text] LONDON, July 20 (PTI)--THE Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, is likely to pay an official visit to Britain in the second week of October in response to an invitation from the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher.

The British government is keen on the visit which will be his first to this country as Prime Minister. Mrs. Thatcher and her ministers have more than once expressed the hope that Mr. Gandhi would be able to undertake the visit to which they attach great importance.

The keen desire of the British government for the visit was reaffirmed during the talks between a high-level Indian delegation headed by the foreign secretary, Mr. Romesh Bhandari, and a British foreign office delegation led by Sir Anthony Ackland, permanent under-secretary. The two-day talks concluded yesterday at Chevening, about 75 km from here.

Informed sources said that while no dates had been finalised, Mr. Gandhi was expected to spend about two days here while on his way to the Bahamas to attend the Commonwealth summit which commences on October 16. This would provide an opportunity for Mr. Gandhi and Mrs. Thatcher to exchange views on topics which would come up at the summit and, more importantly, on bilateral matters.

Mr. Bhandari told newsmen that the talks, which were part of periodic consultations between the two countries, covered a whole range of issues, bilateral as well as international. The situation in the south Asian region was discussed at length.

On the activities of Sikh extremists, the foreign secretary said that the discussions were "candid" and that he had conveyed clearly and unequivocally the feeling in India that the attitude of governments in some Western countries towards such activities had been a contributory factor to acts of terrorism.

Mr. Bhandari said that the British government had given an assurance that it would deal with terrorists with seriousness and firmness within the limitations of the law. He hoped that the assurance would be implemented in all sincerity.

Perceptions of India and Britain on the "Star Wars" programme of the United States differed during the talks. While the British took the view that research on the programme was worth while, the Indian side reiterated its opposition to militarisation of space.

CSO: 4600/1810

INDIA

#### SPEECHES AT DINNER FOR BAHAMIAN VISITOR REPORTED

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 21 Jul 85 p 9

[Text] NEW DELHI, July 20 (PTI)--India and Bahamas today shared their concern over the stockpiling of nuclear arms and felt that "the peril of a nuclear catastrophe will affect countries as far apart as ours without difference in magnitude and without reference to whether it is started by one or other nuclear weapon state."

Speaking at a dinner he hosted in honour of the visiting foreign minister of Bahamas, Mr. Clement T. Maynard, the minister of state for external affairs, Mr. Khursheed Alam Khan, said: "Our concerns as developing countries and as members of the non-aligned community are similar."

The two countries have worked together in international forums on the great issues of the day whether disarmament, development or in the social and humanitarian fields, Mr. Khan said.

Mr. Khursheed Alam Khan said that as developing countries both India and Bahamas remain concerned over the problems facing the countries of the South whose debt has now reached the astronomical figures of almost \$900 billion.

Without a comprehensive approach, many countries would soon be on the verge of bankruptcy, he said, adding that the successive calls by the international community for a new international economic order have not met with any response.

Even in the separate forums of trade, food and agriculture and at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Mr. Khan said, "we find developed countries adopt conservative and restrictive positions."

The facts of inter-dependence were recognised only in name while narrow immediate interests affected the actions of the North, he said, adding that only a constructive dialogue could help.

#### CHOGM Meet

UNI adds: Speaking about the coming meeting of the Commonwealth heads of government (CHOGM) in Nassau, Bahamas, in October, Mr. Khan said it will

provide ample opportunities for renewing personal contacts between the leaders of the member countries and hoped positive contribution would be made towards strengthening the Commonwealth.

Also, as the meeting was being held a week before the United Nations commemorative events in New York, it would provide an important occasion for the leaders to reaffirm the value of multilateral contacts and the abiding role and contribution of the UN.

CSO: 4600/1810



INDIA

# GANDHI 13 JUL PRESS CONFERENCE, OTHER ACTIVITIES

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 14 Jul 85 p 1

[Text] INDORE, July 13 (PTI)--THE Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, today made it abundantly clear that there was no question of imposing emergency now and he was in favour of settlement of all issues through negotiations across the table.

The prime minister pointed out that at no stage, either at his press conference in Delhi or in the past had he said that he would impose emergency.

He said he was not for such "harsh" measures.

Mr. Gandhi said: "From the way I have handled problems in the past eight months since I took office, it could be seen that I am for political solution and amicable settlement of all issues sitting across the table."

He emphasised that it was only if the integrity of the country was endangered and something similar to the emergency was required for maintaining our status as an independent republic that he would not hesitate in using that power.

## Punjab Issue

Mr. Gandhi said there was nothing wrong with the declaration of emergency in 1975. However, certain things went wrong substantially after the imposition of emergency. He said such extensive power should only be used in situations of extreme danger to the country and preferably for very short period.

The prime minister also clarified certain issues on Punjab about which a question was asked by a correspondent of 'Eastern Eye' programme of London's Week-end television recently. He said the correspondent had asked him why he did not unilaterally concede all the demands of the Akali Dal.

He had made clear it would not be possible to do so as some of the demands affected other states as well. It was for the Akali Dal to take some more steps to help normalise the situation. One such step was to call off the Akali morcha. It was, however, incorrect to say that it was a pre-condition for resumption of talks as was reported in the press.

TOINS adds: Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, said here today that the entire approach to framing and implementing the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) and the Drought-prone Area Plan (DPAP) would have to be changed if their benefits were to reach the poor people.

#### Drought Relief

He said the relief works undertaken in the drought-hit areas should be made permanent instead of taking them up on a temporary basis.

Talking to newsmen at the Indore airport before emplaning for Ranchi after his two-day tour of the drought-hit areas in western Madhya Pradesh, the prime minister said several programmes covering political, educational and sporting activities had been planned for the Youth Year.

This morning at Mandhu, the prime minister declared open the Rs. 8-lakh rest house built by the Jain Svetamber Tirtha Trust in the famous Jain temple there. Its trustees presented a silver replica of Lord Mahavir to Mr. Gandhi.

Later, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and Mrs. Sonia Gandhi visited the Jama Masjid, Hoshangashah Tomb and Hindola Mahal at Mandhu and were impressed by their architectural beauty.

Yesterday, while touring the tribal villages in Jhabua district, the tribals addressed the prime minister as "motla baba" as they have been doing since independence and adorned Mr. Gandhi with tribal headgear and a jacket.

Jashpur (PTI): The Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, on Saturday said that government would take measures for speedy implementation of tribal welfare schemes and announced a special allowance for officers posted in tribal areas as an incentive.

Addressing a large gathering of tribals here, Mr. Gandhi said during his visit to the tribal areas in the past two days, he had got an impression that the poor sections among tribals were getting the benefits of the welfare programmes enunciated by the government.

But, Mr. Gandhi said he was not sure whether the poorest of the poor were getting the benefits.

Citing examples how the programme would lose its intended effect by not catering to local needs, Mr. Gandhi said there was no point in supplying buffaloes to tribals without ensuring a proper supply of fodder.

Similarly, if cows were given to the tribals, arrangements should also be made for marketing of the milk.

#### Anti-Corruption Steps

Referring to his recent visits abroad, Mr. Gandhi said he was told by the Indians settled abroad how they would love to come back to India to set up high technology units as the country was on a take-off stage towards progress.

Emphasising the need for maintaining unity and integrity, he said without this the country cannot embark on the path towards progress and emerge as a strong nation.

Mr. Gandhi said the government had already taken steps to tackle the menace of corruption and black marketing. The government, he said, proposed to take more steps and make all efforts to eradicate the evil of black marketing.

Mr. Gandhi said India would not waver from the path laid out by Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. It had shown to the world how it could achieve self-sufficiency on various fronts.

Citing the example of food, Mr. Gandhi said that the country was now exporting food when it was importing the commodity soon after independence.

CSO: 4600/1794

INDIA

GANDHI 15 JUL MADRAS PRESS CONFERENCE REPORTED

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 16 Jul 85 p 1

[Text] MADRAS, July 15--INDIA wanted the Sri Lankan Tamils to go back to their country in honour and had "no connection" with the Tamil militants, who demanded an independent "Eelam" on the island, the Prime Minister told a crowded press conference at Raj Bhavan today.

Answering a barrage of questions on the first round of talks at Thimpu between Colombo and the Sri Lankan Tamil organisations as well as India's role in the affair, Mr. Gandhi said India's stand was that the Tamils were entitled to autonomy on the model of the Indian states. The Tamil militants demanding "Eelam" was another matter, but India had nothing to do with it. India's role was to bring the two parties together for talks.

Asked about the Jayewardene government's view that India's policy on the ethnic issue had changed after the advent of Mr. Gandhi, the Prime Minister said India's policy had not changed at all but the "perceptions" of Colombo might have changed. Mr. Gandhi said he could not make an assessment of what happened at Thimpu as he would get first-hand reports of the proceedings only after his return to Delhi.

Answering questions on a wide range of subjects, Mr. Gandhi maintained that the Congress "can stand on its own legs in Tamil Nadu and I said this even when I campaigned here." At the same time, he said his party's "arrangement" with the ruling AIADMK had not changed and would continue.

Asked about the dispute between Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka on the scope of the Telugu Ganga project, Mr. Gandhi said it would be best for the states concerned to sort out the differences themselves. He noted that the apportionment of the Krishna waters among the three states of AP, Karnataka and Maharashtra had already been made. The question now was of administrative decision about how each state should utilise its quota.

The three states and Tamil Nadu, represented by their chief ministers, had approved the Telugu Ganga project. Subsequently, Karnataka had officially protested. Mr. Gandhi said he had advised the AP chief minister, Mr. N. T. Rama Rao, to settle the differences with the Karnataka government. He said he had written to all the chief ministers (after Karnataka had lodged a strong protest) to find an amicable solution.

On the complaint that Hindi was being "imposed through Doordarshan, Mr. Gandhi said Hindi programmes were "tremendously popular" and the TV people felt that those who were "upset" over the Hindi programmes were fewer than those who welcomed them. Mr. Gandhi conceded amidst laughter that many of the news programmes on Doordarshan "are dull".

MADRAS (PTI): The Congress centenary celebrations organised by the Congress in Tamil Nadu got off to a flying start here on Monday with a massive rally witnessed by the party president, Mr. Gandhi.

Mr. Gandhi, who was scheduled to view the procession for only one hour, stayed on for an additional hour to wave back at the enthusiastic party volunteers.

Tight security arrangements were in evidence. All vehicular traffic was banned on the arterial Anna Salai (Mount Road) between 2 p.m. and 8 p.m. A huge security cordon was thrown around the bullet-proof dais near the Spencers Tower from which Mr. Gandhi inspected the rally. Police personnel were found in strength at both the places. The police also used a helicopter for surveillance.

CSO: 4600/1798

## ROK FOREIGN MINISTER HOLDS DELHI PRESS CONFERENCE

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 21 Jul 85 p 9

[Text] NEW DELHI, July 20--THERE is a tremendous scope for raising the level of economic co-operation between India and Seoul, according to the South Korean foreign minister, Mr. Won-Kyung Lee.

Mr. Lee announced that there was every possibility of South Korea buying wheat, among other commodities, from India to give a new thrust in the bilateral relations. He explained at a press conference that the current imbalance in the trade was largely owing to India having purchased several ships from South Korea in the past two years.

Describing his talks with Indian leaders as satisfactory, Mr. Lee said there were promising areas of joint ventures in ship-building, electronics, chemicals, machinery, communications and power.

He was optimistic about diversification of economic collaboration. He pointed out that South Korea was buying a substantial quantity of iron ore and only recently contracted for the import of 200,000 tonnes of coking coal from India to meet the increasing demand for domestic heating.

He admitted, however, that the Korean government had a very limited role in influencing its industry to purchase products from any particular country.

Nevertheless, he continued, the Korean government would encourage its businessmen to give more attention to competitive products from India. He believed complementary elements in the two economies promised a bright prospect for joint ventures.

He pointed out that the existing joint venture in Madras (cutting of fine granite) was exporting high quality material worth \$10 million to West European countries.

Deprecating the policy of protectionism being practised by the developed countries, Mr. Lee said South Korea consistently supported the principle of South-South co-operation and shared efforts with other developing countries to make a contribution to the common prosperity among the developing world.

Mr. Lee, who was a former sports minister, said that his government would welcome all the participants to the Seoul Olympiad and ensure the safety of all athletes, officials and spectators.

#### Joint Ventures

Addressing the seventh meeting of the Indo-Korean joint business council meeting sponsored by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Mr. Lee regretted that there was no indication yet of a dialogue between the South and North despite the worsening international economic situation.

He welcomed India's initiative in holding the ministerial meeting on the global system of trade preferences among developing countries.

Earlier, inaugurating the JBC meeting, the minister of state for commerce, Mr. P. A. Sangma, urged South Korea to take a fresh look at India's manufactured items to diversify its imports from this country.

Welcoming Mr. Lee at the luncheon meeting, the FICCI president, Mr. D. N. Patodia, suggested that India and South Korea should set up joint ventures in the field of electronics, deep-sea fishing, ship-building, and oil-drilling equipment. For the success of such ventures, the two countries should enter into agreements for bilateral investment guarantee, avoidance of double taxation, fisheries and for direct shipping and air links.

Earlier, speaking at the inaugural session of the JBC meeting, Mr. Patodia invited specialised delegations from South Korea to visit India to identify products suitable for its market.

He suggested that South Korea should increase its imports from India, particularly finished products such as small tools, farm and textile machinery, machine tools and engineering goods as also processed foods.

CSO: 4600/1810

INDIA

BRIEFS

REPUBLICAN PARTY CHIEF--NAGPUR, July 13--Mr. R. S. Gavai has been appointed president of the "unified" Republican Party of India. This was announced at a news conference by MR. W. K. Ganar who said the appointment was made in absentia by 12 of the 20 members of the joint council which formed the unified RPI here in January last. Mr. Ganar said the post had fallen vacant as the then appointed president, Mr. Datta Katti, had carved out a new group of his own. PTI adds The meeting of the founding members of the party held here expressed distrust against Mr. D. A. Katti, president of the united RPI. A resolution passed at the meeting said "We do not have any trust in Mr. Katti. In his hands the party organisation is not safe. It is therefore necessary in the interest of the party organisation to allow Mr. Katti to be free from present office of presidentship of the party." The resolution made a mention of the post-general election activities of the party and accused Mr. Katti of incompetence during the civic polls in Nagpur and of joining hands with the Congress. [Text] [Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 14 Jul 85 p 1]

CSO: 4600/1795



IRAN

MUSAVI: FATE OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC TIED TO THAT OF ALL MUSLIMS

Tehran BURS in Persian 13 Jun 85 pp 1-2

[Text] On the twenty-first evening of the month of Ramadan our country's Muslim and always on the scene nation joined together in mosques, religious theaters, and hosseynleyhs, and while commemorating the martyrdom of Amir ol-Momenan 'Ali, raised prayers for final victory, Islam's warriors and the long life of the nation's imam. According to an IRNA report, in a ceremony held on this occasion in Tehran's Mehdiyeh, Eng Musavi, our country's prime minister, stressed: We proclaim that we are ready to continue this war, even if it lasts 20 years, in order to be independent.

In his speech, the prime minister, pointing to the extensive efforts being made to impose peace on our country, said: This matter is clear as to why the United States is trying to get us to compromise because the Islamic republic has struck the most blows against the United States. We expelled nearly 50,000 U.S. advisors, we took the oil wells out of U.S. hands. Then we took Sar-Cheshmeh out of U.S. claws. We took away from them hundreds of companies and factories in which Americans had invested capital, we took away from them the complex spy bases the U.S. had at five points in the country, we broke the CENTO ring at its most sensitive point, and we shattered and destroyed the world's greatest U.S. government.[as published]

They are branded with the spy nest, they are branded with the defeat in Lebanon. They feel the widespread presence of the Islamic revolution at every point of the world. Therefore if they are able to get us to compromise, they will have taken their biggest enemy off the scene. By dragging us into compromise, they will create opportunities for the activities and growth of the lines of the U.S. liberals, the line of the moderats and U.S.-affiliated groups.

It is not without reason that we see announcements and statements against the war published which are in reality letters of invitation to Saddam from liberals here in this country. Eng Musavi added: Certainly these liberals share in the innocent blood shed in these bombings of our country. With their announcements they are in reality inviting Saddam's Russian bombers to come. Concerning the consequences of imposed peace, the prime minister said: If we were drawn into compromise, Iraq would be strengthened by the superpowers and the region's reactionaries. As a result they expect that

the Islamic republic will also be compelled to compromise with the East in order to obtain complex weaponry. Naturally they are pursuing this kind of peace. Addressing those persons in our country talking about peace, Eng Musavi said: The peace that you are pursuing is an imposed peace that threatens the revolution and our independence. We proclaim that in order to be independent we are prepared to continue this war even if it lasts twenty years.

In another portion of his speech, the prime minister pointed to the various plots that the enemies of the Islamic revolution have pursued since the beginning of its victory in order to overthrow the Islamic republican system and strike blows against the Islamic revolution, and said: Today we are facing a new and special type of confrontation. This fresh plot that is being carried out through the agreement of the superpowers and with Saddam's cooperation is to increase the pressure on us so much that they can get us to compromise. To this end, today the propaganda assault and the psychological war against us that has continuously existed since the revolution's beginning has taken on much vaster dimensions from the standpoint of quantity and volume, and cannot be compared with the days at the war's beginning or those of the hypocrites' plot. For example, this very day, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE devoted several pages of news to Iran, and in them explained how Tehran's people were fleeing the city, the food supply situation, or, as they termed it, how the people have become opposed to the war and the system. The UNITED PRESS also has commentaries in the same fashion on this matter. REUTER also and British newspapers are suddenly becoming sensitive to the human rights situation in Iran. British parliamentary representatives at the height of the psychological war against our revolution write letters and feel anxious about the lack of observance of human rights. It is not at all clear when these man-eating wolves became defenders of human rights. It is interesting here that the East each day presents an analysis that this war is benefiting the United States.

The goal of all this propaganda and psychological warfare is to open a breach in the firm will of the nation to continue the war until final victory and to eliminate the conspiracy, and to draw them into compromise. The prime minister emphasized: Today the fate of the Islamic revolution has become tied to that of all the world's Muslims and oppressed. Any sort of alteration and development in this revolution affects the movements of the world's people.

The Islamic revolution in these days has inspired all the world's powers against it and only through informed movement can we resist them.

9597

CSO: 4640/632

IRAN

## RESULTS OF EFFORTS BY FOUNDATION FOR OPPRESSED IN MAZANDARAN

Tehran BURS in Persian 13 Jun 85 p 8

[Text] In order to sever dependency in the area of agricultural by-products and as a result of the efforts of the employees and workers in the production section of the Mazandaran Province Oppressed Foundation, during the agricultural year of March 1984 - March 1985 over 32,621,186 kilograms of agricultural produce such as wheat, cotton, rice, etc. were produced and supplied to the consumer market in farms under the foundation's coverage.

According to the report by the Mazandaran Oppressed Foundation's public relations office, quoting the figures and information of the foundation's production section, the quantity of produce includes 12,852,756 kilograms of wheat, 3,978,376 kilograms of barley, 3,173,175 kilograms of corn, 3,657,668 kilograms of cotton, 635,189 kilograms of paddy rice, 3,380,000 kilograms of feed corn, 1,159,000 kilograms of hay and 10,284 kilograms of potatoes.

According to this report, in order to supply improved seed for agricultural crops, which is one of the most important elements in agriculture, and also to help villagers to increase production and improve the quality of agricultural by-products, in accordance with an agreement with the Ministry of Agriculture, last year 22,000 tons of improved Prophets wheat seed, 2,000 tons of barley seed, 208 tons of hybrid corn, and 1,146,480 kilograms of cotton seed were produced by the Bujari Factories of the Mehdasht Agricultural Organization and the Dasht Naz mechanized farm, under the coverage of the production section of the Mazandaran Province Oppressed Foundation, and were placed at the disposal of the Agricultural Promotion Organization. It should be noted that one third of the corn needed by the country is produced at the Dasht Naz mechanized farm. This report also indicates that during the March 1984 - March 1985 agricultural year 18,063,930 kilograms of orchard produce were harvested, broken down as follows: 7,842,545 kilograms of fruit, including tangerines and Jaffa oranges, and sweet and sour lemons, 10,306,624 kilograms of fruits including apples, yellow plums, and strawberries. This fruit was harvested from orchards under the coverage of the aforementioned section and was distributed to various points in the country at fair prices in order to break false prices.

According to the same report, in order to supply protein to society, last year the stockraising units of the Mazandaran Oppressed Foundation's

production section produced a total of 232,885, kilograms of red meat including mutton, beef and buffalo and placed it at the disposal of consumers at appropriate prices. Additionally, in the dairy by-products area, these units during the period mentioned produced 524,008 kilograms of milk, 748 kilograms of butter, and more than 45 kilograms of cheese. Furthermore the production and sale of 18,574 kilograms of chicken, 3,406,101 kilograms of chicken feed, 149 kilograms of eggs [as published], 1,051,457 kilograms of wool, 49 head of an improved breed of calf, 526 head of sheep and 248 head of cattle were among the activities of Mazandaran Oppressed Foundation's production section.

The public relations office of the Mazandaran Oppressed Foundation, quoting the statistics and information unit of the foundation's production section, indicates that the production of 880,911,880 centiliters of concentrated compote and juice of apple, yellow plum, plum, tomato, pear, peach and apricot was one of the activities of the Gol Cheshmeh fruit juice extracting and canning factory under the section's coverage. Furthermore, as to last year's production in the area of pressed cotton, the Qods Kalaleh cotton ginning factory, which is active in the areas of oil, cotton seed for planting, linter cotton and gin litter, produced a total of 5,513 tons of cotton seed. Compared to the 1983-1984 year, this shows an increase of 20,513 [as published] tons and compared to the 1982-1983 year, an increase of 2,517 tons. Last year's production at the Fajr Gonbad cotton ginning factory, under the coverage of this section, whose activities are similar to those of the Qods Kalaleh factory, was 6,579 tons, an increase of 2,591 tons over the 1983-1984 year and a growth of 6,080 tons over the 1982-1983 year.

The production at the Hydrofil cotton factory in Gorgan, which belongs to the production section of the Mazandaran Oppressed Foundation and which produces hygienic cotton, produced 1,760,307 kilograms, exceeding the level in 1983-1984 by 337,917 kilograms. Furthermore, the production at the Shahid Bahonar industrial factories in Bandar Torkman in the 1984-1985 year breaks down as follows: 483 tons of carded cotton, 963 tons of oil and 3,293 tons of flour. At the same time planning to implement a project to produce 150 pre-fabricated houses per year was one of the activities at the Now Shahr Industrial factory in the 1984-1985 year.

#### Development and Building Section

The report indicates that last year, despite difficulties such as the lack of suitable land and the supply of raw materials, building operations began on 392 residential units throughout Mazandaran Province, broken down as follows: 45 units in Gonban, 27 units in Gorgan, 94 units in Khazarshahr, 60 units in Nowshahr, 46 units in Nur, 12 units in Amol, 38 units in Neka' and 35 units in Ramsar. The building operations on 84 units in the cities of Amol, Gorgan and Gonbad were completed and the units readied for delivery. Progress on the remaining units was at the 70 percent level.

### Propaganda Unit

During the 1984-1985 year the Mazandaran Oppressed Foundation's propaganda unit put on more than 200 speeches and film showings in various parts of the province, particularly in the villages, units and companies under coverage of the Oppressed Foundation, and 500 religious books were donated to the heroes of the Mobilization, rural students, worker brothers and prisoners.

### Cultural Section

Furthermore, the income realized from showing more than 2,000 permitted and licensed films to more than 8,000,000 viewers last year in the 32 cinemas in Gilan and Mazandaran Provinces cultural section of the Oppressed Foundation came to 447,004,790 rials. After subtracting expenses from the total income, all the profit realized from the activities of the cinemas under the agency's coverage in the provinces mentioned was allocated on the basis of the Oppressed Foundation's plan to construct homes for those deprived of housing. In addition, from the time these cinemas were turned over to the agency, a plan to convert coal-fired to electric lamp projectors [as published] was carried out in three cinemas. This action to some degree reduced the consumption of coal and also improved the quality of the shows while preventing the use of foreign-projector [as published] films.

9597

CSO: 4640/632

IRAN

# OFFICIAL DENIES PRESENCE OF TURKISH TROOPS IN ORUMIYEH REGION

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 8 Jul 85 p 19

[Text] Orumiyeh - ETTELA'AT correspondent--At the present time the elements of the counterrevolutionary minigroups in the West Azarbaijan Province is a most grave and acute situation, and the active presence of the Islamic republic in the Kurdish regions and the positive political and cultural contacts in these regions have caused the counterrevolution to completely lose their position there.

In an interview with reporters, Gholamreza Ansari, deputy political governor general of West Azarbaijan, while stating the above, added: Through the precise political, economic and cultural planning that the Islamic republic has carried out, today the counterrevolution has no sure position for itself in this province, and at the same time, through the political and cultural awareness that has been given to the region's citizens, the number of repentant persons is also rising.

In another portion of this interview he spoke concerning preparedness in West Azarbaijan Province to hold presidential elections, the presence of the people on the scene to defend the values and gains of the Islamic revolution, the propaganda of world arrogance's mass media in connection with the issue of northern Iraq in the bombardment of the small city of Ziveh by the Saddamis, and the manner War Week would be celebrated.

## Silence of International Community

In the interview the deputy political governor general of West Azarbaijan Province pointed to the silence of the international community over the bombardment of our Islamic country's residential areas, and stated: Saddam, in an insane continuation of his crimes, bombarded the small city of Ziveh in which a large group of Iraqi Kurdish refugees and emigrants were dwelling.

He added: At the present time, safer areas are being considered in order to secure the welfare of the refugees, and the Red Cross and the "Siluana" Lt Governor have also taken steps to secure the welfare of the citizens by using various resources.

Ansari, pointing to the biased propaganda of one of world arrogance's mass media concerning the rumor of the presence of Turkish forces in the "Marbishu" region, stated: This movement by world arrogance and its affiliates arises from the successes of the Islamic republic which have found a lofty place in the hearts of Muslim Kurdish people.

He said: This position has been created not only among the Iranian Muslim Kurdish people but also among the region's Kurds. World arrogance has also become aware that one government which is not ready to sell out the Kurdish people in political games is the Islamic Republic of Iran.

He added: Following the decisive position taken by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in connection with the people in the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq, deep love and interest developed among the Muslim Kurdish people for the Islamic Republic of Iran. These people found belief, and this is one of the important reasons for the rumors and propaganda by world arrogance concerning this region. The rumor of the presence of Turkish forces near the "Marbishu" Lake in Orumiyeh is baseless and mistaken.

Pointing then to the broad and unprecedented presence of the people of West Azarbaijan in the demonstrations of Jerusalem Day and their support for continuing the war until the conspiracy is eliminated, he stated:

The people's presence on the revolution's scene and their support for the Islamic republic is a divine blessing to which this republic's servants and workers must give the greatest possible value. We must appreciate the value of this uprisen nation through our services.

Pointing in the interview to the preparedness of the responsible organizations to hold presidential elections, he added: We are also awaiting announcement of the elections by the Interior Ministry.

In conclusion the deputy political governor general of West Azarbaijan Province and the chief of the province's war propaganda staff noted that the Muslim people of West Azarbaijan will themselves make the preparations for celebrating Imposed War Week just as they have in the past. In addition, the Revolution Guards and other organs have composed and readied programs, and God willing, this week will be held with great splendor.

9597

CSO: 4640/657

IRAN

# WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX ANNOUNCED FOR 21 MAR-20 APR

Tehran BURS in Persian 10 Jun 85 p 2

[Text] The wholesale price index in Iran for 21 March to 20 April 1985, 421.7, increased by 2.3 percent over the previous month. In comparison with the figure for the same month last year, the index shows an increase of 11.9 percent. These facts were presented in a report published by the Economic Statistics Office of Bank-e Markazi of the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to the same report, the wholesale price index, after eliminating seasonal fluctuations, was 1.4 percent higher than the index for 20 February-20 March 1985. The increase in the wholesale price index for this month was mainly due to the seasonal increase in the price of fresh fruit. At the same time the price of rice, barley, red meat, dried fruit, stock and poultry feed, cigarettes, non-metal construction material items, metal faucets and types of transportation equipment also increased. But the price of wheat and wheat flour, dairy products, fresh vegetables, cotton seed and unginned cotton, thread-based and silk fabric and carpets decreased, which to an extent neutralized the increase in the price of the aforementioned items. According to the same report, among the main groups of indices, the price index for goods produced and consumed in the country during the month, 482.2, shows an increase of 2.7 over the previous month. The index for the aforementioned group, after eliminating seasonal fluctuations, showed a 1.9 percent increase over the previous month. Furthermore, among the principal groups, the foodstuff and live animal group shows a 2.9 percent increase in the aforementioned month, which was mainly due to the seasonal increase in the price of fresh fruit at the rate of 21.7 percent. This group's index, after eliminating seasonal fluctuations, shows an increase of 1.9 percent over the previous month. Furthermore, the price index for foodstuffs and live animals was 18.9 percent higher than the index for the same period last year. According to the same report, the price index for fabric and clothing decreased 0.8 percent, which was due to a decrease of 0.2 percent in the price of various types of thread, a 0.6 percent decrease in the price of thread-based and silk material, a 2.5 percent decrease in carpet prices and a 0.1 percent decrease in clothing prices. After eliminating seasonal fluctuations, the price index for fabric and clothing increased 0.3 percent over the previous month. According to the aforementioned report, the price indices for machinery and transportation equipment, agricultural produce and animal stock, and the construction material group increase 1.4, 3.4, and 1.3 percent respectively.



IRAN

# OVER 7 MILLION TONS OF MERCHANDISE MOVED THROUGH BANDAR 'ABBAS

Tehran BURS in Persian 29 May 85 pp 1-2

[Text] Through the efforts of the employees of the Hormozegan Province General Office of Ports and Shipping, last year 7.6 million tons of merchandise were unloaded from 672 vessels docked at the Shahid Bahonar and Shahid Raja'i ports in Bandar 'Abbas and were transferred to distribution centers.

In an interview with IRNA's correspondent, Malek Reza Malekpur, general director of Hormozegan Province's ports and shipping, pointing out that in parallel with the decrease in goods imported to this port compared to last year, the port's export volume has increased notably, and said: In comparison with last year, the level of export goods has doubled during this period. He also added: Through the efforts made last year in the area of unloading and loading, the period of ship dockage along the wharves has dropped from 220,000 hours in the 1983-1984 year to 160,000 hours during the 1984-1985 year. Waiting hours, which were 345,000 hours in the 1983-1984 year, dropped to 285,000 hours during the 1984-1985 year. Among the factors effective in speeding up unloading and loading, he noted the utilization of the wharves in the Shahid Raja'i harbor, the improvement in the road transportation situation, and correct implementation of management, and said: In light of the fact that 59 percent of the country's imports through harbors and ports of entry are unloaded and loaded in the Shahid Raja'i and Shahid Bahonar ports, the policy of the Ports and Shipping Organization is to sever as quickly as possible to the greatest possible extent the connection of trucks with ships for that group of goods which are not imported in packaged form and whose unloading is possible only in warehouses. This is because the distribution of the cargo of a 30,000-ton ship in 10-ton truck units causes a waste of time, ship delay and increased loading and unloading costs as a result. This action was put into effect on 6 April 1985 and is still continuing.

The director of Hormozegan Province Ports and Shipping also added: In order to speed up unloading and prevent waste arising from that, 12 units of vacuum equipment to unload grain have been purchased and the experimental operation of these units was successfully accomplished. They will be used in loading and unloading in the future. In this way loading and unloading operations will decrease about 40 percent in relation to the past. In addition, this will reduce the losses of a portion of grain cargo which spills within the holds of 20,000-ton ships, in water and on the ground.

IRAN

OVER 1000 TRACTORS DISTRIBUTED TO ZANJAN FARMERS

Tehran BURS in Persian 4 Jun 85 p 1

[Text] In implementing the policy of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran based on the effort to obtain agricultural self-sufficiency and to mechanize agricultural affairs, 1,396 tractors of various kinds and 11 combines were distributed to qualified applicants by the Zanzan Province Agricultural Machines [as published] last year.

Purhashemi, chief of the Zanzan Province Agricultural Machinery Distribution Agency, while stating these facts, added: Furthermore, last year this agency, in addition to distributing 1,107 ploughshares, 121 motorized pumps, 183 harrows, 281 trailers, 160 fodder cutters and trailers and 4,000 pesticide spray units, also carried out free service on 400 tractors. It also put the equivalent of 10,000,000 rials of spare parts at the disposal of farmers free of charge. Expressing hope that as much agricultural equipment will be distributed throughout the province during the current year as was last year, he said: Through the selection of sellers in Zanzan Province, the problem of a shortage of spare parts for agricultural machinery will be eliminated throughout the province in the 1985-1986 year.

9597

CSO: 4640/628

IRAN

PERMITS FOR NEW BUILDINGS--During 21 Nov to 20 Dec 1984 the country's urban areas' municipalities issued 9,579 building permits, showing a 17.6 percent decrease compared to the same period last year. These permits plan for 2 million meters in total building area which is 8.6 percent less than the figure for the same period last year. Of the building permits issued by the country's municipalities, 10.4 percent are for the twenty-borough area of Tehran, 27.2 percent for large cities, and the remaining 62.3 percent were allocated to other urban areas. Tehran comprised 18 percent, large cities comprised 27 percent and other urban regions comprised 54.9 percent of the total building area of the pemmits issued. The average total building area of the above permits was 205.1 square meters, which shows an 11 percent increase over the figure for the same period last year. [Text]  
[Tehran BURS in Persian 2 Jun 85 pp 1-2] 9597

CSO: 4660/628

PAKISTAN

ANTIREGIME STORM SAID GATHERING

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 18 Jul 85 p 18

[Article by Ayaz Amir]

[Text]

THRICE this year, the army has stepped in to restore law and order. First in Karachi following the Orangi riots; recently in Quetta following the Shia agitation; and again in Karachi in the aftermath of the Lyari agitation.

The readiness of the army to quell civil unrest when a military regime is in power contrasts dramatically with its extreme reluctance to get involved when a political government finds itself in a similar quandary. For instance, Mr. Bhutto had to face resistance from his army commanders when he wanted the army to help put down the police strike in 1972. But leaving this aspect of the matter aside, the army's triple intervention this year drives home two important points.

**Junejo's vulnerability**

First of all, it highlights the vulnerability of Prime Minister Junejo's civilian Government to civil and political unrest leading some observers to draw the conclusion that a hidden hand was at work in the recent troubles in order to underscore the indispensability of Martial Law. In this regard, it is pertinent to mention the contention of some Shias that the first lathi-charge (which later developed into an exchange of firing between the crowd and the police) was largely unprovoked.

The second point is that regardless of their immediate cause, the Karachi and Quetta incidents, taken together, point to a serious breakdown of law and order which becomes all the more glaring when seen against the backdrop of eight years of uninterrupted military rule.

Public concern at these incidents can only be intensified by the two bomb blasts which have occurred in rapid succession in Karachi and Lahore. The first was aimed at the offices of Pan Am and the second at the American Center. What is the purpose behind these anti-American bombings? Are they inspired by the events in Beirut where the United States has repeatedly been humbled? Are they related to the manifestations of Shia militancy in Quetta? Do these incidents signify that the quiet that has largely held in the country since 1977 is about to come to an end? To these critical questions there are no clear answers.

**Serious implications**

Pakistan's Afghan policy is another cause for concern because it has serious implications for domestic security. The role of the Afghan refugees in the Quetta and Karachi incidents had dramatised the nature of the problem Pakistan

faces. Steps to clear Quetta of refugees and efforts to clear the Afghan basti of Sohrab Goth near Karachi (to which much of the drug peddling and arms traffic in the city has been traced) are prime examples of being wise after the event, but they are symptomatic of the fact that even official quarters which had reason to close their eyes to the problem before are at last waking up to its magnitude. Even General Zia has admitted that Pakistani public opinion is split down the middle on this question.

Still our Afghan policy remains in a bind principally because the way to a negotiated settlement is barred by our international alliances which restrict our freedom of manoeuvre. Eagerness to make the best of the opportunity presented by the Geneva talks is missing even though time for a negotiated settlement is in fact running out and Pakistan's bargaining position is fast being eroded. This means that when the tide in Afghanistan turns irreversibly in favour of the Karmal regime, as on present evidence it seems it will, Pakistan will be left with nothing except a highly dangerous foreign presence on its soil.

#### Noorani's hints

Our short and tragic history is replete with instances when governments in power ignored danger signals only to be overwhelmed by the danger in the hour of crisis. There was a surface calm in 1968 but the spreading rumours about the corruption of the Field Marshal's sons was a tell-tale sign that matters were coming to a head. Against this background the significance of Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani's hints of corruption and misdeeds in high places should not be underestimated. Similarly, the run-up to the fall of Dacca was completely hidden from public gaze in West Pakistan thus turning the army's surrender in the East into a traumatic experience for most people. It would be tragic if that same experience was repeated in the case of Afghanistan.

But considerations of foreign policy apart, the American connection, buttressed as a result of the Afghan crisis, has important domestic repercussions. So long as American interest in Afghanistan remains alive, the Americans will have a compelling reason to prop up the present Government, thus making the U.S. connection the major impediment to the revival of democracy in Pakistan.

PAKISTAN

LETTER WRITER DEPLORES TREATMENT OF AHMADIS

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 25 Jul 85 p 4

[Text]

HAVOC has been played with the Ahmadi community in Pakistan during the last one year. I give the following instances of repression to which the Ahmadis are being subjected :

- (1) Seven leading members of the Ahmadi community were murdered, five in Sukkur Division alone, among them, Dr. Akil bin Abdul Kadir, a renowned eye specialist and surgeon of Hyderabad.
- (2) Twenty Ahmadis were seriously injured when attempts were made on their lives.
- (3) Another 150 Ahmadis were arrested for wearing Kalima Tayyaba badges in Sind alone; 50 are still under detention serving sentences under deplorable conditions.
- (4) Six Kalima-wearing detenus have been in prison for the last seven months.
- (5) The Kalima Tayyaba has been erased from 30 Ahmadi places of worship by police and non-Muslim undertrials.
- (6) Four hundred Ahmadis have been arrested in the Punjab for wearing Kalima Tayyaba badges.
- (7) Fifty Ahmadis have been arrested in Karachi for the same reason.
- (8) Police has committed grave excesses by harassing and beating Ahmadis in connivance with the civil administration.
- (9) The only press at Rabwah has been sealed and the publication of one daily and five monthlies has been banned.
- (10) All publications including that of the Holy Quran has been disallowed. During the last year, more than 20 books of the community have been banned.
- (11) Use of loudspeakers even for Friday prayers has been prohibited.
- (12) Ahmadi students are refused admission to secondary as well as higher educational institutions.
- (13) Ahmadis are discriminated against when seeking employment.
- (14) Local administrations have disallowed all religious meetings, and functions, even Seerat-un-Nabi meetings.

- (15) Government media-Radio, Television and the Press - are continuously waging a propaganda war against this community.
- (16) The use of the word 'masjid' and 'azan' or the call for prayers is prohibited and violation of this prohibition carries a three-year sentence.
- (17) Publication of Shariat Court proceedings has been prohibited.
- (18) Baseless and malicious propaganda is being carried out against the founder of the Ahmadi Movement and its respected elders.
- (19) Ahmadis are being labelled traitors.
- (20) Official publications and white papers have been issued condemning the community and degrading them as third-class citizens, working against the integrity of Pakistan. These official publications have been sent to all Pakistani Embassies abroad.
- (21) Law-abiding and peaceful Ahmadis are being branded as disruptionists and anti-social elements.

These are some of the atrocities committed against this community. What should we term those who are clamouring in this country for an Islamic order based on tolerance, justice and fair-play? -  
NAVEEDUL HAQUE, 13, Bangalore Town, Karachi.

PAKISTAN

JI LABOR WING SAID IN DISARRAY

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 25 Jul 85 pp 14, 15

[Text]

THE LABOUR wing of the (defunct) Jamaat-i-Islami seems to have almost collapsed following the exit of 25 active trade unions from the Jamaat-sponsored National Labour Federation. Ten of the dissident unions are collective bargaining agents in different establishments like WASA, the Pattoki Sugar Mills, the Punjab Industrial Development Bank, the Lahore Municipal Corporation, the Punjab Road Transport Board and some local industries. Three of the unions belong to the Punjab Road Transport Board, including the Parwaz Union, two to the Lahore Development Authority another to the Punjab Irrigation Department and yet another to the Pakistan Railways. Thirteen of the unions represent different local industries, including three carpet-manufacturing units.

Charges

Announcing the decision at a Press conference last week, Mr. Abdul Ghafoor Wattoo, Mr. Rashid Abbasi and Mr. Rafiq Mirza, leaders of the Jamaat-led Federation, said that the reason for their exit was that the National Labour Federation had failed to serve the workers and had allowed itself to be used as a forum to promote the political interests of the Jamaat-i-Islami. Mr. Wattoo, who was himself the President of the NLF, Lahore Zone, told newsmen that the Federation had little respect for its constitution and most of its decisions were arbitrary. They announced the setting up another organisation, the Qauid-i-Azam Labour Federation.

Meanwhile, it is understood that the dissident leaders had an altercation with the Jamaat over the "promotion of certain newcomers in the labour field," particularly Hafiz Salman Butt who was made Secretary-General of the Pakistan Railway Employees (PREM) Union following the resignation of Mr. Arshad Chaudhry. Not only this, he was also given a ticket by the Jamaat for the National Assembly elections. Likewise, Mr. Liaqat Baluch was also preferred to many NLF leaders. It is further learnt that the leaders of the dissident group were not happy over 'discrimination' in all matters despite their 'devotion' and 'selfless services' even at the cost of their families.

The other side

However, Hafiz Salman Butt maintains that there was no altercation of the type claimed by the dissidents. He told Viewpoint that Mr. Wattoo and Mr. Abbasi, who were the President and General Secretary of the NLF's Lahore Zone, were expelled by the organisation President, Mr. Shafi Malik, on complaints from many city unions. According to him, those who had left were not organisations affiliated to the NLF but a few individuals who had indulged in 'anti-worker' activities. "THEIR exit will have no effect on the NLF", he said.

Hafiz Salman Butt, who is also an MNA, said that the PREM Union President had resigned only from the Jamaat and not from the union. He told this correspondent that Mr. Abbas ba Wazir, had resigned because of differences with the leaders of the

Karachi Jamaat. Asked whether Mr. Ba Wazir would be expected to discharge his duties in accordance with the Jamaat policies when he was no longer under its discipline, Mr. Butt said that Mr. Ba Wazir was under the discipline of the central leadership of the Jamaat. He said that he had already met Qazi Husain Ahmad and Maulana Jan Abbasi at Karachi on July 2 and was expected to call on Mian Tufail Mohammad at Lahore on the latter's return from abroad.

CSO: 4600/603



PAKISTAN

TEHRIK SAID 'DISGUSTED WITH PPP'

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 16 Aug 85 pp 1, 16

[Text]

The deep differences between two component parties of the MRD, namely, the defunct People's Party and the Tehrik-i-Istiqal came into sharp focus on Wednesday when MRD held a public meeting.

Infuriated by the attitude of the workers and sympathisers of the PPP, the Vice-President of the Tehrik-i-Istiqal, Malik Hamid Sarfraz, declared that if the People's Party continued with its present behavior, the Tehrik considered that this would be the last time that it participated in a public meeting with the People's Party.

Ever since the formation of the MRD, Wednesday's public meeting was the first one held outside Mochi Gate. It did not take long to bring to light in the internal bickerings between the various parties. Workers of different political parties had come to the venue of the meeting in processions. The workers of the PPP had come with pictures of Mr. Bhutto and they carried badges on their chests which had pictures of Shah-nawaz Bhutto. Another procession of the PPP shouted slogans supporting a revolution in the country. This continued till Malik Hamid Sarfraz and later Malik Muhammad Qasim rose to speak.

The Vice President of Tehrik could not stand the slogans of the PPP nor any slogans eulogising Mr. Bhutto. He declared that if the attitude of the workers of the PPP continued, it would be the last time that the Tehrik participated in a public meeting with them.

Malik Muhammad Qasim was also upset over this spectacle although he appealed for unity.

Syed Walayat Hussain Gardezi of the Pakistan National Party, also took serious notice of it but he confined himself to making a statement that till they achieved the goal they had to be together. The other speakers were also conscious of the deep-seated differences between the components of the MRD and they kept on appealing for unity in this difficult time.

PAKISTAN

JI LEADER SAYS HE FAVORS COALITION GOVERNMENT

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 11 Aug 85 p 4

[Text]

FAISALABAD, Aug. 10: Prof. Abdul Ghafoor Ahmad, Naib Amir of the banned Jamaat-i-Islami, has supported the idea of forming a coalition Government in the country in order to pull out Pakistan from the grave crises be-setting the country.

Talking to this Correspondent here on Thursday, the Professor said that a national Government could emerge after meaningful dialogues with political leaders.

Asked to comment on the fate of National and Provincial Assemblies if a national Government is formed, the J.I. leader expressed the opinion that these institutions would be allowed to function upto mid-term general elections.

Prof Abdul Ghafoor also addressed a news conference at which he demanded the lifting of Martial Law, restoration of the unanimously endorsed 1973 Constitution, withdrawal of all amendments incorporated in the Constitution and revival of all political parties. He said that Jamaat-i-Islami would continue to wage a peaceful struggle till the accomplishment of these four basic objectives.

The Jamaat leader bitterly opposed the confrontation

policy adopted by the MRD and said that this alliance committed a political blunder to boycott the general polls. He stated that as the J.I. is of the opinion that only through peaceful methods we would be able to achieve positive results, his party took part in the elections.

Prof. Abdul Ghafoor maintained that Jamaat-i-Islami nominated their candidates to contest the polls but all the other parties including those embodying MRD restrained, but indirectly supported certain candidates whom they had ousted from their parties.

The Jamaat leader said that there was no justification in banning the activities of the political parties. He stated that though his party had serious differences with MRD, yet the J.I. is prepared to extend full co-operation to it in its struggle to lift Martial Law. He said that it would be in the fitness of things for General Zia-ul-Haq to lift Martial Law on August 14.

Prof. Abdul Ghafoor criticised the Government for not being able to solve irrigation problems and power shortage, pointing out that the economy of the country had been shattered in consequence of the inability of the authorities to solve these issues.

PAKISTAN

ASGHAR KHAN TALKS ABOUT RELATIONS WITH INDIAN CONFEDERATION

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 17 Aug 85 p 8

[Text]

SIALKOT, Aug. 16: Severely condemning the slogan of confederation sponsored by some disappointed, disgruntled and sick political leaders sitting abroad, Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan, Chief of the defunct Tehrik-i-Istiqal, said that he and his party was totally against the idea and considered it detrimental to the solidarity of Pakistan.

Addressing a Press conference at Awan-i-Sahafat he said it was quite baseless that there was any danger of attack on India by Pakistan. Such propaganda by the Indian leaders was being made by vested political interests. Mr. Asghar Khan further said that no real normal and friendly relations could be established between Pakistan and India without the solution of the Kashmir issue. Efforts, however, he said should be made to normalise relations between the two countries.

Talking about relations of Pakistan with the two Super-Powers Asghar Khan said that the solidarity of the country could be ensured only by keeping both the Super-Powers away from our sacred land. Equally cordial relations should be established with both, he urged. He said that his party believed in maximum powers

to provinces, but was of the view that four important portfolios including defence, foreign affairs, currency and external communications and trade should remain with the Centre. He opined that the sovereignty of the provinces would inspire confidence and self-reliance among the people of all the four provinces on equal footing.

He said the burden of loans and foreign aid to Pakistan was crushing the country and the burden was increasing day by day. "We shall have to evolve a new system of seeking help and assistance from foreign sources," he said.

Bitterly criticising the economic system of the country he said that public money was being spent relentlessly on the non-productive sector. In this connection, he said that Rs. 80 billion were being spent on the non-productive programme against Rs. 40 billion being spent on the productive sector. He added that at the time of united Pakistan Rs. 40 crore were earmarked on the administrative expenditures. Whereas at present Rs. 8 billion are being annually spent on half of Pakistan. He also expressed his concern over the decrease of earnings of overseas Pakistanis from three billion dollars to 2.3 billion dollars.

Replying to a question about evolving corruption-free society in Pakistan, the T.I. chief said that it was possible only after the abolition of landlordism. The jagirdars for their own interest bribed different Government functionaries including police and spoiled the game. To another question, he said that he was deadly against making the atomic bomb by anybody. But the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was most welcome. He appreciated the idea of having good relations with the neighbouring countries. He expressed deep concern over the miserable condition of the Indian Muslims, who were being subjected to terrorism. He said that the only way to face the country from different complications was immediate lifting of Martial Law.

PAKISTAN

## FORMATION OF ANOTHER BODY ON LITERACY QUESTIONED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 25 Jul 85 pp 7, 8

[Text] **AFTER A WASTE** of four years and many crores of rupees, the Literacy and Mass Education Commission has apparently decided to yield up the ghost to its makers—so that it can be replaced by a National Literacy Council.

Over four years, the Commission promised a great deal, but it showed no worthwhile results. It has had at least four Chairmen — one unwilling, the other unable and the third disallowed to work —, each leaving a mark of incompetence and notable lack of achievement even by the country's poor bureaucratic standards. The fourth or fifth Chairman now in office seems to have concluded, after one week's deep study of Sri Lanka and its educational system, that adult literacy is very difficult without primary education. Having made this startling discovery, he will now probably concentrate on the less difficult primary task.

### Why the flop?

A serious attempt should be made to find out why the Literacy Commission flopped so badly, despite the fanfare with which it was announced and the blessings it received on account of the simultaneous inauguration of the Hijra century. Perhaps, the scheme did not work because the people entrusted were not interested, and treated their postings to the Commission as some sort of relegation. They apparently were not concerned with the fact that Pakistan's level of literacy is no more than 25 per cent (merely ten per cent according to the Planning Minister), and that it is falling steady-

ly. One reason for its failure was that the Commission depended, rightly, on the students and teachers to help it, and the then Education Minister did everything he possibly could to alienate and annoy these sections of our people. The time-worn slogan of each-one-teach-one inspired nobody, because there was no sense of participation and the authorities were unable to provide any motivation for those whose voluntary help they sought. Reportedly, assessment reports of four years' work have been sought from universities and boards of education; unless they are fabricated, most of these should be nil reports. Anything else would be as false as the certificates that the students carry before they were allowed to take their degrees certifying that each has taught one illiterate person to read and write.

### The pyramid

The Commission's sorry chapter should be treated as closed, and honest efforts made to ensure that the Council set up under the Chairmanship of the new Education Minister does not meet the same fate. Here, the pyramid of educational councils sought to be constructed from the top will go down to the provincial level, then down to the districts, and the district councils will supervise the educational programmes through the local union councils. As a start, nine districts have been selected from all four provinces for what one may call a saturation plan for education. It is proposed that in the beginning 80,000 centres will be opened for

the spread of literacy, and every village will have at least a primary school or a mosque school. The goal set is one hundred per cent literacy, but the short-term plan is to eliminate illiteracy from certain selected areas first. For example, the Minister has promised that by 1987 there will not be a single illiterate person in the Federal Area. He hopes to achieve this under the goad of placing a ban on arms or driving licences or passports being issued to illiterates. This, of course, will not be incentive enough, and in any case it will leave out the vast majority of women usually not interested in driving or arms licences and few of them are able to travel abroad.

Apart from the usual weaknesses and vagueness of the scheme, no details have been given of how the actual work of spreading literacy will be carried out. In most countries, where illiteracy has been wiped out with speed the Government has received unstinted cooperation from the people, particularly students and teachers. The Federal and Provincial councils should, before they step out and start spending public money, consult with recognised bodies of teachers and students and seek their cooperation in what is a vast and essential national task.

There are no reasons why adult education programmes should not work in Pakistan, if those with the requisite funds and resources are genuinely interested in promoting education and literacy, and if they can be persuaded to adopt a rational approach.

CSO: 4600/603

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PAKISTAN

POLITICAL STRUCTURE: GOVERNMENT'S MOTIVES, JUNEJO'S STATEMENTS

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 1 Aug 85 pp 7, 8

[Text]

**JUNEJO SAITH:** The lifting of Martial Law is linked with the revival of political parties; and also that the revival of political parties is linked with the end of Martial Law.

Linkage between the proposed burial of one and the intended resurrection of the other is known and accepted; both theorems are valid. But what next? How is the circle to be broken? The procedure to ensure the final demise of Martial Law and re-establish an elected successor authority is apparently not simply a matter of declaring that the Proclamation of July 5, 1977, has been withdrawn. As new factors are added to the conditions precedent for the transition, the situation becomes more complicated. Since the Parliament was installed and the Prime Minister declared succinctly that democracy and Martial Law could not coexist for long, a great deal has been said on this theme by various State dignitaries. The patterns of their thought are not always congruent, and even one big person is seen to contradict himself from time to time. Nit-picking would be both amusing and easy, but the pastime would serve no purpose. What the people want are the answers to the bigger questions, not finger-pointing at verbal somersaults.

**How long is long?**

First, having been reminded again and again that Martial Law will not remain for long, they want to know how long is long — when it refers to the return of democratic functioning. This no-one knows or at least no-one who knows is

prepared to tell. It appears that the two sides are not too unhappy with the present diarchy. Under the careful arrangement real power vests in the same hands as held it before the elections, and induction of the expanding Ministries. Some of the elect have been given a share in the administration, and often they are invited to perform many of the ceremonial functions that are part of governance. This system could probably have worked smoothly for quite some time, but certain busybodies among the MNAs belying their non-political character could not resist the temptation of raising Points of Privilege, and almost through trial and error they succeeded in coming to matters of great import. If the Speaker had ruled out the main Point of Privilege, the political waters would have remained unrippled at least during the summer.

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**BY LINESMAN**

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However, Fakhr Imam thought fit to admit for discussion the piquant Point which made out that continuation of Martial Law was a breach of the Privilege of the House and its Members.

So far most Members had been happily engaged in acquiring other (non-political) privileges. The question, however, could not be ignored. The Privileges Committee selected to deal with the matter could not easily bypass the major issue, and a full-dress debate would have invited focus on a host of constitutional and political disputes. A Select Committee of the National Assembly

was, therefore, appointed with fairly elastic terms of reference to recommend to the House a structure that would be supplementary to the framework of the constitution promulgated by the RCO. Not to be left out, the Senate also appointed a Committee for the same purpose. The two Committees have sensibly held a joint session so that they can accomplish more smoothly the task they have been allotted. The main problem which the two bodies have taken up rather tangentially relates to the question of a future political set-up—whether, and if so how many, political parties should be permitted to rise from their ashes and if new ones are allowed to emerge should their birth be registered? Further, and this too is under consideration, how much political activity should be allowed once the existence of parties is permitted? Will the new brand of political parties perform their duties in the House only or will they also function in the open air and suffer direct contact with the people? If the variety of restrictions that have been mooted are given the force of law, how will Government deal with the other parties which will begin to demand their right to political life? If this is denied, how will this denial be enforced? Will the people gain severely limited civic freedoms? And how will this system be protected if the people decide that it is not acceptable when the umbrella of Martial Law has been folded and put away?

### Heavy burdens

Life would have been much easier for our new elected claimants to power if such awkward questions had not been raised. However, since they carry numerous heavy burdens, people will keep on asking how they are going to cope with them. When, for example, will Parliament begin to give attention to the other items on its agenda? When will it debate the constitutional amendments that were promulgated earlier this year? Is it the Junejo Government's intention to obtain approval for all of them or will some be chosen for repeal? Does Government intend to retain the Press laws in their present form, including the Press and Publications Ordinance? How will the guarantees given now and then by Ministers about policy changes be

put through with the administrative machinery manned by diehard bureaucrats? Is it Government's intent to restore greater powers to the judiciary, so that when the military courts are abolished the judicial system can exercise its privilege of interpreting the Constitution and the law and using its authority to ensure their faithful implementation? How will corruption be rooted out and the administration made accountable? When will Junejo undertake his promised dialogue with politicians outside the legislatures? And above all else, when will he move forward to the promised 'real' and 'genuine' democracy? It is clearly not enough for Mohammad Khan Junejo to nod his head and say that all these matters will be decided by the Parliament. As the Prime Minister, elected unanimously by the House after his nomination by the CMLA-President, he has the right and duty to give a lead to the Parliament and also to take the people into confidence regarding his future plans.

It may be true that those also serve who wait and see, but the time always comes when the people stop waiting and want to see concrete results within their own lifetime.

PAKISTAN

AUSTRALIA URGED NOT TO EXTRADITE ACCUSED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 25 Jul 85 p 15

[Text] The Political Prisoners Release and Relief Committee has expressed deep concern over the reported decision by the Austrian Government to extradite nine Pakistani nationals, described as Al-Zulfikar men, to Pakistan. The Committee appealed to the Austrian Government to review its decision until fundamental rights and normal laws are restored in Pakistan.

In a statement issued by the PPRRC Secretary General Liaquat Warlach, on July 18, the Committee noted with surprise a news item saying that the Austrian Government had acceded to the request by the Pakistan Government for the extradition of nine persons arrested in Austria for their alleged involvement in a conspiracy against the Government of Pakistan. The PPRRC pointed out that Pakistan "is being ruled by a Martial Law Government and a consistent political movement is going on in the country for the restoration of a democratic order."

Political opponents branded as anti-State elements had been imprisoned and tried by military courts under extraordinary laws and procedures without giving them an opportunity to defend themselves properly. "Political workers have been awarded lashes, long-term prison and death sentences, which have been carried out in many cases despite strong protests from the people of Pakistan."

The PPRRC also appealed to Amnesty International and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to use their good offices in persuading the Austrian Government not to hand over the nine accused to the Pakistan Government.



PAKISTAN

PIR KOH GAS FIELD PROJECT TO GET LOAN

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 5 Aug 85 p 12

[Article by Sheikh Ikram Ul Haq]

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Aug. 4: The Asian Development Bank will assist Pir Koh Gas Project Phase-2 which will cost \$87 million.

Phase-2 project envisages development of 9 to 11 wells which will supply 80 million CFT of gas daily. The leader of the eight-member ADB appraisal mission, Mr. Rolf B. Westling told the Pakistan Times that a fact-finding mission studied the project early this year. The appraisal mission currently visiting Pakistan will have detailed study of the technical, financial economic and institutional viability of the project. Its report will be considered by the board of directors early December. The project will cost 87 million dollars of which the foreign exchange component is \$ 50 million, most of which is expected to come from the Bank.

Mr. Westling said the work on the project will start early next year and will be completed by the middle of 1988. By that time, the Pir Koh Project will supply 180 CFT of gas daily. Under phase-1 of the project, also aided by the ADB, 100 million CFT of gas is being supplied daily.

Mr. Westling said that reservoir study of Pir Koh gas field by the foreign firm put the proven gas reservoir at 3.7

billion CFT while the additional studies put it around 11.2 billion CFT. Though no recovery factor has been applied, so far, he said, the figures give indication of the big future potential.

During three-week stay in Pakistan, the mission besides visiting Pir Koh site would review the on-going projects, that is, Phase-1 project, gas purification and compression project, and the Indus Right Bank pipeline project and compression project for which the ADB has lent 55, 19.3 and 16.3 million dollars respectively. In the gas sector so far, the ADB has lent \$144 million while in the pipeline sector the loan for 1984-88 totals \$ 131 million. Mr. Westling said that the ADB has loaned 888 million dollars in various projects of which power sector accounts for 748 million dollars, that is 84 per cent of the total loan.

PAKISTAN

STEEL MILLS TO ATTAIN FULL PRODUCTION SOON

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 17 Aug 85 p 11

[Text]

KARACHI, Aug. 16: Contrary to the detailed project report prepared by the Soviet consultants, Pakistan Steel will attain hundred per cent production capacity by December this year.

Mr. H.N. Akhtar, Chairman, Pakistan Steel, told newsmen here today that Pakistan Steel became fully operational in December last year when all units were run successfully to produce various steel products.

The Soviet consultants had estimated that it will take four to five years to attain hundred per cent production capacity after Pakistan Steel attains full operations but their estimate would prove wrong as all is set to hit the hundred per cent production target.

He said that Pakistan Steel will break even when it attains 83 per cent production capacity which will be achieved very soon.

It is very encouraging to note that some of the units like blast furnace one and two have been successfully tested at 107 and 108 per cent and bloom caster at 120 per cent of their designed capacity, he said.

Mr. H.N. Akhtar expressed optimism that Pakistan Steel is surely coming out of the blue and will be in a position to meet the entire demand of its products at competitive prices. Even at the moment its products cost 30 per cent less than the landed cost at an average, he said.

duction target by December this year, he said.

Mr. Akhtar paid glowing tributes to the engineers, technicians and workers who are working tirelessly to achieve the target which is well in sight.

He said that it was a challenge for all those working at Pakistan Steel which was happily accepted to prove that Pakistani skill and workmanship was second to none in the world.

Mr. Akhtar said that Pakistan Steel has already achieved a production capacity of 60 per cent within a short span of six to seven months which itself speaks highly of the efficiency of the staff.

He said that Pakistan Steel cannot afford to keep running at a loss. It is, therefore, necessary that all the targets are met ahead of schedule.

Mr. Akhtar said that the capital cost of Pakistan Steel has gone high and to make it economic the "hidden capacity" of the units will have to be utilised to meet the demand of steel products as and when it arises.

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